GovernanceInSeaportClusters港口集群治理毕业论文外文文献翻译及原文Word格式.docx

GovernanceInSeaportClusters港口集群治理毕业论文外文文献翻译及原文Word格式.docx

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GovernanceInSeaportClusters

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2017.02.14

PeterW.deErlangen

1.Introduction

Apartfromwell-knownphysicalfactorssuchasthelocation,maritimeaccessibilityandhinterlandinfrastructure,thegovernanceofseaportsisanimportantdeterminantoftheirperformance.

Ananalysisofthegovernanceofseaportshasmostlybeenlimitedtotheroleoftheportauthority.Notwithstandingthecentralroleofportauthoritiesinports,wearguethatananalysisofgovernanceinseaportsrequiresattentionfortheroleof（private）firms.Institutionaleconomicliteratureoffersausefulframeworkforanalysingadvantagesanddisadvantagesofalternativegovernancemechanismsandprovidesabasisforanalysingtherolesofportauthorities.

InthispaperwedealwiththeissueofclustergovernanceinseaportsandillustrateourapproachwithananalysisoftheportofRotterdam..

First,webrieflydiscussthetheoreticalfoundationsoftheclustergovernanceconcept.Second,wediscusstheroleofportauthoritiesinthegovernanceofseaports.Third,wepresentempiricalresultsofasurveyamong43clusterexpertsinRotterdamonthegovernanceofRotterdam’sportcluster.Wefeminalitythepaperwithconclusions.

2.TheQualityOfClusterGovernance

Wedefineclustergovernanceas‘themixofandrelationsbetweenvariousmechanismsofcoordinationusedinacluster’.Thequalityofthegovernancediffersbetweenclusters.Thequalitydependsonthelevelofcoordinationcostsandthe‘scope’of‘coordinationbeyondprice’.Lowcoordinationcostsandmuchcoordinationbeyondpriceimprovethequalityofgovernance.

Whenthebenefitsofcoordinationaredistributedunequally,when（thethreatof）opportunisticbehaviourpreventscoordinationorwhenbenefitsofcoordinationareuncertain,coordinationbeyondpricedoesnotarisespontaneouslyorinstantaneously,evenwhenbenefitsofcoordinationexceedcosts.Thereforethereisingeneralashortageofcoordinationbeyondprice.Morecoordinationbeyondpriceimprovesthequalityofthegovernanceofclusters.

2.1Trust

Inclusterswheretheleveloftrustishigh,（average）transactioncostsarerelativelylow,becauseoflowcoststospecifycontractsandlowmonitoringcosts.Furthermore,costsofcoordinationbeyondpricearelowerandasaconsequence,morecoordinationbeyondpricewillarise.Theleveloftrustinaclusterisinfluencedbytheimportanceofreputationeffectsinacluster.Ifreputationeffectsarestrong,abusingtrusthasnegativeeffectsandthereforeacultureoftrustissustained.

2.2Intermediaries

Thepresenceofintermediarieslowerscoordinationcostsandexpandsthescopeofcoordinationbeyondprice,forthreerelatedreasons.First,theyprovidea‘bridgingtie’（WeevilyandZachery,1999）betweentwoormoreotherwisenotconnectedexchangepartners.Second,intermediariesreducecoordinationcostsbecausethey‘connectcognitions’.Intermediariescanbridgecognitivedifferencesbetweenfirmsthatoperateindifferentmarketenvironments.Thisroleofconnectingcognitionsisespeciallyimportantinclustersgiventhefactthatclustersarecharacterismbya‘cognitivedivisionofLimbourg’（BelusandTardigrada,2000）.

2.3Leaderfirms

Leaderfirmsare‘strategicCentrewithsuperiorcoordinationskillsandtheabilitytosteerchange’（LorenzandBadenfuller,1995）.Thebehaviourofleaderfirmsinfluencestheperformanceoftheclusterasawhole,becauseleaderfirmshaveboththeabilityandincentivetoinvestinthecompetitivenessofawholenetworkoffirms.Weidentifythreeinvestmentsofleaderfirmswithpositiveeffects（thesecanbetermed‘leaderfirmexternalities’）onotherfirmsinthecluster:

∙Internationalism;

∙innovation;

∙contributingtosolvingcollectiveactionproblems（Olson,1971）

Thus,leaderfirmscanenableorevenenforcecooperationandforthatreasonaddtotheperformanceofclusters.

2.4Collectiveactioninclusters

The‘problem’ofcollectiveaction（Olson,1971）isrelevantinclusters.Evenwhencollectivebenefitsofco-operationtoachievecollectivegoalsexceed（collective）costs,suchco-operationdoesnot（always）developspontaneously.DifferentCAP’s（CollectiveActionProblems）,suchaseducationandtrainingandinnovationarerelevantinclusters.ForeachCAPagovernanceregimearises.Inthiscontext,aregimecanbedefinedasa‘relativelystablecollaborativeagreementthatprovidesactorswiththecapacitytoovercomecollectiveactionproblems’.

3.Portauthoritiesas‘clustermanagers’

Eventhoughavarietyofactorsplayaroleinthegovernanceofaseaportcluster,theportauthorityisthemostcentralactor.Theterm‘clustermanager’canbeusedtodescribetheroleoftheportauthority.Wediscusstheroleofaclustermanageringeneral,theinstitutionalpositionofportauthoritiesandsourcesofrevenueandinvestmentdecisionsofportauthorities.

3.1Theroleofa‘clustermanager’

A‘perfect’clustermanagerwouldbeangalvanizationwiththefollowingfourcharacteristics.

1.Aclustermanagerhasincentivestoinvestinthecluster,becauseitsrevenuesarerelatedtotheperformanceofthecluster.The‘perfect’clustermanagerwouldreceiveashareofthevalueaddedgeneratedintheclusterasrevenue,forinstancethrougha‘clustertax’.

2.Aclustermanagerinvestsinactivitieswithclusterbenefits（insteadoffirmspecificbenefits）.Furthermore,theclustermanageraimstoinvestwhen‘clusterbenefits’exceedcosts.

3.Aclustermanageraimstodistributeinvestmentcostsforinvestmentstothosefirmsthatbenefit.Thisinvolvesco-financearrangementswithaspecificgroupofbeneficiaryfirms.

4.Aclustermanageroperatesself-sustaining:

overtimeinvestmentsequalrevenues.

Theportauthoritymatchesallfourcriteria:

theyhaveincentivesandresourcestoinvestinthecluster.Theportduesandleaserevenuesareresourcestoinvestintheportcluster.Furthermore,theygenerallyareself-sustainingandinvestintheperformanceoftheclusterasawhole.Portauthoritiesinvestinactivitieswithgeneralbenefits,suchasportexpansion,safetyanddredging.Giventheirinstitutionalposition,mostportauthoritiesarenotprofitdriven

Theportauthorityownsandexploitstheportareaandbenefitswhentheportclusterisanattractivelocationbecausetheycanleasemorelandandchargehigherprices.Furthermore,portauthoritiescollect‘portdues’.Thus,themoreshipscallaportthehighertheportdues.Forthesetworeasons,portauthoritieshaveaclearincentivetoinvestintheperformanceoftheportcluster.Thus,portauthoritiescanberegardedasclustermanagers.

3.2Revenuesofportauthorities

Theportauthorityhasvarioussourcesofrevenue.Theexistenceandrelativeimportanceofvariouschargesdiffersbetweenports（Asar,2001）.Ingeneral,portauthoritiesgeneraterevenuefromthreesources:

∙chargestoshipowners/shipoperators;

∙chargestotenantsintheport,includingterminaloperators;

∙chargestocargo-owners.

Chargesforshipowners/shipoperatorsaretermed‘portdues’andinmostcasesrelatedtothesizeofvessels.Theseportduesarejustifiedbyinvestmentsindredging,safetysystems,andinvestmentsinportbasins.Chargesfortenantsareleasechargestofirmssuchasterminaloperatorsandwarehousingandproductionfirms.Chargesforcargoownersaretermedwharfageandaremostlyrelatedtocargovolumeortothevalueofgoods.Someportauthoritiesdonothavewharfagecharges,becausecargoownersindirectlypaybothotherchargesaswell.Insuchcases,apartofbothotherchargescanbeconceivedas‘pseudo-wharfage’.

Thisimpliesthattheportchargesdonothavetobefullyjustifiedonthebasisofinvestmentswithbenefitsforeithertenantsorshipowners.Investmentsforthebenefitofcargoowners,suchasinvestmentsinhinterlandinfrastructure,hinterlandaccessorwarehousingfacilities,canbejustifiedbecausethecargoownersasusersoftheportpaytheportcharges‘intheend’.Therefore,investmentswithbenefitsforthesecargoownersarejustified,evenifportchargesarepaidonlybytenantsandshippingfirms.

3.3Investmentdecisionsofportauthorities

Theportchargeshavetobejustifiedbyinvestmentsoftheportauthority.‘Investmentappraisal’–onthebasisofwhichcriteriadoportauthoritiesdecidetoinvest-isthereforeacentralissueforportauthorities.Weclaimthatthefollowingsimpleruleisaguidelineforinvestmentappraisalofportclustermanagers:

benefitsfortheclusterofaninvestmentshouldexceedcostsforthecluster.Clusterbenefitsarethesumofallbenefitsoffirmsinthecluster,clustercostsarethecostsofaninvestmentforfirmsinthecluster.Inmostcasescostsareincurredbecauseportchargesarerequiredforclusterinvestments.Sincecostsequalrevenues,ahighinvestmentlevelrequireshighportcharges.

4.ClustergovernanceintheportofRotterdam

InthissectionwepresentanempiricalcasestudyoftheportofRotterdam.Weinterviewed43portexpertsintheportofRotterdam.First,wedealwiththeimportanceofclustergovernancefortheperformanceofthecluster.Inthenextfourparagraphs,wediscusstheempiricalresultsforthefourvariablesthatinfluencethequalityoftheclustergovernance.Sixth,webrieflydiscusstheroleoftheportauthorityinRotterdamandendwithconclusions.

4.1TheimportanceofclustergovernanceinRotterdam’sseaportcluster

Theseresultss