存在与时间的术语表打印版.docx

1、存在与时间的术语表打印版Glossary of Terms in Being and TimeBy Roderick MundayIntroductory notesThis glossary is taken from my Explication and Commentary of Heideggers Being and Time. It was first published online in February 2006 and was substantially updated in September 2006. It is, however, a work in progres

2、s, so please do not expect a definitive list of terms (yet). The citations contained in this glossary refer to the relevant passages in the aforementioned Explication and Commentary and also to the page references found in the 1962 English translation of Being and Time. The full citation of this wor

3、k is:Heidegger, Martin (2000), Being and Time, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (trans), London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.The glossary is primarily aimed at persons reading Being and Time in English and consequently German terms are, for the most part, omitted. The primary exception to this is the

4、term Dasein, which is familiar enough to English readers. Needless to say, I apologise to any German readers - as well as to Heidegger purists reading this! For those seeking translations of the many of the Greek words and phrases in Being and Time, there is already and excellent online resource ded

5、icated to this at Petes Ereignis site:- A -ApophanticA term coined by Aristotle to designate a certain kind of judgement, which, he claimed, could ascertain what is false and what is true about phenomena. However, an apophantic judgement does not arrive at its verdict by comparing true entities with

6、 false ones, but by examining and evaluating the entities in themselves. This is why Heidegger was so keen on the method for his phenomenology ref. 7, page 56. Heidegger argues that the comparative methods of judging actually obscures the truth, because it is a placing of something in front of somet

7、hing else. Therefore in order to discover the truth, one must apprehending the being of an entity in and for itself.Apophantic judgements are made either by attributing a predicate to a subject (insofar as it pertains to the subject as a property of it); or conversely denying a predicate to a subjec

8、t (insofar as it does not pertain to it), However in both cases the subject and predicates belong to the entity itself and not to something else. Thus, from this ontological basis Aristotle claimed that apophantic judgements could establish the pure forms of all possible true (and false) predication

9、s and Heidegger claimed by using them he could avoid basing his philosophy on the comparative method of judgment (so that his would not be a mere philosophy of appearances) ref. 7, Page 52 - 53. (This explanation of apophantic was adapted from www.marcuse.org).Appearance and AnnouncingAppearance des

10、cribes a relationship between phenomena, which is always based on a referral of some kind or other, therefore it is contrary to phenomena that show themselves in their genuine Being. The phenomenon of appearance also shows itself, but its Being is always a reference masking some other kind of Being.

11、 ref. 7, page 54Appearance (as the appearance of something) does not mean something that shows itself, but rather something that announces itself. Announcing can be defined as a showing itself by not showing itself, for example an illness announces itself in its symptoms, which are, so to speak, its

12、 calling card. So, in a sense, appearance is a not showing itself (Heidegger uses the term not here with the caveat that it is not to be understood as meaning a negation, but as indicating the presence of something unseen). Anything that never shows itself is also something that can never seem. This

13、 is why appearance is different from showing or seeming. All indications, presentations, symptoms and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing. Appearance has four distinct meanings.1.Appearance = something which announces itself without showing itself, i.e. the disease announcing itsel

14、f through its symptoms.2.Appearance = something that signifies showing itself, and therefore implies the appearance of phenomena, i.e., a phantom trace on a radar screen that is mistaken for a plane.3.Appearance = the term used incorrectly to describing the genuine showing-itself of a phenomenon.4.A

15、ppearance = something which is the positive emissary of that which does not appear in any manifest form, i.e., a thing which indicates the existence of that which does not appear and never will appear. For instance, causal changes due to the passage of time announces itself in the greying of someone

16、s hair, or the changes in a landscape, or the decaying of fruit, left in a bowl. All these instances appear to point to the existence of a thing called time, which otherwise does not exist as a phenomenon which can be seen in itself.The point to be made here is that if one defines phenomenon with th

17、e aid of a conception of appearance which does not differentiate between these multiple meaning, then confusion is bound to reign! ref. 7, Page 52 - 53Assignment(See equipment)Authenticity and InauthenticityAuthentic Being is its own measure, in other words when it does not have to justify its exist

18、ence as compared with anything else.Authenticity and inauthenticity are what gives Dasein its definite character. Dasein is either Authentic, which, in the sense of my Being, means that I can chose and win myself, or conversely lose and never win myself ref. 9, Page 68, or Dasein is Inauthentic, whi

19、ch means fleeing in the face of my Being and forgetting that I can chose and win myself ref. 9, Page 69-70. Authenticity and inauthenticity do not derive their meaning or value by comparison with anything else, in this sense that they simply are what they are. This means that we cannot speak of them

20、 as being determined by any prior considerations or influences, but rather we should think of them as determining these things, since authenticity and inauthenticity are the grounds on which a particular Dasein determines its own possibilies. ref. 12, page 78When a particular Dasein talks about its

21、Being, it is in each case my Being. And because the essence of Dasein lies in its to be it is also my to be. Thus, we talk about Daseins Being in terms of possibility rather than actuality. But of course describing something in terms of all of the potential ways that it can be, is far more complex t

22、han describing it in terms of what it is. ref. 9, Page 67.The decision as to which way the Being of Dasein is my to be, is something that a particular Dasein will have decided beforehand, based on the constraints imposed upon it by experience (see historicality). The entity Dasein, whos Being is an

23、issue for it, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility and for that reason it can chose itself and win itself, or conversely lose itself and never win itself, or perhaps only seem to do so. But this choosing and loosing is defined only in t

24、he sense that it can be essentially viewed by Dasein as Being authentic - that is as something which has a reality value that is not relative to or measured by comparisons with anything else. Authenticity stands alone: it is the way things are. ref. 9, Page 68 An authentic Being is its own measure,

25、because it does not have to justify its existence by comparing it with anything else (indeed, how would it be possible for people step outside of their own lives to do this?)Dasein exists, either in the mode of authenticity, or inauthenticity. In fact, in saying this Heidegger is claiming that Dasei

26、n cannot properly be described as existing in any other state, although he does concedes that Dasein can be said to be modally undifferentiated. However in considering this last remark, I want to point out that this undifferentiated Dasein cannot be said to constitute a description of any positive c

27、haracteristics, since undifferentiated Dasein would not possess any characteristics at all. The key word in Heideggers above statement is describe. You cannot describe Dasein itself since Dasein is not a thing that can be pointed at or talked about in the way we can talk about entities which are not

28、 Dasein ref. 9, page 67. In order to talk about being at all we have to talk about structures of Being. For example you cannot talk about the Being of a particular Dasein because it is the sum total of all its possibilities, but you can say of Dasein, generally speaking, that it is the sum total of

29、its possibilities and potentials (whatever they may be). This statement is structural because it describes the structures in which Dasein inhabits. This then is what we are looking at when we are analysing Being. The structural map to the territory that is Being. By looking at the map, we can point

30、to certain characteristics that stand out, of which authenticity and inauthenticity are the primary ones. Authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein must be seen and understood in Heideggers analysis as being a priori (that is as coming before) Daseins understanding of itself and thus of its understa

31、nding of its own existence. However, although not determined by anything prior, authenticity and inauthenticity are themselves grounded upon a state of Heidegger calls Being-in-the-world. ref. 12, page 78 (see also inauthenticity)Average EverydaynessIn this history of philosophy, one gets the strong

32、 impression that thoughts about existence have always emerged in the rarefied atmosphere of solitary contemplation. As Heidegger quite rightly points out, this attitude is not typical of the way people live their everyday lives. Much of our existence is not spend in reflexive contemplation of our Being-in-the-world, but rather we are immersed in the task of just getting on with our lives. This then is Daseins mode of average everydayness. However Heidegger considers this ordinary mode of Being, despite being the most unconsidered, to be also the most impor