外文翻译国家公共财务管理机构和宏观经济的思考.docx
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外文翻译国家公共财务管理机构和宏观经济的思考
外文文献翻译译文
一、外文原文
原文:
SubnationalPublicFinancialManagement:
InstitutionsandMacroeconomicConsiderations
Transparentpublicfinancialmanagementatthesubnationallevelrequiresinstitutionsandprocessesthatmirrorthoseneededatthecentralgovernmentlevel,inordertogeneratebetteraccountabilityandcompetitionamongdifferentsubnationalgovernments,criticalelementsinensuringgoodgovernanceandefficiencyofdecentralizedadministrations.Furthersubnationaldebtalsohasimplicationsforoverallmacroeconomicstabilitythatconcernsthecentralgovernment.Thekeycomponentsareidentified,withaparticularfocusonsubnationaldebtmonitoringandmanagement.
Practicalissuesrelatingtoeffectivepublicfinancialmanagementultimatelygovernwhetherornotthereisgoodgovernanceatthesubnationallevel-hencethesuccessorfailureofdifferentpolicyoptions.Althoughthereisagrowingliteratureon"fiscalrules"andsubnationaldebtmanagement,therehasbeenlessattentiontothecriticalgovernanceaspectsofpublicfinancialmanagement(althoughseePotter1997,Momoniat,2001).Partofthisneglectmaybeduetothepresumptionthatdecentralization,togetherwithcommunity-baseddecisionmaking,wouldsufficeingeneratingefficientandequitablespendingdecisions.
Indeed,theemphasisoncommunityparticipationwasafeatureofdevelopmentstrategyinthe1950s,largelydrivenbytheFordFoundationandU.S.foreignassistanceprograms.Despitealackofsignificantsuccessatthetime,therehasbeenaresurgenceofthepolicyinrecentyearsduetotheeffortsofnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs).Theemphasisoncommunity-drivendevelopmentwasadoptedasoneofthecornerstonesoftheWorldBank'sComprehensiveDevelopmentFramework(WorldBank,2001).However,thereisincreasingevidencethatweakorabsentpublicfinancialmanagementfunctionsandinstitutionsarelikelytonegateanyadvantagesthatmightbeinherentinbringingpublicservices"closer"tolocalcommunities.
Theunderpinningsofpublicfinancialmanagementrelatetothebasicinstitutionalandproceduralelementsthatmightbeenshrinedinaconstitution,orhigherlevellawsonthebudget,orlawsoragreementsgoverningsubnationaloperationsorlevelsofindebtedness.Insomecountries,suchasSouthAfrica,wheretheprocesshasbeennicelysequenced,thereisasetofconsistentandwelldesignedlegislationcoveringalltheareasmentionedabove.
Inorderforanylevelofgovernmenttotakeresponsibilityforitsactions,theremustbeclarityinitsfunctions,itsmechanismsforappropriatingfundsandprioritizingandauthorizingspending,andensuringthatthespendingisactuallycarriedoutandaccountedfor.Anothercriticalaspectrelatestotimelyandaccuratereportingtotherespectivelegislatureandanyhigherlevelsofadministration.Inshort,questionswouldneedtobeposedconcerningthetransparencyandaccountabilityofagovernmentandwhetherthesemeetminimuminternationalstandards.Quiteoftentheconsequencesofsubnationalspendingcanbeshiftedtohigherlevelsofgovernment,oracrossgenerations,ifthereisnohard-budgetconstraintatajuniorlevelofgovernment(Rodmen,Laidback,andEskelund,2003).Thisgenerallytranslatesintoweakornonexistentcontroloverborrowing.Theborrowingmightbeexplicit,forexample,throughissuanceofdebtorcontractingofloans,orindirect,suchasthoughthebuildupofarrearsoraccountspayable.Underdifferentconstitutionalarrangements,policyresponsesvaryfromenforcedcontrolsoversubnationalborrowing(generallyinunitarystates)tovoluntaryagreementsorrules(infederations,aswellasinsupranationalconglomerationsofstates,suchastheEU),tosolerelianceonthestricturesofthemarket.
Thecaseforcommunity-basedgovernancedependsonthepossibilitiesoflocalinformationgenerationtogetherwiththenetworksofinter-communityinteractionsorsocialcapital.Thecombinationofthesefactorscould,inprinciple,generatespendingtailoredtolocalneeds,withsubstantivelocalinteractionsinordertoensurethatfundsarenotdivertedfromexpressedobjectives.Andasstatedabove,internationalanddonoragencieshaveraisedthesepossibilitiesinthedesignofassistanceprograms.But,inpractice,therearetwosubstantivesindifficulties.Thefirstrelatestowhetherornottheremightbeelitecapture,andthesecond,thatwouldservetoreinforcethefirst,relatestothetypeofinformationthatisgenerated.Inthefinalanalysis,thecaseturnsontheeffectivenessoflocalservicedeliveryandwhetherornotpowerfullocalinterestgroupsareabletogarnerasignificantproportionoffundsallocatedtothelocalities.
BradmanandMothered(2005)discusstheoreticaltradeoffsbetweencentralizedanddecentralizeddeliveryofinfrastructureservic