《关于国家对国际不法行为的责任条款草案》.docx

1、关于国家对国际不法行为的责任条款草案国际法委员会关于国家对国际不法行为的责任条款草案第一部分 国家的国际不法行为第一章 一般原则第一条 国家对其国际不法行为的责任国家的每一个国际不法行为都会引起该国的国家责任第二条 国家国际不法行为的构成要件当行为是由下列作为或者不作为构成的，就产生了国家的国际不法行为：（1）按照国际法，可归因于该国家；（2）构成对该国国际义务的违背。第三条 国家的国际不法行为的认定国家的国际不法行为的认定为国际法所规范。其认定不受国内法把同一行为认定为合法所影响。第二章 归因于国家的行为第四条 国家机关的行为（1）任何国家机关的行为在国际法下都应当被看作是该国的行为，不管该

2、机关行使的是立法、行政、司法还是其他职能，不管它在国内政治结构中的地位如何，也不管它是作为中央政府的一个机关还是作为该国地方政府的一个机关。（2）一个机关包括根据该国国内法具有此种地位的任何个人或实体。第五条 经授权行使政府权力要素的个人或实体的行为ARTICLE 6 Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State The conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an

3、act of the former State under international law第七条 超越授权或违背指示的行为（应当看作国家行为）第八条 为一国所指挥或控制的行为（应当看作国家行为）第九条 在缺乏或者没有获得正式授权情形下做出的行为（应当看作国家行为）第十条 叛乱或其他运动行为（不应看作国家行为）第十一条 为一国自己所承认并采取的行为（不应看作国家行为）第三章 违背国际义务第十二条 违背国际义务的发生如果一国的行为与其国际义务所要求它做出的行为不一致，就发生了该国对国际义务的违背，不管有关义务的起源和性质如何。第十三条 国际义务对一国有效第十四条 违背国际义务在时间上的延续第十

4、五条 违背是由复合行为构成的第四章 一国因卷入他国行为而承担的责任第十六条 援助或协助做出国际不法行为第十七条 受指挥（direction）和控制做出的国际不法行为第十八条 为他国所胁迫第十九条 本章的效力第五章 排除行为不法性的情势第20条 同意第二十一条 自卫第二十二条 国际不法行为的对抗措施第二十三条 不可抗力（Force majeure）第二十四条 危难（distress）第二十五条 紧急状态（necessity）第二十六条 遵守强行法规范第二十七条 援引排除行为不法性的情势的后果根据本章援引排除行为不法性的情势不得有损于：（1）遵守有关义务，如果和在一定程度上排除行为不法性的情势不再

5、存在；（2）由有关行为引起的任何物质损失的赔偿问题。第二部分 国家国际责任的内容第一章 一般原则第二十八条 国际不法行为的法律后果第二十九条 继续履行的义务第三十条 终止和不再犯第三十一条 赔偿第三二十二条 与国内法无关第三十三条 规定在本部分中的国际义务的范围（1）规定在本部分中责任国的义务可能是对另一国，或几个国家，或者是作为整体的国际社会所承担的，具体取决于有关义务的性质和内容及违背之情形。（2）本部分不得损害因国家之国际责任可能直接带给国家之外的个人或实体的任何权利。第二章 对损害的赔偿第三十四条 赔偿的形式第三十五条 复原第三十六条 补偿第三十七条 使受损方得到满足第三十八条 利息第

6、三十九条 对损害的促成第三章 严重违反一般国际法强行规范性下的义务第四十条 本章的适用第四十一条 严重违反本章中的义务的具体后果（1）国家应当通过合法手段进行合作以终止第四十条意义上的任何严重违反之行为。（2）任何国家都不得承认第四十条意义上的严重违反之行为所创造的情势为合法，也不得援助或协助维持此情势。（3）第三部分 国家的国际责任的履行第一章 国家责任的追究第四十二条 由受害国追究责任第四十三条 由受害国告知其要求第四十四条 要求的可接受性第四十五条 追究责任权利的丧失第四十六条 受害国为多个国家第四十七条 责任国为多个国家第四十八条 由一国而不是受害国对责任的追究（1）除受害国以外的任何

7、国家都有权根据第2段追究另一国的责任，如果：（1）被违反的义务是对包括该国在内的国家集团承担的，且是为保护该集团的集体利益而确立的；或者（2）被违反的义务是对作为整体的国际社会承担的。第二章 对抗措施第四十九条 对抗措施的目的与限制（1）受害国只能针对对国际不法行为负有责任的国家采取对抗措施以促使该国遵守其在第二部分下的义务。（2）对抗措施只限于采取对抗措施的国家暂时不履行其向责任国承担的国际义务。（3）对抗措施应尽可能以容许恢复有关义务的履行的方式采取。第五十条 不受对抗措施影响的义务第五十一条 相称性第五十二条 诉诸对抗措施的有关条件第五十三条 对抗措施的终止第五十四条 由他国而不是受害国

8、采取的措施第四部分 一般性规定第55条 特别法第五十六条 不为本草案条文规范的国家责任问题第五十七条 国际组织的责任第五十八条 个人责任第五十九条 联合国宪章Daniel Bodansky, John R. Crook and James Crawford FNa1 , *874 THE ILCS ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS: A RETROSPECT, 96 Am. J. Intl L. 874 (October, 2002).The development of the art

9、icles on state responsibility of the International Law Commission (ILC) FN1 has been described elsewhere, in particular in the ILCs Yearbook. The phases of development of the first (1955-1996) and second (1998-2001) readings are well enough known, and there is little point in repeating this material

10、. FN2 Whatever the trials and longueurs of their production, the articles with their commentaries now exist and may be assessed as a whole. The first reading was the product of decades of work under successive special rapporteurs (Roberto Ago, Willem Riphagen, and Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz). The second r

11、eading was equally a collective process and many members contributed to the final result. As I was formally responsible for shaping the work on second reading, I may not be the best person to comment on the outcome. Anything less than a full-scale defense of the text will be seen as an unauthorized

12、retreat, and if the text cannot defend itself with the aid of the commentaries, it is too late for individuals to make up for any deficiencies. Nonetheless, some of the reflections in this helpful and timely symposium do call for some comment. Rather than deal with the comments successively, I will

13、do so thematically, focusing on the questions that now seem the most important. As will be seen, these are mostly questions of a general character. Indeed, the symposium is striking for the comparative absence of suggestions as to how particular provisions could have been worded differently-assuming

14、 at least that the ILC was correct in limiting the text to issues of state responsibility and to invocations of that responsibility by states, a matter discussed by Edith Brown Weiss and one to which I will return. Furthermore, I agree with much of what is said here-in terms of both the descriptions

15、 of what was done and intended by the ILC and, to some extent, the criticisms of what may have been left undone-so that it is possible to be selective. An initial point should be made, which some of the contributors tend to ignore. FN3 The ILC process did not occur in isolation. In addition to debat

16、es in the literature (some of it appearing in time to be reflected in the text), the Commission received rather regular feedback from *875 governments, through the Sixth Committee and otherwise. It is true that the forms of discussion fell short of consultation processes adopted by national law comm

17、issions, and of course the ILCs consultations were not necessarily representative. But they were not negligible. The draft articles in the course of their development were subjected to several hundred oral comments in the Sixth Committee (most of them informally made available in writing), as well a

18、s many hundreds of pages of written comments, published by the United Nations Secretariat. Altogether, the process of comment and feedback during the second reading was, relatively speaking, substantial. Several articles owe their language, and in a few cases even their existence, FN4 to comments of

19、 governments. Where suggestions were rejected, reasons were given. Over and above the specific points on drafting, the comments conveyed a sense of the sustainable balance of the articles as a whole, which was particularly significant in the latter stages of the work. More particularly, Article 54 (

20、countermeasures by states other than injured states) was reduced between 2000 and 2001 from a substantive article to a saving clause in response to the general views of governments. The exclusion of any form of punitive or exemplary damages (as at one stage envisaged for Article 41) resulted from ne

21、arly unanimous criticisms of governments; this decision helped to consolidate the ILCs view that former Article 19 (international crimes of states) should be deleted. On the positive side, there was widespread support in the Sixth Committee and in written comments for such matters as the retention o

22、f the articles on countermeasures; the distinction between injured and other states (Articles 42 and 48); the simplification of former chapter III of part 1 on breach; and the concept of invocation as the key organizing idea in chapter I of part 3. The final balance struck in the chapter on counterm

23、easures owed much to government comments, as well as the decision to retain chapter IV of part 1 dealing with responsibility of one state for the conduct of another, despite the criticism (arguably justified) that it did not form part of the secondary rules of responsibility. These government commen

24、ts and statements (many of them expressed by legal advisers in the regular week for their attendance in New York) formed part of a process of feedback that paralleled and indeed overshadowed the less direct and more subtle feedback loop with the International Court of Justice. FN5 Such opinions cann

25、ot simply be manipulated. The fact that government comments were carefully taken into account may well have played a role in the relatively benign reception of the articles by the Sixth Committee at the fifty-sixth session of the UN General Assembly in October 2002, and in the rapid adoption of the

26、Assemblys Resolution 56/83. Of more than fifty governments FN6 that expressed views in the debate, only two (Mexico and Guatemala) made criticisms of such a kind as to imply rejection of the ILCs proposals-and they did so in terms of a preference for an immediate diplomatic conference rather than ou

27、tright rejection of the text. Neither of these possibilities, however, stood any chance of acceptance by the Sixth Committee, and there was little support even for a deferral of a resolution to the following year. As the editors of this symposium, Daniel Bodansky and John Crook note, Resolution 56/8

28、3 leaves open the question of the form of the articles, in accordance with the ILCs recommendation. FN7 It annexes the articles (the term draft is deleted) and commends them to the attention of governments. The General Assembly did no less (and no more) than the ILC had hoped, and did it with remark

29、able promptness. *876 Against this background, I propose first to mention certain issues regarding the content of the articles, and then, at rather greater length, to discuss some of the questions raised about their character and future. I. THE CONTENT OF THE ARTICLES The Distinction Between Primary

30、 and Secondary Obligations as an Organizing Device An initial point concerns the distinction between primary and secondary obligations as the central organizing device of the articles. This approach, of course, goes back to Ago, and (uniquely) he is cited in the commentary by name, and his own expre

31、ssion of the distinction quoted with approval: It is one thing to define a rule and the content of the obligation it imposes, and another to determine whether that obligation has been violated and what should be the consequences of the violation. FN8 To be precise, the key idea is that a breach of a

32、 primary obligation gives rise, immediately by operation of the law of state responsibility, to a secondary obligation or series of such obligations (cessation, reparation .). The articles specify the default rules that determine when a breach occurs and, in general, the content of the resulting secondary obligations. In their final form the