高管薪酬和激励外文翻译可编辑.docx

高管薪酬和激励外文翻译可编辑.docx

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高管薪酬和激励外文翻译可编辑

高管薪酬和激励外文翻译（可编辑）

高管薪酬和激励外文翻译

外文题目ExecutiveCompensationAnd

Incentives外文出处AcodemyofManagementPerspectives,20062:

p25-40

外文作者MartinJ.Conyon

原文:

ExecutiveCompensationAndIncentives

MartinJ.Conyon

Executivecompensationisacomplexandcontroversialsubject.Formanyyears,academics,policymakers,andthemediahavedrawnattentiontothehighlevelsofpayawardedtoU.S.chiefexecutiveofficersCEOs,questioningwhethertheyareconsistentwithshareholderinterests.SomeacademicshavefurtherarguedthatflawsinCEOpayarrangementsanddeviationsfromshareholders’interestsarewidespreadandconsiderable.Forexample,LucianBebchukandJesseFriedprovidealucidaccountofthemanagerialpowerviewandaccompanyingevidence.MarianneBertrandandSendhilMullainathantooprovideananalysisofthe‘skimmingview’ofCEOpay.Incontrast,JohnCoreetal.presentaneconomiccontractingapproachtoexecutivepayandincentives,assessingwhetherCEOsreceiveinefficientpaywithoutperformance.Inthispaper,weshowwhathashappenedtoCEOpayintheUnitedStates.Wedonotclaimtodistinguish

betweenthecontractingandmanagerialpowerviewsofexecutivepay.Instead,wedocumentthepatternofexecutivepayandincentivesintheUnitedStates,investigatingwhetherthispatternisconsistentwitheconomictheory.

TheContext:

WhoSetsExecutivePayBeforeexaminingtheempiricalevidencepresentedinthispaper,itisimportanttoconsiderthepay-settingprocessandwhosetsexecutivepay.Thestandardeconomictheoryofexecutivecompensationistheprincipal-agentmodel.Thetheorymaintainsthatfirmsseektodesignthemostefficientcompensationpackagespossibleinordertoattract,retain,andmotivateCEOs,executives,andmanagers.Intheagencymodel,shareholderssetpay.Inpractice,however,thecompensationcommitteeoftheboarddeterminespayonbehalfofshareholders.AprincipalshareholderdesignsacontractandmakesanoffertoanagentCEO/manager.Executivecompensationamelioratesamoralhazardproblemi.e.,manageropportunismarisingfromlowfirmownership.Byusingstockoptions,restrictedstock,andlong-termcontracts,shareholdersmotivatetheCEOtoimizefirmvalue.Inotherwords,shareholderstrytodesignoptimalcompensationpackagestoprovideCEOswithincentivestoaligntheirmutualinterests.Thisisthecontractapproachtoexecutivepay.FollowingCore,Guay,andLarcker,anefficientoroptimalcontractisone“thatimizesthenetexpected

economicvaluetoshareholdersaftertransactioncostssuchas

contractingcostsandpaymentstoemployees.Anequivalentwayofsayingthisisthatcontractsminimizeagencycosts.”

Severalimportantideasflowfromthisdefinition.First,thecontractreducesmanageropportunismandmotivatesCEOeffortbyprovidingincentivesthroughriskycompensationsuchasstockoptions.Second,theoptimalcontractdoesnotimplya“perfect”contract,onlythatthefirmdesignsthebestcontractitcaninordertoavoidopportunismandmalfeasancebythemanager,giventhecontractingconstraintsitfaces.Third,inthisarrangement,thefirmdoesnotnecessarilyeliminateagencycosts,butinsteadevaluatesthemarginalbenefitsofimplementingthecontractrelativetothemarginalcostsofdoingso.Improvementsinregulationorcorporategovernancecanpossiblyalterthesecostsandbenefits,makingdifferentcontractsdesirable.Moreover,whatisefficientatonepointintimemaynotbeatanother.Improvementsinboardgovernance,forexamplebyaddingindependentdirectors,mayleadtodifferentpatternsofcompensation,stock,andoptioncontractsthataredesirableforonefirmbutnotanother.

AnalternativetheoryisthatCEOssetpay.Thisisthemanagerialpowerview,exemplifiedrecentlybyBebchukandFried.Inthistheory,theboardandcompensationcommitteecooperatewiththeCEOandagreeonexcessivecompensation,settlingoncontractsthatarenotinshareholders’interests.Thisexcesspayconstitutesaneconomicrent,

anamountgreaterthannecessarytogettheCEOtoworkinthefirm.TheconstraintstheCEOsfacearereputationlossandembarrassmentifcaughtextractingrents,whatBebchukandFriedcall“outragecosts.”OutragemattersbecauseitcanimposeonCEOsbothmarketpenaltiessuchasdevaluationofamanager’sreputationandsocialcosts?

thesocialcostscomeontopofthestandardmarketcosts.Theyarguethatmarketconstraintsandthesocialcostscomingfromexcessivelyfavorablepayarrangementsarenotsufficientinpreventingconsiderabledeviationsfromoptimalcontracting.

ExecutiveCompensation

ThereissubstantialdisclosureaboutU.S.executivecompensation.TheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionSECexpandedandenhanceddisclosurerulesforU.S.executivesin1992.Asaresult,theproxystatementsoffirm