外文翻译大型企业的财务控制doc.docx

外文翻译大型企业的财务控制doc.docx

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外文翻译大型企业的财务控制doc

英文原文：

FINANCIALCONTROLOFLARGE-SCALEENTERPRISE

ByR.A.GORDON

UniversityofCalifornia

Therehasbeenmuchdiscussioninrecentyearsaboutthecontrolofthelargecorporation.Wehearagreatdealaboutconcentrationofcontrol,separationofownershipandcontrol,controlbybankingandotherfinancialinterests,andsoon.Oneofthemoststrikingcharacteristicsofthewritingsinthisfieldisthevaguenessthatsurroundsthefrequentlyverylooseuseoftheword"control."Surprisinglylittlehasbeensaidaboutthecontentandnatureofcontrol（inrelationtocorporateactivities）,andlittle,ifany,attempthasbeenmadetodistinguishbetweenthepossessionofpower,ontheonehand,andtheexerciseofcontrolarisingfromthepossessionofpower,ontheother.Norhastherebeenanysystematicefforttorelatethecontrolconceptsimpliedinvariousstudiesofcorporateorganizationtotheactivecontrolfunctionoftheentrepreneurwhichissupposedlynecessarytotheefficientworkingofoureconomicsystem.

Ishallattemptinthispapertodispelsomeoftheambiguitynowsur-roundingdiscussionsofcorporatecontrol.Ipropose,inparticular,toex-aminethepowerpossessedbyfinancialgroupsandtheextenttowhichthispoweristranslatedintotheexerciseofanactualandactivecontrolovertheproductiveprocess.

I.EntrepreneurialControlandtheLargeCorporation

Inassayingthenatureandextentof"financialcontrol,"wemusthaveclearlyinmindwhatwemeanby"control."Inparticular,whatdoes"con-trol"meanintermsofactivedirectionoftheproductiveprocess,andhowdoesitrelatetothevariousaspectsofthedynamicleadershipthathasbeenascribedtotheentrepreneurofeconomictheory?

Bettertojudgetheeco-nomicsignificanceoftheinfluenceoffinancialgroupsoncorporateenter-prise,Ishallthereforefirstbrieflyconsiderthenatureofwhatmaybecalled"entrepreneurialcontrol,"particularlyassuchcontrolmaymanifestitselfinthelargecorporation.

Whateverthenumberofagentsorfactorsco-operatinginproduction,andwhateverthelegalformswhichbusinessenterprisesmayassume,jointproductionforamarketinasystemcharacterizedbycomplexdivisionoflaborandcontinualchangerequiresthedirectingandunifyingforceofbusinessleadership.Thisfunctionofleadership,whichinvolvesforesight,planning,andactivedecision-makingintheformationofpolicies,Iproposetocallthefunctionofentrepreneurialcontrol.Sincetheproductiveprocessisdividedintounits-thatis,businessfirms-theexerciseofthisfunctioninvolvescontroloveranddirectionoftheactivitiesofthefirm.Entre-preneurialcontrol,asthusdefined,isanactiveconcept;itimpliestheexerciseofacertaintypeofleadership,notmerelythepossessionofcertainpowers.Theabilitytoexercisesuchcontroloveranyfirmmaybeobtainedinanumberofways,ofwhichlegalownershipisonlyone.

Intheone-manconcern,entrepreneurialcontrolis,ofcourse,exercisedbytheowner;andacombinationofsuchcontrolandtherisk-takinginherentinownershipwerethestandardelementsinthecompletefunctionattributedtotheentrepreneurofeconomictheory.Theapplicationofentrepreneurialconceptstothelargecorporationraisesahostofnewproblems,tothesolu-tionofwhichthetwotypesoftreatmentmostgenerallymadeofferverylittle.Onesolutionistoredefineentrepreneurshipsolelyorchieflyintermsofrisk-takingandtoidentifythestockholderasentrepreneur.Theotheristodeclaretheprobleminsolubleandtoconcludethattheatomofentre-preneurship,liketheatomofownership,hasbeenforeverandirreparablysplitinthelargecorporation.

Whetherornotrisk-takingshouldbeconsideredallorpartoftheentre-preneurialfunctionisanacademicquestionintoadiscussionofwhichIprefernottoenterhere.Theimportantpointisthis:

Whetherthedominanttypeofbusinessorganizationistheindividualproprietorship,thepartner-ship,orthecorporation,businessleadershiporentrepreneurialcontrolisstillnecessary.Myaim,atthisjuncture,istoseewhathappenstothisfunc-tioninthelargecorporation.Twoproblemsarisehere.First,whatdoesentrepreneurialcontrolmeaninthelightoftheusualdelegationofpowersfoundinthelargecorporation?

Secondly,theresidueofcontrolremainingafterallowanceforsuchdelegationofpowersisitselfdivisible,andwemusttakeaccountofthefactthatthiscontrolmaybesharedbydifferentindi-vidualsorgroupsinavarietyofways.

Withrespecttotheproblemofdelegatedpowers,itmaybenotedthatsomedegreeofdirection,planning,andpolicyformingisassumedevenbyminorexecutives.Dothesepersonsexerciseentrepreneurialcontrol,orissuchcontrolexercisedbythosewhochoosesuchmen?

Ifchoiceofmenisthecriterion,andifdelegateddecision-makingisexcluded,thenwearedrivenupthepyramidofmanagementorganizationtothoseactuallyre-sponsiblefortheselectionofboardsofdirectors.Thosesoresponsible,incidentally,arefrequentlyreferredtoasthe"ultimatecontrol"groupandaredistinguishedfrom"management,"mainlythetopexecutives,towhomdecisionmakingisdelegated.Whilerecognizingtheimportanceofthisdistinctionbetween"ultimatecontrol"and"management,"Idonotthinkthatthistreatmentprovidesanefficientenoughtooltoanalyzetheproblemofcontrolofcorporateactivity.Toomuchishiddeninthevagueterm"management,"andtheemphasison"ultimatecontrol"frequentlyimpliesthatoutsidegroupsplayamoreimportantandactiveroleinshapingthefirm'spoliciesthanisactuallythecase.Ishouldprefertopickoutthevari-ousfunctionsofactiveleadership,withtheemphasisontheimpactofsuchleadershipontheproductiveprocess,todefinethisleadershipasentre-preneurialcontrol,andthentoseek,onthebasisofavailableevidence,howsuchleadershipisgained,amongwhomitisshared,andsoon.Ithereforesuggestthefollowingtentativedefinitionofentrepreneurialcontrol:

"Entre-preneurialcontrolconsistsofmakingthosebroaddecisionswhichdeter-minethegeneralnatureofafirm'sactivities,providedsuchdecisionsarenotsubjecttotheactivevetopowerofothersinfact（whateverthenominalrelationshipsmaybe）.Suchcontrolincludestheoriginationofmajorpolicies,themakingoftheresidueofdecisionsnotdelegatedtosubordi-nates,thechoiceofthosetoadministerpolicies,andthedeterminationoftheextenttowhichdecision-makingandauthorityaretobedelegated."Thisdefinitionis,ofcourse,vague;itismadesopurposely.Thegeneralidea,however,shouldbeclear;theemphasis,torepeat,isonactiveandactualleadership.

Thisfunctionofleadershipisreallyacompositefunction,possibleofdivisioninanumberofways.Althoughlimitationsoftimeprecludeanydetaileddiscussionofthewaysinwhichentrepreneurialcontrolmaybedivided,afewillustrationswillindicatesomeofthepossibilitiesandgivefurtherconcretenesstotheconcept.Typically,inthelargecorporation,oneorafewtopexecutivesmakemostofthebroaddecisionsthatshapethatfirm'spolicies.Onoccasion,however,thedecisionmakersmaybeforcedoutofthepositionofentrepreneurialcontrolbyapowerfulinterestgroup,untilthenpassivewithrespecttodecisionscurrentlybeingmade.Untilthattime,thedecisionmakers,notthepassiveinterestgroup,haveexercisedentre-preneurialcontrol,sinceitisthey,notthelatter,whohavedeterminedthedirectionofthefirm'scourseintheproductiveprocess.Thoughallorthemajorpartofentrepreneurialcontrolisusually,inthelargecorporation,exercisedforlongperiodsbyimportantexecutives,itmaybefrequentlyshared,eithercontinuouslyoronspecialoccasions,withcertainindividualsandcommitteesonboardsofdirectorsorwithanoutsideinterestgroup.Seldomdoboardsasawholeorstockholdersasawholeexercisecontinuous-lyanysignificantpartofthefunctionofentrepreneurialcontrol.Directorsasgroupsandcertainoutsidegroups,latertobementioned,exercisepartialorcompleteentrepreneurialcontroloccasionally-but,inthecaseofcom-pletecontrolparticularly,suchexerciseisusuallysporadic.

II.SegmentsofInterestintheCorporation

Letusturnnowtothegroupswhichtypicallyhaveaninterestinthelargecorporation.Theseinterestgroupsorsegmentsmakeuptheeconomicen-vironmentwithinwhichentrepreneurialcontrolisexercisedandcreatepressures,inproportiontothepowertheycanacquire,onthosemakingentrepreneurialdecisions.Actually,thoseinentrepreneurialcontrolcomefromoneormoreoftheseinterestsegments-usually,ashasalreadybeenimplied,fromthemanagementsegment.Butsomeotherinterestgroup,dependingonthepowerithasandthestrengthorweaknessoftheothergroups,maytakeoversomepart,thoughseldomall,ofthecompositeentre-preneurialfunction.

Aninterestgrouporsegmentwithrespecttoacorporationexistswhentheeconomicwelfareofthatgroupdependsdirectly,andinanimportantdegree,ontheactivitiesofthefirminquestion.Suchinterestsusually,butnotnecessarily,ariseoutofbuyingandsellingrelationshipsbetweenthegroupandthefirm.Thesegroupsmaybevariouslyclassified;thefollowinglistrepresentsonepossibleclassificationwhichwillbehelpfulinanalyzingourmainproblem:

（1）Suppliersofgoodsbysaleorlease（forexample,materials,equipment,land,andsoon）;

（2）lendersofmoney-funds,bothshorttermandlongterm;（3）owners（whetherownershiparisesfromin-vestmentofcapitalorwateredstock）;（4）labor;（5）providersoforganiza-tionservices,chieflyfin