IresonKSpaperNov07.docx

1、IresonKSpaperNov07The Knowledge Sharing Experience in AgricultureRandall IresonPresented at the Conference, Ten Prospects for International Cooperation in Knowledge Sharing in the Service of Economic Development in the DPRKSeoul, November 2007I. IntroductionSince the DPRK food crisis began in the mi

2、d 1990s, foreign donors and aid agencies have provided assistance in two main areas: agriculture and health. Agriculture is of course directly related to the need for increased food production, while aid to the health sector addresses effects of both reduced food supply and a deteriorated health-car

3、e infrastructure in the DPRK. This paper will review the history and current state of knowledge sharing in the agriculture sector, considering both knowledge sharing between aid organizations and their DPRK counterparts, and knowledge sharing among the different aid organizations working in the DPRK

4、. It should be considered as a snapshot of a work in progress, because the nature and degree of knowledge sharing about agriculture is changing, and this conference may well influence future directions. I will begin with a brief outline of the institutional context in which agriculture aid has been

5、delivered. Knowledge sharing and material aid in the agriculture sector relates directly to the DPRK food crisis, and has evolved over the last decade as the DPRK food situation has changed from an acute emergency to a less critical, but longer-lasting shortfall that is still being largely met throu

6、gh foreign assistance. The nature of agriculture assistance has changed in parallel with changes in the nature of the food problem over that period. In the mid 1990s, the DPRK experienced a catastrophic farm production collapse. Foreign aid organizations delivered food, and later fertilizer, in an e

7、ffort to improve the nutritional situation directly and immediately. Initially very little was known outside the DPRK regarding its agricultural practices or policies, or even about the proximate causes of the food crisis. Humanitarian aid representatives (multilateral, bilateral and NGO) worked dil

8、igently against the organized resistance of the DPRK government to identify and collect reliable and accurate data about local food production, farming practices, agriculture policy, and the state of the DPRK economy. To be sure, there were instances of cooperation with government such as the develo

9、pment of the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Environmental Protection (AREP) plan, but for the most part the position of the DPRK government was that the best role for foreign assistance was simply to provide food, fertilizer and fuel. The government could take care of everything else if these needs

10、 were met. We recognize now that the root causes of the DPRK food crisis were not the “natural disasters” of 1995 to 1997, though these certainly contributed to the crisis. In fact, the collapse in farm production had begun well before 1995, reflecting acute shortages of fuel and fertilizer which we

11、re caused by the loss of friendly trade with the USSR and China. Thus the first instance of knowledge sharing in agriculture was the knowledge gained by international organizations about the practical conditions on DPRK farms, and about the policies and production technologies promoted by the govern

12、ment. With a clearer understanding of the situation in the DPRK farm sector, foreign aid organizations began slowly to adjust their programs, turning first toward short-term increases in farm production, and then toward longer-term improvements in farm productivity. While deliveries of food aid rema

13、ined high through 2002, the nature of other material assistance for agriculture changed from an emphasis on fertilizer and plastic film to improved seed varieties to improved machinery and production methods. Foreign assistance to the DPRK has always been subject to political constraints, and aid to

14、 the agriculture sector is no exception. On one hand, agriculture is considered a “neutral” topic, one which can be addressed in purely technical terms and in ways which do not question or threaten the DPRK state. For this reason the DPRK government has accepted and encouraged aid to the agriculture

15、 sector, and has been less restrictive in allowing its citizens to interact with foreigners than in other areas such as economics, law or social sciences. However food self-sufficiency has been a core tenet of the juche ideology, and “juche agriculture” includes a number of specific recommendations

16、regarding farming practices. Therefore knowledge sharing efforts which question either the economic desirability of self-sufficient food production or some of the farming methods which have been instituted through on-the-spot-guidance, have sometimes been seen as implicit criticisms of fundamental D

17、PRK agriculture policy. In past years, DPRK policy makers have also demonstrated a tendency to seek “magic bullets” simple production solutions that often do not recognize physical or environmental limitations to specific practices, but are promoted as The Solution to the nations food crisis. The Po

18、tato Initiative of 1999 and the nationwide call in 2000 to multiply grass eating animals are cogent examples. Foreign assistance organizations have for the most part chosen not to question the structure of agriculture in the DPRK, such as reliance on cooperative and state farms, national procurement

19、 of staple grains for distribution through the PDS, centrally planned production targets and distribution of farm inputs, state-managed prices for staple foods, the land rezoning initiative, and so on. This paper also accepts these structural elements as given, as for the most part being outside the

20、 scope of discussion regarding knowledge sharing, and also as for the most part not being significant impediments to either knowledge sharing or to improving farm productivity. II. The scope of knowledge sharing in agricultureDuring a decade of agricultural aid to the DPRK, the topics which have bee

21、n addressed are numerous and wide-ranging. Table 1 provides a partial list of topics which have been addressed by one or more aid programs. As can be seen, they cover many fundamental aspects of farming, and do not address questions which might be called “cutting edge” research problems. Rather the

22、emphasis in knowledge sharing has been on improving the understanding of “best farming practices” as implemented in different settings around the world. Countries hosting knowledge sharing delegations from the DPRK, and the home countries of aid organizations (bilateral and NGO) which have sponsored

23、 these delegations are listed in Table 2. The languages of agriculture knowledge exchange for the last decade have been almost exclusively Korean, English and Chinese.Because DPRK agriculture researchers and DPRK farmers had very little knowledge of and exposure to ideas and practices outside the DP

24、RK, most international agriculture experts visiting the DPRK in the 1990s described the knowledge and practices as two to three decades out of date. Lacking regular access to international journals, scientists who might read a single article had no basis for understanding its context in the general

25、development of agricultural science, and consequently little ability to evaluate it for relevance or applicability. Most early efforts at knowledge sharing including both study tours outside the DPRK and visiting specialists coming to the DPRK therefore focused on improving knowledge of and access t

26、o basic, current agriculture science information. Aid organizations also engaged in a parallel effort to learn more about the level of understanding and priorities of their DPRK counterparts and counterpart organizations.Another effort by international specialists has been to overcome widely accepte

27、d mis-information, such as the “rule of thumb” for farm managers and AAS scientists that application of 1 kg of ammonium sulfate fertilizer would always result in a yield increase of 10 kg of rice. Rigid planting and harvest dates promulgated by the national information network also constrained farm

28、 managers ability to adapt to changes in annual weather patterns. Two selected examples poultry production and conservation farming - may give a better idea of the kind of information which has been transferred in the agriculture sector. In the late 1990s, the DPRK government apparently decided to m

29、odernize poultry production nationwide. Technicians were sent to Europe to research breeding and management systems, and several contracts were negotiated with European poultry housing and equipment companies and suppliers of chicks, resulting in the construction of several turn-key chicken farms in

30、 the DPRK, financed by the government. Other study delegations were supported by aid organizations and continued to learn about topics such as breeding practices, poultry genetics, chick production, nutrition, and disease control. With the outbreak of avian influenza in neighboring countries, the FA

31、O provided training and materials for screening for the disease, and when a disease outbreak occurred in the DPRK, FAO experts came to assist in diagnosis and control, and determined the disease was not in fact H5N1 influenza. More recently, several aid organizations introduced the concept of reduce

32、d tillage farming methods as a means of improving soil quality, controlling soil erosion, and reducing fuel use in farming. These practices are being promoted in the DPRK as “Conservation Agriculture”. Several expert missions have come to the DPRK, and other delegations from the DPRK have visited co

33、untries such as China, Brazil and the US to observe reduced tillage practices and results. Specific areas of scientific knowledge which are being developed include the effects of conservation agriculture on soil structure and soil life, weed control methods (mechanical, chemical, and by crop rotation), testing reduced tillage farm equipment in the DPRK, an