环境规制与国际贸易外文翻译Word下载.docx

环境规制与国际贸易外文翻译Word下载.docx

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外文题目：

Environmentalregulationandinternationaltrade

出处：

JournalofRegulatoryEconomicsVolume8,Number1,61-72,DOI:

10.1007/BF01066600

作者：

EftichiosSophoclesSartzetakisandChristosConstantatos

原文：

Abstract：

Inthispaper,weinvestigatehowacountry'

schoiceofenvironmentalpolicyinstrumentaffectstheinternationalcompetitivenessofitsfirms.WeshowthatinaCournot-Nashequilibrium,thetotalmarkeshareoffirmsregulatedthroughtradeableemissionpermitsincreasesrelativetothatofthefirmsoperatingundercommandandcontrolduetobetterallocationoftotalabatementamongthefirmsinthecountry.Ourworksuggeststhatfreetradesituationsshouldnotonlyresultinsimilarenvironmentastandardsbutalsoinsimilarregulatoryregimes.ItmaycomeasnosurprisethattheenvironmentalauthoritiesinCanadaareseriouslyconsideringfollowingtheUnitedStatesininstitutingatradeableemissionpermitsmechanism.

1.Introduction

Inrecentyears,increasedawarenessofenvironmentalissueshasmadepollutioncontrol,notablythecontrolofemissions,animportanttopicinpublicpolicydiscussions.Acommonlyraisedobjectionagainstemissionscontrolisthatthismayimpairthecompetitivenessofthedomesticindustryininternationalmarkets.Inparticular,ithasbeenarguedthatfirmsoperatingincountrieswithlowenvironmentalstandardswillacquiresubstantialcostadvantagesoverinternationalcompetitorsoperatinginmoreenvironmentallyconsciouscountries.Concernhasevenbeenexpressedthatsomecountriescouldbecome"

pollutionhavens"

byattractingindustriesthroughlowenvironmentalstandards;

seeforexample,Markusenetal.（1993）.WhileearlierempiricalresearchbyLeonard（1988）andTobey（1989;

1990）suggestedthatdifferencesinenvironmentalstandardsdidnothavesignificantimpactontradepatterns,morerecentworkbyLucasetal.（1992）showedthatthisimpactmaybeimportant.

Substantialliteraturehasbeendevotedtotheimpactofenvironmentalpolicyontradepatterns.Thelinkbetweentradeandtheenvironmentisrootedinpolicyrigiditiesthatpreventauthoritiesfromachievingfirstbestoptimality.Intheabsenceofanyrestrictionsontheuseofenvironmentalandtradepolicies,anyimpacttheformermighthaveonacountry'

stermsoftradecouldeasilybeoffsetbytheappropriatechoiceoftariffs.Internationalagreementsaswellastheactionofdomesticlobbyinggroupsmayinfactlimittheapplicabilityoftradeand/orenvironmentalpolicyinstruments.BaumolandOates（1988）andMarkusen（1975）considerlimitationsintheexerciseofenvironmentalpolicyandexaminemodificationstothefirst-besttariffsnecessarytoaccountforenvironmentalissues.Krutilla（1991）andMarkusen（1975）considercasesinwhichinternationaltradeagreementslimittheuseoftariffsleavingenvironmentalregulationastheonlyfeasiblepolicytowardsrentextractionfromforeigners.Inallcases,itisfoundthatthesecond-besttarifforenvironmentaltaxmaybehigherorsmallercomparedtoitsfirst-bestlevel.

Kennedy（1994）alsoconsidersenvironmentalpolicyastheonlyinstrumentinthepresenceoftransboundarypollutionwithinanimperfectlycompetitiveglobalenvironment.Ratherthanlookingattheoptimaltaxlevel,hedeterminestheNashequilibriumpollutiontaxesandshowsthatstrategicinteractionbetweencountriesresultstoequilibriumtaxesthatarelowerthanwhatisgloballyefficient.Finally,Copeland（1994）recognizesthepossibilityofrestrictionsontheuseofbothenvironmentalandtradepolicyinstrumentsandinvestigatesconditionsforgradualpolicyreformstobewelfareimproving.Hisworkemphasizestheneedforcoordinatedtradeandpollutionpoliciesinordertoavoidexacerbatingdistortionsandshowsthatsmallpolicyreformsmaybemoreeasilyimplementedunderaquotaratherthanataxregime.Healsofindsthatinternationalfactormobilityincreasesthebenefitsfromreformingpollutionpolicy.

Inthispaper,wedealwiththeimpactofenvironmentalpolicyontradepatterns.Ourworkdiffersfromtheaforementionedpapersinthat,insteadoffocusingonthelevelofenvironmentalstandards,weconcentrateontheimpactofthetypeofregulatoryregimeonacountry'

sinternationalcompetitiveness.Thisparticularfocusismotivatedbythefollowingobservations.First,thefactthatsomecountrieshavealreadyadopted"

incentivebased"

regulatorypolicyinstruments--namelytaxesandtradeableemissionspermits--whileothersaremorehesitanttomoveinthisdirectionandcontinuetoapplycommandandcontrolregimes.Second,thatenvironmentalstandardstendnottobesignificantlydifferentamongdevelopedcountries;

seeCropperandOates（1992）.Thesimilarityofstandardsismerelyduetosimilarpreferencesforenvironm