毕业论文全套系列八 法学专业 外文翻译 简谈胎儿权利的法律保护.docx

1、毕业论文全套系列八 法学专业 外文翻译 简谈胎儿权利的法律保护毕业论文全套系列八 法学专业 外文翻译 简谈胎儿权利的法律保护 法学专业 外文文献翻译题目: 简谈胎儿权利的法律保护姓名:学院(部):专业: 法 学 班级:学号: 5 指导教师:职称: 外文文献翻译胎儿和法律SHELLEY BURTT美国耶鲁大学政治系,New Haven,CT 06520-8301 划定孕妇的性质和权力范围不完全是美国中央的问题。通过其本国法律和司法审判,每一个州对这个问题采取的立场并非总是一致的。然而在美国,结合最近的一些事态发展,孕妇的政治地位被以特有的方式而关注。最熟悉的也许是辩论如何在怀孕期间控制日益严重的

2、药物滥用。全国卫生统计中心记录了从1986年到1988年增加了百分之五十的婴儿出生时产妇药物使用的迹象。参议院的一个文件表明百分之十一新生儿有药品滥用的迹象。随着探讨孕妇的性质和权力的范围,引发一些对孕妇的引人注目的医疗措施,迅速进步的医疗技术使早期发现和治疗胎儿的违规行为增多,新的理解和注意那些健康危害的工作场所和损害胎儿发育的环境,不可避免地,在美国每年那些堕胎冲突持续不断。 提出上述各领域的争议问题:关于父母和社区对尚未出生儿童的责任程度。医生应该将治疗的胎儿作为一个第二个病人?还是应该确定他们的中心完全根据与他们协商的健康和有福利的成年人? 我对这些问题的措辞,以强调照顾出生的孩子是一

3、项共同的责任,女子愿意或不情愿地发现自己怀孕对这个健康的结果并不是唯一一个负责任的。我为州立法支持“紧急家庭”而制订案例,我会说更多的是采取在政体中的作用,确保幸福期待父母和他们对后代的预期。但是与胎儿权利争论的核心相抵触是有关某一个妇女对胎儿进行的责任。一个女人的“注意义务” 是以她的孩子在出生时开始?还是在胎儿能发育的时候开始?或是在她要是决定怀孕的时候开始?甚至是在她意识前到她已经怀孕的时候开始? 这或许是值得在这里说,这种看法可能意味着对道德和政治的人工流产。简单地说,我的立场是,妇女照顾她的胎儿义务不排除在某些情况下堕胎作为一种道德上可以接受的选择。此外,一个事实即堕胎是不是在所有情

4、况下都可行,在道德上都可接受处理自己的怀孕方式,而本身不会以任何州的判例或责任来确保妇女使自己怀孕的决定在道德上正确。我在此重点论述当一个女人决定(通过不行使其权利去流产)妊娠到足月时,提供照顾的职责和适当的政府管制。 幸运的是,大多数妇女在美国都有决定孕育婴儿这样的选择。虽然,照顾胎儿并不取决于是否有这样的选择。由于至少在一段时间内堕胎仍然存在,一个在道德上可以接受的选择是,发现一个人怀孕本身并不强加一种照顾胎儿的义务,也并不强加选择继续怀孕。怀孕的责任是将导致生产婴儿和照顾儿童这是相当合理的期望。 胎儿权利的辩论不是每个人都认为母婴关系屈服于过度单纯化特点。一定数量强有力的努力,确定了孕妇

5、开始被确认道义上独特性质的责任和非凡的道德复杂性的关系。一定数量强有力的努力开始设法对妇女和一个在子宫内的孩子之间通过肯定关系确定孕妇独特的本质道德责任和非凡复杂道德。在我自己思考这个问题,我发现最有力强调这一特殊的关系的以下特点。 正如出生或收养,婚姻或婚约创立了新的关系,因怀孕带来了新的责任。在子宫内植入形成受精卵的妇女参与了一个独特而复杂的关系,从受孕的一刻将许多个月与另一个人拥有一个单独的(基因)身份,不像子女或配偶,他没有单独存在。这个问题,他们必须处理的是其中一个男人或一个不孕妇女将永远不会面对的:对界定不是对另一个人的照管义务,也不是一个人的配偶,父母或后代,而是另一个在有限的时

6、间内与自己共存的人。 接受怀孕作出道义上的差异并不是在于本身,我们州的限制可能会因此发生被期待母亲的行为。一个期待女人的怀孕(情愿或不情愿地),假设新的道义上的义务与未来的父亲一样,但是政府不一定拥有相应的权力,以确保这种道德履行职责。这个问题仍然存在,社会能恰当地要求一名孕妇有什么样的牺牲,在多大程度上可以合法地限制她的行为。外文文献翻译原文The fetus and the lawSHELLEY BURTTDepartment of Political Science,Yale University,New Haven,CT 06520-8301,USA The fetus and the

7、 law: Maternalist vs. natalist perspectives Delimiting the nature and scope of state authority over pregnant women I snot an exclusively American problem. Through its laws and judicial decisions, every nation takes a position not always logical or coherent or just on this question. In the United Sta

8、tes,however, a number of recent developments have combined to focus attention on the possibly unique political status of the expectant mother in a particularly striking way.Most familiar perhaps is the debate over how to control the growing problem of substance abuse during pregnancy.The National Ce

9、nter for Health Statistics documented a 50 percent increase in infants born with indications of maternal drug use between 1986 and 1988 Kennedy,1991:p. 558.One Senate document places the number of drug-exposed newborns at 11 per cent of all births Johnsen,1989:p. 212.Discussion of the nature and sco

10、pe of state authority over pregnant women has also been fueled by several spectacular cases of court ordered medical interventions on pregnant women,rapid advances in medical technology that allow increasingly early detection and treatment of fetal irregularities,new understanding and attention to t

11、hose health hazards in workplace and environment that compromise fetal development and,inevitably,continued conflict over the number of abortions performed in the United States each year. Each of these areas of controversy raises questions:about the extent of parental and community responsibility to

12、 children who have not yet been born.Ought doctors to treat the fetus as 30 % patient? Or should they define their concerns exclusively in terms of the health and welfare of the adult who consults them? I have phrased these questions so as to underline the fact that caring for the unborn child is a

13、shared responsibility; the woman who willingly or unwillingly finds herself bringing a pregnancy to term is not the only one responsible for a healthy outcome. In elaborating my case for state action in support of theemergent familyI will say more about what I take to be the politys role in ensuring

14、 the well-being of expectant parents and their anticipated off-spring.But at the core of the fetal rights debate are competing claims about an individual womans responsibility to the fetus she carries.Does a wemanduty of care to her child begin at birth? Once the fetus is viable? Once she has decide

15、d to carry the pregnancy to term?Or even before she realizes she is pregnant? It is perhaps worthwhile to say something here about what this view might mean for the morality and politics of abortion. Briefly,my position is that the duty of care a women owes to her fetus does not rule out abortion as

16、 a morally acceptable choice in some circumstances and as a morally flawed but still allowable choice in others.Furthermore, the fact that abortions are not in all circumstances a morally acceptable way of managing ones pregnancy does not in itself give the state either the authority or the responsi

17、bility to assure that the decisions women make about their pregnancies are morally correct.Working from these premises which are,of course, eminently debatable themselves,I focus in this essay on the duties of care and governmental regulation appropriate when a woman decides through not exercising h

18、er right to an abortion to carry a pregnancy to term. I speak in this paper about a decision to bring a baby to term because,fortunately,most women in the United States have such a choice to make.However,the care owed to the fetus is not dependent on the availability of this choice as if having no c

19、hoice about going through with a pregnancy might lessen ones responsibility to the child growing inside one. Because abortion remains,for at least some period of time, a morally acceptable option,discovering one is pregnant does not itself impose a duty of care to the fetus.Nor does a choice to cont

20、inue the pregnancy.The ground of prenatal responsibility is rather the reasonable expectation whether welcome or not that the pregnancy will result in a live birth and a child to be cared for. Given these disparate characterizations of an identical physical condition, it is perhaps hard to accept th

21、at maternalists and natalists share any common ground. In fact,both sides in this debate reach their conclusions on the basis of partial and partisan depictions of the fetus status. Declaring the fetus a separate creature from the moment of conception does not transform a pregnant woman into a mothe

22、r with maternal duties towards the separate creatureattached by an umbilical cord to a placenta in her womb.Yet it is equally misleading to treat pregnancy simply as a transitory physical disability ? a puzzling bloating of the body and hormonal onslaught that nine months later magically resolves it

23、self into a truly separate being to whom extensive duties of care are n o w owed. Not everyone who thinks about the maternal-fetal relationship succumbs to the oversimplification characteristic of participants in the fetal rights debate. A number of powerful efforts to define the moral responsibilit

24、ies of pregnant women manage to begin or conclude by affirming the unique nature and extraordinary moral complexity of the relationship between a woman and a developing child in uterus.Any one of these accounts represents a significant improvement on what passes for moral reflection in most of the f

25、etal rights literature. In my own thinking about the issue,I have found it most helpful to emphasize the following features of this special relationship. Just as a birth or an adoption,a marriage or an engagement creates a new relationship that brings with it new responsibilities, so does a pregnanc

26、y.The implanting of the fertilized egg in the womb creates for the woman involved a unique and complex relationship with another human being - one who possesses,from the moment of conception,a separate genetic identity yet who will for many months, and unlike a child or spouse, have no separate exis

27、tence.The problem with which they must grapple is one which a man or an infertile woman will never confront:the problem of defining the duty of care owed not to another unrelated human being, nor to ones spouse,parent or offspring,but rather to another being coexistent,for a limited period of time,w

28、ith oneself. To accept that pregnancy does make a moral difference does not in itself tell us anything about the sort of limits the state may therefore place on an expectant mothers behavior.A woman who anticipates carrying her pregnancy to term willingly or unwillingly assumes new moral duties,as d

29、oes the prospective father,but neither her government nor her obstetrician necessarily possess any corresponding authority to assure that such moral duties are fulfilled.The question remains open of what sort of sacrifices the community can appropriately demand of a pregnant woman,how far it can legitimately constrain her behavior. 指 导 老 师 评 语 签名: 年 月 日