外文翻译特许经营和独立的小型企业成活率的比较.docx

外文翻译特许经营和独立的小型企业成活率的比较.docx

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外文翻译特许经营和独立的小型企业成活率的比较

毕业论文（设计）外文翻译

题　　目：

　　农村零售终端连锁经营模式研究

一、外文原文

标题：

AComparisonofFranchiseandIndependentSmallBusinessSurvivalRates

原文：

ABSTRACT.

Aspiringentrepreneurschoosingtobecomefranchiseescertainlyexpecttoimprovetheirchancesofsurvivalduringtheturbulentearlyyearsofbusinessstartupandoperation.Alignmentwithafranchisorparentcompanyoffersthefranchiseemanagerialassistance,accesstofinancialcapital,andaccesstomarketsviatherighttoutilizetheparentcompanytrademark.Thisstudyexaminessurvivalpatternsamongfranchiseandnonfranchisesmallfirmsstartedbetween1984and1987:

survivalthroughlate1991istrackedforallfirms.Althoughthefranchiseoperationsarelargerscale,bettercapitalizedyoungfirms,theindependentbusinessstartupsarefoundtobemoreprofitableandtheirsurvivalprospectsarebetterthanthoseoffranchises.

A.Introduction

Personsenteringself-employmentbybecomingfranchiseescommonlybelievethattheirchancesofsurvivingthoseearlyturbulentyearsofsmallbusinessoperationsareenhancedbytheirdecisiontoalignwithafranchisorparentcompany.Thefranchiseisasafebet,accordingtotheconventionalwisdom.Itistimetoreconsiderthiswisdom.Anationwidesurveyofself-employedpersonsactiveinsmallbusinessin1987servesasthedatabaseanalyzedinthisstudy.Asampleof20,554youngfirmsdrawnfromtheU.S.BureauoftheCensusCharacteristicsofBusinessOwnersdatabaseisutilized,andallofthesefirmsweresurveyedinlate1991todeterminefirmsurvivalrates.Bylate1991,34.7percentofthefranchiseesand28.0percentofthenonfranchiseyoungfirmsactivein1987haddiscontinuedoperations.Furtherindependentbusinessvs.franchiseecomparisonsrevealthattheyoungfirmsstarted

Withoutthebenefitofaparentfranchisorweresignificantlymoreprofitablethanthefranchisefirms.Inshort,thefranchiseroutetoself-employmentisassociatedwithhigherbusinessfailureratesandlowerprofitsthanindependentbusinessownership.Thisstudydescribesvariousownertraitsandoperationalcharacteristicsoffranchiseandnonfranchiseyoungfirms.Logisticregressionequationsareutilizedtoisolatetheimpactofthefranchisecharacteristiconfirmsurvivalprospectswhenownerandfirmtraitsarecontrolledfor.Itisthelargerscale,bettercapitalizedfirmsheadedbycollegegraduateownersworkingfull-timeintheirsmallbusinessesthataremostlikelytoremaininoperation;thefranchisetrait,otherfactorsconstant,exhibitsahighlynegativerelationshiptofirmsurvivalprospects.Separateanalysesofminority-ownedfranchiseandindependentsmallbusinesssubsamplesrevealthatsurvivalpatternsamongminority-ownedfirmscloselyresemblethosepresentintheoverallsmallbusinessuniverse:

franchiseoperationsaremorelikelytogooutofbusinessthanindependentfirmstartups.Thecomprehensivecross-sectionandtimeseriesdataonyoungsmallbusinessesanalyzedinthisstudyaredrawnfromalargenationwidesmallbusinessdatabase-theCharacteristicsofBusinessOwners（CBO）database-thatwascompiledbytheU.S.BureauoftheCensusin1992.OnelimitationoftheCBOdatabaseisitsexclusionoffirm’sfittingtaxreturnsasregularcorporations:

theCBOincludesonlyproprietorships,partnerships,andS-corporationtillers

B.Measuringsurvivalpatternsamongyoungsmallbusinesses:

Databaseconsiderations

Mostevidenceonfranchisesurvivalratesisforthcomingfromjournalisticsources.Arecentadinbusinessweek,forexample,claimedthat"afranchiseehasafourtimesgreaterchancetosucceedthananentrepreneurwholaunchesanewindependentbusiness."Factualunderpinningsforthisclaimwerenotapparent.Attheotherendofthejournalisticspectrum,theFebruary1994issueofmagazineclaimsthat50.7percentofDecoratingDen'sfranchiseesterminatedoperationsduringthethreeyearperiodendinginDecember1992.DecoratingDenisafranchisorthatgrewspectacularlyduringthe1980s;itsfranchiseesinvestbetween$17,000and$50,000tolaunchtheirfirms.

BusinessfailureratefiguresdisseminatedbyindividualfranchisorsandtheInternationalFranchiseAssociationsuggestthat92percentoffranchisebusinessstartupsarestillinbusinessattheendoffiveyears,versusonly23percentoftheindependentfirms.Suchpromotionalbusinessfailureratefigurescitethe"U.S.DepartmentofCommerce"astheirsource.Infact,theU.S.DepartmentofCommercehas,untilrecently,conductedannualssurveysoffranchisorsandpublishedtheresultsinbiennialreports,franchisingintheeconomy.AccordingtothestaffoftheU.S.HouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonSmallBusiness,however,acomprehensivereviewofthefranchisingintheeconomyreports"failstoshowanyfiguresprovidingcomparablefailureorsuccessratesforfranchisesorfranchisees.Onthecontrary,thereportsnotespecificallythat'thenumberoffailuresisunknown'（franchisingintheeconomy,1988）,".MyownreviewofapplicableU.S.DepartmentofCommercepublicationsrevealsnostudiesorstatisticscapableofsupportingcomparativesurvivalratesfornewfranchiseversusindependentbusinessstartups.ClaimsthatfranchisestartupshavevastlyhighersurvivalratesthanindependentbusinessstartupscannotbesupportedbypublishedU.S.DepartmentofCommercestudiesofsmallbusiness.Thus,claimsaboutfranchiseratesofsurvivalhaveoftentendedtoextremes.Thepurposeofthisstudyistoraisethedebatetoahigherplain.ThepresenceOftheCBOdatabasemakesitpossibleforissuesoffranchiseesurvivaltobeanalyzedinobjective,comprehensiveways.TheCBOoversamplesminorityandwomenbusinessowners,anditoversamplesthelargerscalesmallbusinessesthatutilizepaidemployees.Oftheroughly90,000smallbusinessessurveyedtocreatetheCBOdatabase,over70percentresponded.Allofthereportedstatisticsinthisstudyareweightedtoadjustforbothsurveynonresponsive,andtheCensusBureau'snonrandomsamplinginthecreationoftheCBO:

thefirmsdescribedinthisstudyarethereforerepresentativeofyoungfirmsthatgrossedatleast$5000intotalrevenuesin1987.Thisstudycoversonlyfirmsformedoverthe1984--1987periodandtheunitofanalysisisfirms,notpersons.Thus,theuniverseoffirmscoveredinthisstudyis4,005,561smallbusinesses.AdescriptionoftheCBOsampleofyoungfirmsanalyzedinthefollowingpagesappearsintheappendixofthisstudy.Thesampleoffranchisefirmsanalyzedhere’snotidenticalwiththeuniverseoffranchiseunitsopenedbetween1984and1987forseveralreasons.First,somefranchiseunitsareownedbythefranchisor.Second,somenewfranchiseunitsareownedbymulti-unitfirmsthatbeganoperationsbefore1984.Third,multi-unitnewfirmsincludedinthisstudymightownfranchiseoperationsatseverallocations,butsuchafirmisonlycountedonce,becausetheunitofanalysishereisthefirm.Thus,thefailurerateforallnewfranchiseunitsoperatingin1987thatopenedupbetween1984and1987maydifferfromtheclosureratereportedinthisstudy.

C.Characteristicsoffranchiseandindependentyoungfirms

Existingstudiesidentifytraitsthatarepositivelycorrelatedwithfirmlongevity.Thelargerscale,oldersmallbusinesseshavehighersurvivalratesovertimethansmaller,youngerfirms（Evans,1987;BatesandGucci,1989）.Amongveryyoungfirms,ownertraitsassociatedwithgreaterlikelihoodofsurvivalincludeownersworkingfull-timeinthefirm,highlyeducatedowners,andlargeownerfinancialcapitalinvestmentinthefirmatstartup（Bates,1990a）.Tableoneindicatesthatfranchiseesaregenerallybetterendowedwithtraitslinkedtosurvivalthannofranchiseyoungfirms.Intermsofmean1987salesrevenues,theyoungfranchiseesreport$513,961,overfivetimeslargerthanthecorrespondingfigureof$102,410reportedbytheindependentbusinesses（tableone）.Capitalizationatstartupissimilarlymuchgreater-meanvalue--$86,493-forthefranchisefirms,almostthreetimesgreaterthanthenofranchisefirmcapitalizationof$29,822.Onlyintheareaofownereducationalbackgrounddothefranchisefirmsappeartobeweakerthantheindependents:

9.1percentoftheformerand16.2percentofthelatterhadpursuedgraduatestudiesbeyondthebachelor'sdegree.AlloftheabovegroupmeandifferencesarestatisticallysignificantYet,despitetheobviousstrengthsoftheyoungfranchisefirmssummarizedintableone,theyaredramaticallylessprofitablethanindependentfirmsofthesameage,andtheyexhibitalowersurvivalrate-65.3percent（versus72.0percentfornofranchisefirms）-overthe1987-1ate1991timeperiod;thesedifferencesarestatisticallysignificantatconventionallevels.Aspiringentrepreneurschoosingtobecomefranchiseescertainlyexpecttoimprovetheiroddsofsurvivalovertheearlyturbulentyearsofbusinessstartup.Beyondlowriskoffailure,whatspecificallydoesthepotentialownerseektogainbypurchasingafranchiseratherthanoperatinganindependentbusiness?

Rubin（1978）listshypothesizedadvantagesaccruingtofranchisees.Firstthetrademarkandtheproductsoldappeartobevaluable,whichfacilitatesaccesstocustomersfortheyoungfranchisee.Second,thefranchisoroftenmakescapitalavailabletothefranchisee,eitherbyextendingcreditdirectlyorco-signingforabankloan.Third,franchiseeslackingappropriatehumancapitalcanreceivemanagerialadviceandassistancefromfranchisors.Tableonesummarystatisticsprovideevidencethatisconsistentwiththesehypothesizedadvantagesofthefranchiserelationship.Franchiseesaregeneratinggreatersalesperun