外文翻译大型企业的财务控制doc.docx

1、外文翻译大型企业的财务控制doc英文原文：FINANCIAL CONTROL OF LARGE-SCALE ENTERPRISEBy R. A. GORDONUniversity of CaliforniaThere has been much discussion in recent years about the control of the large corporation. We hear a great deal about concentration of control, separation of ownership and control, control by banki

2、ng and other financial interests, and so on. One of the most striking characteristics of the writings in this field is the vagueness that surrounds the frequently very loose use of the word control. Surprisingly little has been said about the content and nature of control (in relation to corporate a

3、ctivities), and little, if any, attempt has been made to distinguish between the possession of power, on the one hand, and the exercise of control arising from the possession of power, on the other. Nor has there been any systematic effort to relate the control concepts implied in various studies of

4、 corporate organization to the active control function of the entrepreneur which is supposedly necessary to the efficient working of our economic system. I shall attempt in this paper to dispel some of the ambiguity now sur-rounding discussions of corporate control. I propose, in particular, to ex-a

5、mine the power possessed by financial groups and the extent to which this power is translated into the exercise of an actual and active control over the productive process.I. Entrepreneurial Control and the Large Corporation In assaying the nature and extent of financial control, we must have clearl

6、y in mind what we mean by control. In particular, what does con-trol mean in terms of active direction of the productive process, and how does it relate to the various aspects of the dynamic leadership that has been ascribed to the entrepreneur of economic theory? Better to judge the eco-nomic signi

7、ficance of the influence of financial groups on corporate enter-prise, I shall therefore first briefly consider the nature of what may be called entrepreneurial control, particularly as such control may manifest itself in the large corporation.Whatever the number of agents or factors co-operating in

8、 production, and whatever the legal forms which business enterprises may assume, joint production for a market in a system characterized by complex division of labor and continual change requires the directing and unifying force of business leadership. This function of leadership, which involves for

9、esight, planning, and active decision-making in the formation of policies, I propose to call the function of entrepreneurial control. Since the productive process is divided into units-that is, business firms-the exercise of this function involves control over and direction of the activities of the

10、firm. Entre-preneurial control, as thus defined, is an active concept; it implies the exercise of a certain type of leadership, not merely the possession of certain powers. The ability to exercise such control over any firm may be obtained in a number of ways, of which legal ownership is only one. I

11、n the one-man concern, entrepreneurial control is, of course, exercised by the owner; and a combination of such control and the risk-taking inherent in ownership were the standard elements in the complete function attributed to the entrepreneur of economic theory. The application of entrepreneurial

12、concepts to the large corporation raises a host of new problems, to the solu-tion of which the two types of treatment most generally made offer very little. One solution is to redefine entrepreneurship solely or chiefly in terms of risk-taking and to identify the stockholder as entrepreneur. The oth

13、er is to declare the problem insoluble and to conclude that the atom of entre-preneurship, like the atom of ownership, has been forever and irreparably split in the large corporation. Whether or not risk-taking should be considered all or part of the entre-preneurial function is an academic question

14、 into a discussion of which I prefer not to enter here. The important point is this: Whether the dominant type of business organization is the individual proprietorship, the partner-ship, or the corporation, business leadership or entrepreneurial control is still necessary. My aim, at this juncture,

15、 is to see what happens to this func-tion in the large corporation. Two problems arise here. First, what does entrepreneurial control mean in the light of the usual delegation of powers found in the large corporation? Secondly, the residue of control remaining after allowance for such delegation of

16、powers is itself divisible, and we must take account of the fact that this control may be shared by different indi-viduals or groups in a variety of ways. With respect to the problem of delegated powers, it may be noted that some degree of direction, planning, and policy forming is assumed even by m

17、inor executives. Do these persons exercise entrepreneurial control, or is such control exercised by those who choose such men? If choice of men is the criterion, and if delegated decision-making is excluded, then we are driven up the pyramid of management organization to those actually re-sponsible

18、for the selection of boards of directors. Those so responsible, incidentally, are frequently referred to as the ultimate control group and are distinguished from management, mainly the top executives, to whom decision making is delegated. While recognizing the importance of this distinction between

19、ultimate control and management, I do not think that this treatment provides an efficient enough tool to analyze the problem of control of corporate activity. Too much is hidden in the vague term management, and the emphasis on ultimate control frequently implies that outside groups play a more impo

20、rtant and active role in shaping the firms policies than is actually the case. I should prefer to pick out the vari-ous functions of active leadership, with the emphasis on the impact of such leadership on the productive process, to define this leadership as entre-preneurial control, and then to see

21、k, on the basis of available evidence, how such leadership is gained, among whom it is shared, and so on. I therefore suggest the following tentative definition of entrepreneurial control: Entre-preneurial control consists of making those broad decisions which deter-mine the general nature of a firm

22、s activities, provided such decisions are not subject to the active veto power of others in fact (whatever the nominal relationships may be). Such control includes the origination of major policies, the making of the residue of decisions not delegated to subordi-nates, the choice of those to adminis

23、ter policies, and the determination of the extent to which decision-making and authority are to be delegated. This definition is, of course, vague; it is made so purposely. The general idea, however, should be clear; the emphasis, to repeat, is on active and actual leadership. This function of leade

24、rship is really a composite function, possible of division in a number of ways. Although limitations of time preclude any detailed discussion of the ways in which entrepreneurial control may be divided, a few illustrations will indicate some of the possibilities and give further concreteness to the

25、concept. Typically, in the large corporation, one or a few top executives make most of the broad decisions that shape that firms policies. On occasion, however, the decision makers may be forced out of the position of entrepreneurial control by a powerful interest group, until then passive with resp

26、ect to decisions currently being made. Until that time, the decision makers, not the passive interest group, have exercised entre-preneurial control, since it is they, not the latter, who have determined the direction of the firms course in the productive process. Though all or the major part of ent

27、repreneurial control is usually, in the large corporation, exercised for long periods by important executives, it may be frequently shared, either continuously or on special occasions, with certain individuals and committees on boards of directors or with an outside interest group. Seldom do boards

28、as a whole or stockholders as a whole exercise continuous-ly any significant part of the function of entrepreneurial control. Directors as groups and certain outside groups, later to be mentioned, exercise partial or complete entrepreneurial control occasionally-but, in the case of com-plete control

29、 particularly, such exercise is usually sporadic. II. Segments of Interest in the Corporation Let us turn now to the groups which typically have an interest in the large corporation. These interest groups or segments make up the economic en-vironment within which entrepreneurial control is exercised

30、 and create pressures, in proportion to the power they can acquire, on those making entrepreneurial decisions. Actually, those in entrepreneurial control come from one or more of these interest segments-usually, as has already been implied, from the management segment. But some other interest group,

31、 depending on the power it has and the strength or weakness of the other groups, may take over some part, though seldom all, of the composite entre-preneurial function. An interest group or segment with respect to a corporation exists when the economic welfare of that group depends directly, and in

32、an important degree, on the activities of the firm in question. Such interests usually, but not necessarily, arise out of buying and selling relationships between the group and the firm. These groups may be variously classified; the following list represents one possible classification which will be

33、 helpful in analyzing our main problem: (1) Suppliers of goods by sale or lease (for example, materials, equipment, land, and so on); (2) lenders of money-funds, both short term and long term; (3) owners (whether ownership arises from in-vestment of capital or watered stock); (4) labor; (5) providers of organiza-tion services, chiefly fin