《中欧全面投资协定》投资者东道国争端解决机制构想以ISDS改革为视角.docx

1、中欧全面投资协定投资者东道国争端解决机制构想以ISDS改革为视角中欧全面投资协定投资者-东道国争端解决机制构想以ISDS改革为视角An Outlook for the Possible ISDS Mechanism of China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment from the Perspective of ISDS ReformIntroduction引言In 2014, China and the European Union (“EU”) initiated their first round of negotiations on t

2、he investment agreement. After 35 rounds of “tug-of-war”, on 30th December 2020, China and the EU have finally concluded in principle the negotiations for the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (“CAI”). The text of the CAI is partially released on 22nd January 2021.2014年，中国和欧盟启动了第一轮的投资协定谈判。历经35轮拉

3、锯，双方最终于2020年12月30日完成了中欧全面投资协定（EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment，“CAI”）的谈判，并于2021年1月22日公布了CAI部分文本。1The CAI aims to replace and unify the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) entered by China and 26 out of the 27 member countries of the EU respectively so as to establish a unified multila

4、teral institutional framework, which covers, inter alia, the market access commitments, information transparency, fair trading and competition, fair labor treatment, sustainable development and etc. It is worth noting that, in regard to the dispute resolution mechanism, the CAI has not directly set

5、out a set of rules for the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”), but adopted the similar route as is in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which was signed by and among China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast

6、Asian Nations on 15th November 2020. That is, the signatory parties vowed to conclude the negotiations on ISDS mechanism within 2 years after the signing of the CAI. China and the EU had also specifically agreed that such ISDS mechanism would take into account of the ISDS reform currently carried ou

7、t by the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”). In this regard, what kind of ISDS mechanism that will be finally adopted in the CAI is particularly worth the attention.中欧全面投资协定旨在取代中国和欧盟其中26个成员国之间现有的双边投资条约，建立一个统一的制度性框架，其中涉及市场准入、透明度、公平竞争、劳工待遇、可持续发展等等方面。然而，值得注意的是，中欧全面投资协定中关

8、于投资者-东道国争端解决（Investor-State Dispute Settlement，“ISDS”）机制方面没有具体规定，而是采取类似于中国与日本、韩国、澳大利亚、新西兰及东南亚国家联盟十国共十五方于2020年11月15日正式签署的区域全面经济伙伴关系协定（Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership，“RCEP”）中的约定，即缔约方承诺在该协议签署后的2年内完成ISDS机制的谈判。中欧双方在CAI中还特别承诺，该ISDS机制的设立将会考虑联合国国际贸易法委员会（UNCITRAL）组织下的ISDS改革（“ISDS改革”）方面获得的相关工作成果。

9、2如此一来，中欧全面投资协定最终将采取何种ISDS机制，就尤为值得关注与期待。In light of the above, this article will first introduce the ISDS reform led by the UNCITRAL with particular attention paid on the reform submissions by China and the EU, which may shed a light on the possible positions to be adopted by China and the EU in the

10、CAI with respect to ISDS mechanism. Based on the above analysis together with the consensus and progress achieved so far in the ISDS reform, this article will then look forward to the ISDS mechanism that may be eventually adopted in the CAI.有鉴于此，本文将首先梳理UNCITRAL组织下的ISDS改革，并就其中欧盟与中国关于部分关键问题的立场进行简要分析，以

11、期窥见双方在中欧全面投资协定项下ISDS条款的商定中可能倾向采取的立场。最后，基于上述分析以及ISDS改革目前已取得的共识与阶段性进展，本文将对中欧全面投资协定可能最终呈现的ISDS机制进行展望。1. ISDS Reform led by the UNCITRALUNCITRAL组织下的ISDS改革As an essential part of international investment dispute resolution, ISDS mechanism has now been adopted or incorporated into many International Inves

12、tment Agreements (IIAs). While ISDS provisions in investment treaties may vary, they normally have an arbitration-based dispute settlement mechanism with the following features: (i) the claimant/investor may bring a claim directly against the host State; (ii) the dispute is resolved by an arbitral t

13、ribunal constituted ad hoc for that particular dispute; and (iii) both parties to the dispute, i.e., the claimant/investor and the respondent/State, play an important role in the appointment and selection of the arbitrators. It is undeniable that the ISDS mechanism plays a crucial part in the protec

14、tion and promotion of investment. The ISDS mechanism empowers the investor to protect their interests against the States in a more active and fairer way compared to the diplomatic protection provided by the investors own countries.作为国际投资争议解决机制中极为重要的一部分，ISDS机制已被大多数国际投资条约纳入。虽然投资条约中ISDS条款各不相同，但它们通常都规定了

15、基于仲裁的争议解决机制，并且具有以下特征：1）投资者可直接针对东道国提出请求；2）投资者与东道国之间的争议由专为该争议组成的仲裁庭解决；3）争议双方，也即投资者和东道国，均有权利参与仲裁员的提名。3不可否认的是，目前通行的ISDS机制在促进外商投资、保护投资者方面发挥了重要的作用。通过ISDS机制，投资者将不再必须通过母国的外交保护去实现自己的投资利益，而可通过以提起仲裁这一更为主动、也更为平等的方式向东道国主张自己的权益。However, in recent years, the drawbacks of the current ISDS mechanism have become incr

16、easingly pronounced, especially the lack of consistency and coherence in the arbitral awards. First of all, there is a lack of coherence and consistency in the investment protection standards. The current international investment treaty regime is rather fragmented. Multilateral investment treaties a

17、re rather rare while most of international investment treaties are only bilateral and investment protection standards provided in these BITs vary widely. This problem is magnified by the fact that the language of some BITs, especially of those earlier treaties, are relatively vague and broadly-defin

18、ed, leaving arbitrators with rather unrestricted discretion in interpretation and application. Secondly, the facts that ISDS cases are heard by arbitral tribunals constituted ad hoc and there is no strict doctrine of precedent in arbitration lead to the widespread conflicts in arbitral awards. In pr

19、actice, different tribunals sometimes have different conclusions even on the same standards drawn from the same investment treaty. For example, regarding the “fair and just treatment” under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada the tribunal held that this pro

20、vision cannot be read in the vacuum, but should be interpreted with reference to other international treaties, while in Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican State, another tribunal took the view that the so-called “fair and just treatment” should be independent of the custom international laws an

21、d means the host State should provide extra fairness and justness to the investors. Thirdly, the ISDS arbitral awards are normally final with very limited appeal and review mechanisms. For example, in an arbitration case administered under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Betw

22、een States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID”), the annulment proceeding can be brought under Art. 52 of the ICSID in extremely limited situations that only relate to the procedural aspects. The restricted access to appeal and review further exacerbates the consistency and coherence in the ISDS

23、arbitral awards. Besides, in respect of the arbitrators, under the current ISDS mechanism, there is no code that may regulate the arbitrators conduct and no mechanism to hold them accountable for any misconduct, which endangers the impartiality and independency of the arbitrators. Moreover, with res

24、pect to the procedural matters, ISDS cases may involve increasingly high costs and lengthy proceedings and etc, which cause unnecessary burden upon the parties, especially from the claimant/investors perspective. These concerns are all negatively affecting the legality and effectiveness of the ISDS

25、mechanism.但是近年来，目前通行的ISDS机制的问题日渐彰显，其中尤为突出的问题在于投资仲裁的结果严重缺乏一致性。具体而言：第一，在投资保护标准方面的不一致。目前的国际投资条约体系呈现“碎片化”的特征，现有的大部分国际投资条约几乎都是各国之间签订的双边投资条约（Bilateral Investment Treaty，“BIT”），而少见多边投资条约，而各BIT之间的具体条款规定不尽相同，由此在根源上导致了各国乃至各案之间的投资保护标准不同。此外，很多投资条约，尤其是第一代投资条约，用语相对宽泛模糊，给予裁判者极大的解释空间，加剧了投资保护标准的不一致性。第二，在仲裁庭方面，由于投资者与

26、东道国之前的投资争议通常是由专为该争议组成的临时仲裁庭解决，仲裁庭也并无遵循先例的强制性义务，这就导致仲裁裁决结果容易相互冲突，甚至于不同仲裁庭会就相同投资条约中相同标准得出不同结论，4例如，对于北美自由贸易协定（North American Free Trade Agreement，NAFTA）下约定的“公正与公平待遇”的标准认定，在S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada案中，仲裁庭认为“公正与公平待遇”条款不能单独理解，应该参考其它国际条约，5而在Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States案中，仲裁庭认为“公正与公平待遇”条款

27、应独立于习惯国际法解释，意味着东道国额外给予的公平公正待遇。6第三，缺乏有效的复审或者上诉机制。国际投资仲裁裁决具有终局性，在国际投资争端解决中心（ICSID）仲裁下，虽然当事人可以根据解决国家与他国国民间投资争端公约（Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States，“ICSID公约”）第52条申请撤销裁决，但其所允许的裁决情形极为有限，通常都是与正当程序相关，对于实体问题的错误，则几乎求告无门。7除仲裁结果缺乏一致性之外，在仲裁员方面，虽然在现有的

28、ISDS机制下，仲裁员可由当事人双方指定，但由于缺乏硬性的仲裁员行为规范、监督与问责机制，仲裁员的独立性和公正性难以保障。同时，在仲裁程序方面，投资者与国家间争议解决存在时间漫长、费用繁杂等等问题。8这些都对ISDS体制的合法性和有效性造成了不小的冲击。9Against this backdrop, the UNCITRAL initiated the ISDS reform in 2017, which consists of a three-stage scheme, i.e. (i) to identify and consider concerns regarding ISDS; (i

29、i) to consider whether reform is desirable in light of any identified concerns; and (iii) if the reform is desirable, any relevant solutions should be formulated.正是在这样的背景下，UNCITRAL于2017年启动了对现有ISDS的改革工作，整体改革基于三步走的方案，也即：首先，确定和审议有关ISDS改革的具体问题；其次，审查对已确定的具体问题进行改革是否可行；最后，提出具体可行的改革方案建议。102. Positions of Ch

30、ina and EU on the ISDS Reform under UNCITRAL中国与欧盟在UNCITRAL组织下的ISDS改革中的立场According to the 2018 Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-sixth session, the identified concerns mainly cover the inconsistency of ISDS, absence of review mechanism, i

31、mpartiality and independence of arbitrators, and third-party funding. Regarding these concerns, the EU points out that the identified concerns are intertwined and systemic, and addressing such specific concerns in a piecemeal approach would leave some concerns unaddressed. Thus, to address these con

32、cerns, the EU proposes a systematic and holistic approach, that is, the establishment of Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) which is consistent with the nature of international investment treaty regime.根据UNCITRAL于2018年发布的报告，目前各国就ISDS改革达成一致的具体问题包括：ISDS机制具有不一致性，ISDS机制缺乏上诉机制，仲裁员的公正性与独立性，ISDS程序成本高，第三方资助等等。11其中欧盟进一步指出，这些已确定的需要改革的具体问题是相互交织和系统性的，如果仅仅以零敲碎打的方式解决，难以彻底解决所有问题。12对此，欧盟提出，应当着手建立与国际投资条约体系特征一致的“多边投资法院（Multilateral Investment Court，MIC）”。According to the submission of the EU and its member states, the Multilateral Investment Court functions as follows:根据欧盟及其成员国提出的意见，多