Background GuideGeneral AssemblyWord下载.docx

Background GuideGeneral AssemblyWord下载.docx

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Contents

—SecurityCouncilReform

SecurityCouncilBackground3

CallingforSecurityCouncilReform4

Reforms5

PastInternationalActions17

OverallPositionsofcountriesandblocs21

—GlobalIlliteracy

ToallthedelegatesintheGeneralAssembly26

GeneralAssembly28

Backgroundoftheissues31

BlocsPositions36

Questionstoconsider44

Reference45

SecurityCouncilBackground

TheSecurityCouncilhasprimaryresponsibility,undertheCharterforthemaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity.Itissoorganizedastobeabletofunctioncontinuously,andarepresentativeofeachofitsmembersmustbepresentatalltimesatUnitedNationsHeadquarters.On31stJanuary1992,thefirsteverSummitMeetingoftheCouncilwasconvenedatHeadquarters,attendedbyHeadsofStateandGovernmentof13ofits15membersandbytheMinistersforForeignAffairsoftheremainingtwo.TheCouncilmaymeetelsewherethanatHeadquarters;

in1972,itheldasessioninAddisAbaba,Ethiopia,andthefollowingyearinPanamaCity,Panama.

Whenacomplaintconcerningathreattopeaceisbroughtbeforeit,theCouncil'

sfirstactionisusuallytorecommendtothepartiestotrytoreachanagreementbypeacefulmeans.Insomecases,theCouncilitselfundertakesinvestigationandmediation.ItmayappointspecialrepresentativesorrequesttheSecretary-Generaltodosoortousehisgoodoffices.Itmaysetforthprinciplesforapeacefulsettlement.

Whenadisputeleadstofight,theCouncil'

sfirstconcernistobringittoanendassoonaspossible.Onmanyoccasions,theCouncilhasissuedcease-firedirectiveswhichhavebeeninstrumentalinpreventingwiderhostilities.ItalsosendsUnitedNationspeace-keepingforcestohelpreducetensionsintroubledareas,keepopposingforcesapartandcreateconditionsofcalminwhichpeacefulsettlementsmaybesought.TheCouncilmaydecideonenforcementmeasures,economicsanctions（suchastradeembargoes）orcollectivemilitaryactions.

IfaMemberStateisagainstanypreventiveorenforcementactionswhichhavebeentakenby

theSecurityCouncil,itmaybesuspendedfromtheexerciseoftherightsandprivilegesofmembershipbytheGeneralAssemblyontherecommendationoftheSecurityCouncil.AMemberStatewhichhaspersistentlyviolatedtheprinciplesoftheChartermaybeexpelledfromtheUnitedNationsbytheAssemblyontheCouncil'

srecommendation.

AStatewhichisaMemberoftheUnitedNationsbutnotoftheSecurityCouncilmayparticipate,withoutavote,initsdiscussionswhentheCouncilconsidersthatthecountry'

sinterestsaremuchcorrelated.BothMembersoftheUnitedNationsandnon-members,iftheyarepartiestoadisputebeingconsideredbytheCouncil,shallbeinvitedtotakepartin,withoutavote,intheCouncil'

sdiscussions;

theCouncilsetstheconditionsforparticipationofanon-memberState.

ThePresidencyoftheCouncilrotatesmonthly,accordingtotheEnglishalphabeticallistingofitsmemberStates.

CallingforSecurityCouncilReform

Eventhoughthegeopoliticalrealitieschangeddrasticallysince1945,whentheset-upofthecurrentCouncilwasdecided,theSecurityCouncilchangedverylittleduringthislongperiodoftime.ThewinnersofSecondWorldWarshapedtheCharteroftheUnitedNationsintheirnationalinterests,dividingtheveto-powerpertinenttothepermanentseatsamongstthemselves.WiththeenlargementoftheUnitedNationsmembershipandincreasingself-confidenceamongthenewmembers,goinghandinhandwithprocessesofdecolonization,oldstructuresandprocedureswereincreasinglychallenged.TheimbalancebetweenthenumberofseatsintheSecurityCouncilandthetotalnumberofMemberStatesbecameevidentandtheonlysignificantreformoftheSecurityCouncilcametopassin1965aftertheratificationoftwothirdsofthemembership,includingthefivepermanentmembersoftheSecurityCouncil（whichhaveavetorightonCharterchanges）.Thereformincludedanincreaseofthenon-permanentmembershipfrom6to10members.WithBoutrosBoutros-GhalielectedasSecretary-Generalin1992,thereformdiscussionsoftheUNSecurityCouncilwerelaunchedagainashestartedhisnewtermwiththefirst-eversummitoftheSecurityCouncilandthereafterpublished"

AnAgendaforPeace"

.HismotivationwastorestructurethecompositionandanachronisticproceduresoftheUNorgans.

Reforms

ReformoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilencompassesfivekeyissues:

categoriesofmembership;

thevetopowerheldbythefivepermanentmembers;

regionalrepresentation;

thesizeofanenlargedCouncilanditsworkingmethods.MemberStates,regionalgroupsandotherstakeholdersdevelopeddifferentpositionsandproposalsonhowtomoveforwardonthiscontestedissues.

1.Membership

TheSecurityCouncilisneverademocraticinstitution.Chapter5oftheUNChartersetsupaCouncildominatedbythefiveGreatPowersthatarethevictorsinWorldWarII--theUnitedStates,theSovietUnion,Britain,FranceandChina.

Inspeechesandcorridorconversations,diplomatsoftenpointoutthatfouroutofthefivePermanentMembersare"

European"

（aconceptthatincludestheUnitedStates）andfouroutoffiveare"

industrialized"

countries.Thefour-fifthsofhumankindthatliveinthepoorcountriesoftheGlobalSouth,theysay,haveonlyoneseat--China--amongthePermanentMembers.LatinAmerica,AfricaandtheMiddleEasthavenoregionalpresenceatall.ReformersinsistthattheCouncilshouldbetter"

represent"

thewholepopulationoftheglobe.ButthereareconsiderabledifferencesabouthowrepresentationshouldbeachievedandwhateffectiveSCdemocracywouldbelike.

ThesharpestdebateturnsontheproposalforPermanentMembershipforGermanyandJapan.Sincebothcountrieshavemiddle-rankingmilitaryforceswhichhavebeenconstitutionallyrestrictedintheirforeigndeployment,theyjustifytheirclaimtoapermanentseatbyreferringtotheirwealthandtheirroleasmajorfundersoftheorganization.

Afewcountrieshavearguedforaddingmoreveto-wieldingpermanentmembersfromtheGlobalSouth.Nigeria,BrazilandIndia,wouldliketobecomepermanentmembers,andtheyhavebeencampaigningactivelyforseats.Buttheirregionalrivalsarestaunchlyopposed.Smallercountries,inturn,areunhappyaboutanysystemthatwillstrengthenthepowerattheirexpense.

ReportsofdiscussionswithintheWorkingGroupsuggestthatamajorityofcountriesopposeanexpansionofthenumberofpermanentmembersandstillinsistonvetorestrictionsfirmly.

ThemajoritypreferstoenlargetheCouncilwithadditionalnon-permanentmembers--acommonfigureisten--bringingtheCounciltopresent25membersaltogether.Thoughopinionsvarywidely,mostcountriesseemtobelievethatanelectoralprocesswillyieldbetterrepresentationofregions,andofdiversekindsofstates--pooraswellasrich,smallaswellaslarge.Betterrepresentation,theyargue,willhelpcreateaCouncilthatcanactcrediblyandlegitimatelyinthenameofallhumanity.

ManyUNdiplomatsandreformersareunhappyaboutpermanentmembership,especiallytheveto,andtheywanttore-considertheissue,evenifthenumberofpermanentmembersdoesnotincrease.

BecauseArt.23,Sect.1oftheCharterspeaksofcriteriafortheselectionofnon-permanentmembers（their"

contribution"

tothe"

maintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurityandtotheotherpurposeoftheOrganization"

）,somecountrieshavecalledontheGeneralAssemblytodevelopobjectivemeasuresforthispurpose.CriteriamightbeembarrassingtothePermanentFive,though.Theyare,afterall,possessorsofnearlyalltheworld'

snuclearweaponsaswellas

mostofthestockofchemicalandbiologicalweapons.Theyhavethelargestmilitaryestablishmentsandspendcollectivelyabouttwo-thirdsoftheworld'

s$775billioninmilitaryoutlays.Theyaccountforaverylargeshare（about85%）oftheworld'

smajorarmsexports.AndtheyhaveignoredCharterinjunctionsthattheyabstaininCouncilvotingwhentheyarepartiestodisputes（Art.27,Sect.3）.

ThePermanentFivehaveanadditionaladvantageoverthenon-permanentmembersintheCouncil,becauseelectedmembersserveforonlytwoyearsandcannot,accordingtotheCharter,beimmediatelyre-elected.

Manyreformerswouldliketolimitordoawaywiththevetoandevenwithpermanentmembershipitself.Indebates,phraseslike"

obsoleteprivilege"

and"

exclusiveclub"

tendtocropup."

TherighttovetounderminestheprincipleofsovereignequalityofstatesasprovidedintheCharter,"

saidHasmyAgam,DeputySecretaryGeneraloftheMalaysianMinistryofForeignAffairsinaspeechtotheGeneralAssembly."

Nocountry,howeverpowerful,shouldarbitrarilystandinthepathofcollectiveneedsasdeterminedbythegeneralmembershipoftheUN."

2.Vetopower

ThefivepermanentmembersoftheSecurityCouncil（China,France,Russia,UnitedKingdom,andUnitedStates）enjoytheprivilegeofvetopower.ThispowerhasbeenintenselycontroversialsincethedraftingoftheUNCharterin1945.

Vetoes（whetherthreatenedoractuallyused）areablocktoaction,asUNperformanceinformerYugoslaviaandotherrecentcriseshasclearlyshown.Asingeveto-wieldingpowercanstopinternationalresponsedeadinitstracksandtotallyfrustratethewilloftheoverwhelmingmajorityoftheinternationalcommunity.Thisblockage,whichhasfrustratedUNactiononk