绩效管理最大的问题管理者为什么使用绩效信息文献翻译.docx

绩效管理最大的问题管理者为什么使用绩效信息文献翻译.docx

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绩效管理最大的问题管理者为什么使用绩效信息文献翻译

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

外文出处JournalofPublicAdministrationResearchandTheory

外文作者Moynihan,Pandey

原文:

TheBigQuestionforPerformanceManagement:

WhyDoManagersUsePerformanceInformation?

Moynihan,Pandey

AMODELOFPERFORMANCEINFORMATIONUSE

PreviousResearch

Thereareanumberofempiricalpiecesonperformanceinformationuseinthepublicsector,andthemajorityofsuchresearchisrecent.Heinrich（1999）notedthatmostempiricalevidencecamefromtheprivatesector.Herstudyofperformancestandardsinjobtrainingfoundthatdatawereusedbutmuchdependeduponthedesignoftheoverallperformancesystemandthattherewaslittletoguidedesignersbeyondneoclassicaleconomicargumentsforfinancialincentives.

Sincethen,moreresearchhasemergedtoofferalternativestoneoclassicalmodels,

usuallyrelyingonself-reportedsurveydata.Itappearsfairtoassertthatthisprevious

workhasnotresultedinacommonoroverarchingtheoryofperformanceinformation

use.deLancerJulnesandHolzer（2001）theorizedabasicdistinctionbetweenrational/technocraticandpolitical/culturalfactors.Otherresearchhasfocusedmoreonexplicitlypoliticalvariables.BourdeauxandChikoto（2008）examinedtheroleofthegovernor,thelegislature,andthestatepoliticalcontext.MelkersandWilloughby（2005）categorizedvariablesintermsofcommunitycharacteristics,respondentcharacteristics,organizationalculture,andperformancemeasurementcharacteristics.MoynihanandIngraham（2004）andDull（2009）bothplacedtheroleofleadershipascentral.ThestudybyAskim,Johnsen,andChristophersen（2008）ofmunicipalbenchmarkingnetworksinNorwayexaminednetworkcharacteristics,administrativefactors,politicalvariables,taskcharacteristics,andhistorydependence.MoynihanandLanduyt（2009）characterizedperformanceinformationuseasanelementoforganizationallearningandidentifiedstructuralandculturalvariablesthatpredictsuchuse.

Manyoftheresultsofsuchresearcharediscussedbelowinthecontextofspecific

hypothesesinordertoindicatewherethisarticlebuildsuponanddepartsfrompreviousresearch.Here,wesummarizesomeoftheadditionalfindingsofthisresearchthatarenotdirectlytiedtoourmodel.Someofthesefindingsresultfromtestingsimilarvariablesacrossmodels.Forexample,theprovisionofadequateresourceshasbeenconsistentlyfoundtobeassociatedwithperformanceinformationuse（Askim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008;deLancerJulnesandHolzer2001;MoynihanandLanduyt2009）.Theexistenceofdedicatedlearningforumsisalsoassociatedwithuse（Askim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008;MoynihanandLanduyt2009）.EvidencefromUSstategovernmentsandNorwegianmunicipalgovernmentsassociatesperformanceinformationusewithmoreliberalpoliticalsettings（Askim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008;BourdeauxandChikoto2008;MoynihanandIngraham2004）.Thereismixedevidenceonsize.LargerUSstategovernmentshavebeenassociatedwithperformanceinformationuse（Bourdeauxand

Chikoto2008;MoynihanandIngraham2004）,butsmallergovernmentsweremorelikelytouseperformancedataamongNorwegianmunicipalities.Politicalcompetition（Askim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008）hasbeenfoundtobepositivelyassociatedwithuse,althoughothermodelshavenotfoundsignificantresults（MoynihanandIngraham2004）,andinsomeinstances,politicalconflicthasbeenshowntohaveanegativeornonsignificanteffect（Dull2009）.Thepresenceofbasicbureaucraticcompetenceandexpertiseinperformancemanagementisassociatedwithuse（BourdeauxandChikoto2008;Dull2009）.Measuresoflegislativeinvolvementvaryintheirinfluenceonuseamongexecutivebranchofficials,rangingfrompositive（BourdeauxandChikoto2008）,negative（MoynihanandIngraham2004）,tononsignificant（Dull2009）.

Otherfindingsarespecifictoparticularstudies.Thefollowingvariableshavebeen

foundtobepositivelyassociatedwithperformanceinformationuse:

administrativestability（Askim,Johnsen,andChristophersen2008）;internalrequirementsandlowerlevelsofgovernment（deLancerJulnesandHolzer2001）;inclusionoforganizationalmembersinperformancemanagementprocesses（MelkersandWilloughby2005）;andchiefexecutivepower（BourdeauxandChikoto2008）.Factorsthathavebeennegativelyassociatedwithperformanceinformationuseincludeeffortsbythecentralagencytocontrolthepolicyagenda（MoynihanandIngraham2004）andmeasurementchallenges（Dull2009）.

Qualitativeworkhasexaminedfewervariablesandhasgenerallynotattemptedtoconstructformalmodels.Butithasidentifiedsomecommonfindingsthatoverlapwithmuchofthequantitativeworkcitedabove.Leadershipandorganizationalculturearerecurringthemes（BroadnaxandConway2001;Franklin2000;Moynihan2005）.Radin（2006）pointsoutthatsometasksaremorecompatiblewithperformancemanagementthanothers,whereasAmmonsandRivenbark（2008）findthatthequalityofperformancedatamatters.

ConceptualizingPerformanceInformationUseasOrganizationalBehavior

Weconceptualizeperformanceinformationuseasaformoforganizationalbehavior.Likeotherformsoforganizationalbehavior,employeeshavediscretionaboutwhetherandthedegreetowhichtheyengageinitbutareinfluencedbythesocialcontextandformalsystemsinwhichtheywork.Wetestcategoriesofvariablesconsistentwiththisconceptualization,incorporatingindividualbeliefs,jobattributes,organizationalfactors,andenvironmentalinfluences.

Ourmodeldrawsuponsomeofthevariablesusedinpreviousresearch,althoughweseektousealternativemeasuresoftheunderlyingconcept.Forexample,ratherthanmeasureleadershipsupportforperformancemanagement,wemeasurewhethertheleaderisinageneralistofspecialistposition.Ratherthanmeasurepublicparticipationinperformancemanagementroutines,wemeasureifmoregeneralformsofparticipationmatter.Themodelalsoincludesvariableswhoserelationshipwiththedependentvariablehasbeenpreviouslyuntested,includingpublicservicemotivation（PSM）,rewardexpectations,roleclarity,task-specificexperience,theroleofbudgetofficials,andtheinfluenceofprofessionalorganizations.

IndividualBeliefs

Thereissignificantevidencethataltruisticbeliefsaffectpublicemployeebehaviorinwaysthatbenefittheorganization.MuchofthisevidencefallsundertherubricofthePSMconcept（seePerryandHondeghem2008）.HighPSMemployeesexhibithigherlevelsoforganizationalcommitment,enjoyhigherjobsatisfaction,experiencegreaterjobinvolvement,andrequirelessextrinsicrewards（PandeyandStazyk2008）.ThereisalsoevidencethatPSMfosterspositivecitizenshipbehaviorbothinternal（Pandey,Wright,andMoynihan2008）andexternaltotheorganization（Brewer2003;Houston2006）.

Therehas,thusfar,beensurprisinglylittleinvestigationintohowPSMmightaffectorganizationaldecisionmaking.TherearetworeasonstoassumethatPSMmightfosterperformanceinformationuse.First,performanceinformationuseinvolvescostsfortheemployees.Performanceinformationuseisabehaviorthatimposescostsontheemployee.Itdisplacestraditionalmodesofdecisionmakingandheuristics,whileaddinganotherdecisioncriterion,makingdecisionprocessesmoreratherthanlesscomplex.Althoughusingperformancedatamightgenerateorganizationalbenefits,individualbenefitsareunlikelyoruncertain.Itthusresemblesaformofextra-rolebehaviorwhereemployeesmakegiftsoftheirtimeandefforttotheorganizationwithouttheexpectationofindividualreward.1Suchbehaviorislikelytobeexhibitedbyemployeesdrivenbyprosocialoraltruisticmotives.Second,itisplausiblethathighPSMemployeesidentifywithandcareabouttheachievementforganizationalgoals.IthasbeenproposedthatPSMfostershigherindividualandorganizationalperformance,althoughwithoutdefinitiveevidence（Brewer2008）.IfhighPSMemployeesseeperformanceinformationuseasameansofachievingorganizationalgoals,theymayalsoseeitasameanstofulfilltheirdesiretoserve.

H1ManagerswithhigherlevelsofPSMaremorelikelytouseperformanceinformation.

H2Managerswhoperceivealinkbetweenextrinsicrewardsandperformancearemorelikelytouseperformanceinformation.

H3Task-specificleadersaremorelikelytouseperformanceinformationthangeneralistleaders.

H4Managerswithgreatertask-specificexperiencearemorelikelytouseperformanceinformation.

H5Managerswhoperceiveperformanceinformationisavailableandtiedtomanagementsystemsaremorelikelytouseit.

H6Adevelopmentalorganizationalculturefostersperformanceinformationuse.

H7Managerswhoperceivedecisionflexibilityaremorelikelytouseperformance

information.

H9Thewillingnessofbudgetstafftoadoptanadversarialstanceaffectsperformanceinformationuse.

H10Perceptionsofcitizenparticipationaffectsperformanceinformationuse.

H11Managersinfluencedbyprofessionalorganizationsaremorelikelytouseperformanceinformation.

CONCLUSION

Thisarticlearguesforexaminingperformanceinformationuseasakeyvariableifwearetodevelopsystematicknowledgeaboutcontemporarygovernance.Theusualcaveatsandflawsofcross-sectionalsurveydataapply.Inparticular,thepotentialthatcommonsourcebiasinflatestherelationshipbetweenindependentvariablesandthedependentvariablecannotbedismissed.Butintestingsuchrelationships,capturingalargenumberofcomparableindividualresponsesonitemsthataredifficulttoexternallyobserve—suchasPSMorculture—isakeyrequirement,necessitatingsurvey-baseda