外商直接投资和技术溢出泰国制造业的一个跨行业分析外文翻译Word格式文档下载.docx
《外商直接投资和技术溢出泰国制造业的一个跨行业分析外文翻译Word格式文档下载.docx》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《外商直接投资和技术溢出泰国制造业的一个跨行业分析外文翻译Word格式文档下载.docx(6页珍藏版)》请在冰豆网上搜索。
![外商直接投资和技术溢出泰国制造业的一个跨行业分析外文翻译Word格式文档下载.docx](https://file1.bdocx.com/fileroot1/2022-12/16/d5fe1a39-b212-49ae-bf71-8f2f5b6f6a6b/d5fe1a39-b212-49ae-bf71-8f2f5b6f6a6b1.gif)
一、外文原文
ForeigndirectinvestmentandTechnologySpillover:
ACross-industryAnalysisofThaiManufacturing
Importanceoftheissue
Foreigndirectinvestment(FDI)hasbeenwidelyrecognizedasagrowth-enhancingfactorininvestmentreceiving(host)countries.FDInotonlybringsincapitalbutalsointroducesadvancedtechnologythatcanenhancethetechnologicalcapabilityofthehostcountryfirms,therebygeneratinglong-termandsustainableeconomicgrowth.Moreimportantly,thetechnologicalbenefitisnotlimitedtolocallyaffiliatedfirmsbutcanalsospreadtonon-affiliatedones.Thelatterbenefitisusuallyreferredtoastechnologyspillover.
TheexpectationofgainingfromtechnologyspilloverpersuadesmanydevelopingcountriestooffervariousincentivesinordertoattractFDI.Howevertheresultsofempiricalresearchtotestthevalidityoftechnologyspilloverarefarfromconclusive.PositivetechnologyspilloverfromFDIhasonlybeenfoundinsomecountries.1Overall,thefindingsseemtosuggesttechnologyspilloverisnotautomatic,butdependsonbothcountryspecificfactorsandpolicyenvironment.
ForeignPresenceinThaiManufacturing
Thirdly,foreignplantsarelikelytobelocatedinahighlyprotectedindustry.TheaverageERP2ofindustrieswhoseoutputsharesofforeignplantsaregreaterthan50%is15.3%.Theexceptionintheseindustrieswouldbeelectricalmachinerywhichispresumablydominatedbylabor-intensiveassembledelectronicsandelectricalappliances.Ontheotherhand,regardingtheindustrieswheretheshareofforeignplantsislessthan50%,averageERPtendstobelowerataround10.8%.Inaddition,theoutputshareofforeignplantsislikelytobeassociatedwiththedegreeofmarketconcentration.
Involvementofforeignplantsinthemanufacturingsectorwaspredominatelyinimportsubstitutingindustriessuchastextiles,automobiles,andchemicalsuptoaboutthelate1970s(Akira,1989).Fromthenon,itwasdirectedtomoreexport-orientedactivities.Tobeginwith,export-orientedforeignfirmsenteredlightmanufacturingindustriessuchasclothing,footwear,andtoys.Morerecently,labor-intensiveassemblyactivitiesinelectronicsandelectricalgoodsindustrieshavebeenthemainattractionforforeigninvestors(Kohpaiboon,2005).
Suchinvolvementhascloselymirroredtheshiftinthetradepolicyregime.Thailandbeganitsfirstnationaleconomicdevelopmentplanin1961withanimportsubstitution(IS)regimetopromoteindustrialization.Tariffswerethemajorinstrumentusedtoinfluencethecountry’sdevelopmentpath.Theroleoftariffstopromotethedomesticindustryeffectivelybeganin1974withtheimpositionofanescalatingtariffstructure,wherethetariffrateascendedfromrawmaterialstofinishedproducts.Thesechangesincreasinglyfavoredtheproductionoffinishedproducts,particularlyconsumerproducts.In1975,therangeoftheeffectiverateofprotection(ERP)intheThaimanufacturingsectorwasbetween–36to350%(Akrasanee&
Ajanant,1986).In1982,thevariationwidenedfrom–25.2to1,693.4%(Chunanantathumetal.1984).Severalindustries,suchastextiles,tyres,furniture,automobiles,andleatherproducts,hadanextremelyhighERP.TherewasalsoahighdegreeofvariationinERPacrossindustries.Thistariffstructureremainedvirtuallyunchangeduntilthelate1980s,eventhoughin1974thegovernmentannouncedachangeindevelopmentstrategytoanexportpromotion(EP)regime.
Significanttariffreductionscommencedin1988,startingwithelectricalandelectronicgoodsaswellaswiththeinputsintotheseproducts.Comprehensivepackagesoftariffreformwereimplementedin1995and1997.Itinvolvedtariffreductionandrationalization.Maximumtariffswerereducedfrom100%intheearly1990sto30%.Bytheendofthe1990s,thetariffbandswerereducedfrom39to6tariffrates(0,1,5,10,20and30%).Thetwolowrates(0and1%)wereforrawmaterialsandthetwotoprates(20and30%)forfinishedproductswiththetwomiddleratesforintermediategoods.Inaddition,tariffrestructuringhasreceivedrenewedemphasisasanessentialpartoftheoveralleconomicreformsaimedatstrengtheningefficiencyandcompetitivenessoverthepasttwoyears.TheThaigovernmentintroducedanotherefforttolowertariffrates,commencinginJune2003(implementedinOctober2003),followedbyafouryearperiodoftariffreductionfrom2004to2008.Therearearound900itemsinvolvedinthesecondroundoftariffreductions,coveringawiderangeofmanufacturingproducts.Thetariffreductioninthisroundismainlyonintermediateproducts,therebymaintainingtheescalatingtariffstructure.Themagnitudeoftariffreductionismoderate,withintherangeof0to8.9%(Athukoralaetal.2004).
Asaresult,averagetariffsdeclinedmarkedlyfrom30.2%in1990to21.3%in1995andfurtherto11%in2005.ThedispersionofERPalsonarrowedovertheperiodsacrossindustries.In2003,theERPrangereducedto-27.1to142%(Athukoralaetal.2004).4ThechangesinthetariffstructurewouldhavesignificantlyimprovedtheincentivetoattractFDItoindustrieswhereThailandhasacomparativeadvantageininternationalproduction.
AnalyticalFramework
TechnologyspilloverfromFDIissaidtotakeplacewhenthepresenceofaforeignfirmgeneratesproductivityorefficiencybenefitsforthehostcountry’slocalnon-affiliatedfirms(Blomströ
m&
Kokko,1998).Asmentioned,technologyspilloverfromFDIisnotautomaticbutratherconditionedonthenatureofthetradepolicyregimeacrossindustries.AtheoreticalframeworkforexaminingtheeffectofthetradepolicyregimeonthegainsfromFDIinagivenhostcountrywasfirstpresentedbyBhagwati(1973)asanextensiontohistheoryofimmiserizinggrowth.ItwasfurtherdevelopedbyBhagwati(1985,1994);
Brecher&
Diaz-Alejandro(1977);
andBrecher&
Findlay(1983).Akeyhypothesisarisingfromthisliteratureisthattechnologyspillovertendstobesmaller,orpossiblyevennegative,underarestrictive,importsubstitution(IS)regimecomparedwithaliberalizing,exportpromotion(EP)regime.
ToillustratehowtechnologyspillovertakesplaceaswellashowthetradepolicyregimeacrossindustriescanalterthemagnitudeofthesespilloversassuggestedbyBhagwati(1973),weusethetheoreticalmodeldevelopedbyWang&
Blomströ
m(1992).Inthemodel,therearetwofirms,namelyanaffiliateofamultinationalenterprise(MNE)andalocalnon-affiliatedfirm(henceforthreferredtoasthe‘foreign’and‘local’firms,respectively),producingdifferentiatedbutsubstitutableproductsforthehostcountrymarket.Technologyspilloverisanoutcomeofinteractionofthesetwofirms.Ontheonehand,theentryofaforeignfirmisalwaysassociatedwithsomeamountofproprietarytechnologyfromtheparentcompanysoastooffsetthepotentialdisadvantageagainstthelocalfirmpossessingsuperiorknowledgeoftheavailabilityoffactorinputs,businesspracticesand/orconsumerpreferencesinthehostcountry.Inaddition,advancedtechnologywouldhelptheforeignfirmtogainmarketshareinthehostcountry.HowevertransferringtechnologyfromMNE’sheadquartertoitsaffiliatesarecostly.Themoretheadvanceleveloftechnologytransferred,thelargerthedollarcostsassociatedwiththetransfer.Becauseofthepresenceofcostandbenefit,theforeignfirmhastodecidetheeffortofundertakingtechnologytransferredfromitsheadquartertomaximizeitsnetbenefit.Sucheffortwoulddependonthelocalfirm’sresponsetothepresenceoftheforeignfirm.Inasituationwherethelocalfirmactivelyputsintheefforttolearntheadvancedtechnologyassociatedwiththeforeignfirm,thetechnologysuperiorityofthelatterwillnotlastlong.Astheresult,itwillneedtokeepundertakingtechnologytransferactivitiesinthefollowingperiodinordertomaintaintheadvantageoreventojustsurviveinthehostcountryenvironment.Incontrast,asituationwherethelocalfirmislessresponsiveinattemptingtolearntheassociatedtechnologyprovidesrelativelylessincentivefortheforeignfirmtocontinuetoactivelyundertaketechnologytransfersfromitsparentcompany.
Ontheotherhand,thelocalfirmcanobserve,learn,andadaptsuperiortechnologyassociatedwiththeforeignfirmtoenhanceitsowntechnologicalcapability.Thisisbecausethetechnologyaccompaniedwiththeforeignfirmhascertainpublicgoodqualities,whichcannotbefullyinternalized,thusthelocalizationoftheforeignfirmcouldpotentiallygeneratepositiveexternalityintermsoftechnologicalbenefittothelocalfirm.Sincethemarketsuccessofeachfirmdependsontheleveloftechnologyitemploys,thisencouragesthelocalfirmtolearntheassociatedsuperiortechnology.Nevertheless,theeffortoflearningandadaptingtheassociatedtechnologyisassociatedwiththedollaramountofcostsothatthelocalfirmhastodecideitsefforttolearnassociatedadvancedtechnology.Similartotheforeignfirm,thelearningeffortofthelocalfirmalsodependsontheforeignfirmbehavior.
Toincorporatethe‘Bhagwatihypothesis’,themodeldiscussedaboveismodifiedbyhypothesizingthatthetradepolicyregimeinfluencesthecosteffectivenessinthelearningactivitiesofthelocalfirm.Thatis,everyefforttoenhancethetechnologicalcapabilityofthelocalfirmismorecostlyinanyindustrywherethetraderegimeismorerestrictive.ThisisbecausemuchoftheFDIflowingtoanindustrywithhightraderestrictionsoftenentersrelativelycapital-andskill-intensiveproductswhereoutputismainlysuppliedforahighlyprotecteddomesticmarket.Althoughtheproduction