外文翻译外商直接投资模式的解释基于土耳其汽车产业的分析.docx

1、外文翻译外商直接投资模式的解释基于土耳其汽车产业的分析 本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目：Understanding patterns of FDI: the case of Turkey and its auto industry 出 处：European Business Journal, 15 (2), 2003, pages 61-69 作 者： M. John Foster Ipek Alkan. Ipek 原 文：Patterns of FDI for Turkey: actuality and expectationThe starting point arguably for an

2、y aspirant developing economy in its search for inward foreign investment FDI from the perspective of the investors is the general upswing in aggregate global FDI trends from source economies, which occurs for a variety of well-rehearsed reasons, see e.g. Porter (1990), Buckley (1992) and Dunning (1

3、993). These reasons include: market extension (perhaps because the home market is near saturation); accessing scarce primary products (primarily oil and minerals); production efficiency strategies benefiting from location-specific cost advantages in sink economies; and more or less complex mixtures

4、of these and other factors. For developing economies, the question they may reasonably ask is: Can we get a share of this inflow of capital?Table 1 summarises global patterns of FDI in recent years. It shows a 238% increase in aggregate FDI over the period 1994 to 1999. This comprised a 338% increas

5、e in FDI into developed countries and a 98% rise in the inflows to developing economies. In short, while there has been significant growth in developing economies, for the developed economies the growth has been much more dramatic. Even China, the much vaunted star of foreign investment, has only pe

6、rformed steadily when benchmarked against global aggregates. The table shows, using Vietnam as a benchmark, that Turkey has not done very well in aggregate terms when compared with newer emerging economies over the past decade.This simple aggregate pattern is further elaborated by considering the FD

7、I per capita figures shown in Table 2. This clearly suggests that Turkey is missing out in that its per capita performance over the decade shown has been flat while the picture has been one of sharp growth within the other developing economies. The comparison with Vietnam is very stark; Vietnam is a

8、 country which had to re-launch its economy from a very low base after the US removed its block on US companies investment, instituted immediately after its withdrawal from the Vietnam War in 1975.Indeed the flat performance of the 1990s at a time of aggregate global increase is even more notable wh

9、en compared with the 1980s. Data for that period show that the liberalisation-oriented change in regime of the period did indeed produce a positive increase albeit from a low base. Hence the fairly modest average performance around the change of decade (see Table 1) nevertheless marked a five-fold i

10、ncrease on the first couple of years. A corner was turned, so to speak, but was not followed by the expected acceleration.At an aggregate level, the ratio FDIt/GDPt,，where t is the year or period chosen, is sometimes used as an indicator of how well a country is doing in attracting FDI. Is a country

11、 getting its share? The unreliability of source data can be a problem but the ratio is likely to be fairly robust certainly to an order of magnitude. Based on data from the UN Statistical Yearbook (UN, 2001) and the data in Table 1, in 1999, Turkeys ratio was 0.4, compared with Thailand 5.5, Vietnam

12、 5.8, China 3.8, UK 5.7, and US 3.1. These data suggest that Turkey failed to perform it clearly did not get a relative share, whether compared with developed or comparable developing countries.Until recently, manufacturing was very important within the pattern of FDI into Turkey, and the biggest su

13、bsector therein was the auto and transport parts industry. Hence the auto industry might be expected to be a particular target for FDI. But actual realised FDI in that sector has been muted in absolute if not internal, comparative terms, as we explain in more detail in the next section: why?We have

14、already stated that Turkeys aggregate FDI performance has been weaker than might be expected based on simple benchmarking around the size of the countrys population and GDP. An examination of some of the key elements of the countrys business environment would tend to suggest that the expectation mig

15、ht well be for a stronger performance than that found.First of all there is its favourable geographical position. Turkey sits at the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. As such, it: abuts the EU via its current most easterly element, Greece (and has its customs union with the EU), has borders wit

16、h oil rich Iran and Iraq and moregenerally can be seen as well placed to serve the growing Middle East market, and has immediate access to a number of ex-Comecon economies either via direct land borders or by sea via Black Sea ports it controls the Bosphorus, which is the gateway to the Black Sea.Th

17、ree more positive factors can be readily identified, all of which might be thought to be sources of comparative advantage:1. competitive labour rates, certainly compared with EU rates, if not with those of other developing economies in other regions (e.g. the benchmark used before, Vietnam);2. a wel

18、l-developed infrastructure, in the west of the country at least, which is also the industrialized area; and3. a large privatisation programme, over the past decade.We conclude this section by noting the major sources of FDI into Turkey. Recently the main sources have been: France, Germany, US, Nethe

19、rlands, Switzerland, UK, Italy and Japan, see e.g. Loewendahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2000, Table 1). In other words the EU and the US lead such inward investment as is occurring, not for example its oil-rich Arab neighbours.The auto sector within the Turkish economyAt the time of the research in 20

20、01, there were 15 auto-makers in Turkey (TAMs), of which 10 have at least some element of FDI. The pattern of production and imports is shown in Table 3. It shows a growing share of the Turkish market for auto units being taken by imports even as the market itself grew.The industry is the third larg

21、est industrial segment in the economy and employs 500 000 people. Vehicle ownership rates currently are around 62 per thousand persons, compared with a global average of 82 per thousand, indicating high potential demand if the economy can grow generally. However, there are major perceived impediment

22、s to auto sales, as we discuss in the next section. These include low income per capita and high levels of final sales tax.The 15 producer companies have a capacity to build 667 000 passenger cars per annum (in five companies) and a further 223 000 vehicles of other types, making 890 000 in total. T

23、able 4 shows the recent export performance of the TAMs. While they show an upward trend they are still not sufficient to enable the TAMs to achieve acceptable levels of plant utilisation, no more than the order of 50% over a number of years.Survey of foreign-invested TAMsGiven the twin facts of Turk

24、eys general underperformance in the FDI stakes, including the auto sector, and, apparently, the potentially favourable conditions for FDI in Turkey, the question of its relatively poor level of FDI remained. In order to explore this issue, a survey was conducted of the 10 auto-makers in Turkey which

25、 have at least some element of foreign investment (the FITAMs see Appendix 1 for a list). Five of the ten responded and supplied some considerable detail, including answers to follow-up queries by telephone, where answers to questions were not wholly clear. The questionnaire was structured in the fo

26、rm of a combination of closed (fact gathering) and open (opinion offering) questions.Perceived barriers to FDI in the auto industryIt was found that the main factors believed to impede the development of the auto industry and hence act as barriers to further FDI into it were as follows: political in

27、stability, including corruption; recurring economic crises, with attendant high inflation, interest rates and stagnation; low income levels these are believed to be holding back latent domestic demand; heavy reliance on imported components (inputs) this can also be seen as the industry not achieving

28、 sufficient mass to allow local vertical integration; and high taxes on final vehicle sales, from 37 to 64%.One consequence of these factors, in combination, was low utilisation rates within Turkish auto plants (of the order of 50%, as already noted). A consequence of this in turn is that unit costs

29、 are higher than would be the case were something close to full capacity use to be achieved. This in turn has made Turkish exports less competitive, in the EU for example, than might have been expected. In the case of the EU market this lack of competitiveness occurs in spite of markedly higher EU l

30、abour rates. This highlights an important point, made elsewhere in a Southeast Asian context, see Foster (1997), that simply having low wage rates available is an inadequate basis for an FDI decision. The point seems obvious once made but is often glossed over because the low wage rationale for FDI

31、is the one most frequently discussed.The sense of Turkey being in an apparently strong competitive position vis-vis inward FDI but failing to realise its potential because of concerns regarding political and economic stability is supported by the conclusions of a recent paper by Loewandahl and Ertug

32、al-Loewendahl (2000).Prognosis for the future of FITAMsThe responding auto companies were also asked for their prognosis for the future. Those foreign manufacturers already committed to Turkey, as were our respondents, are cautiously bullish. Conclusions, in brief, were: none of the responding FITAMs had plans to withdraw nor expected competitors to do so; indeed three of the five respondents had further immediate investment plans in hand and a fourth had recently completed a significant investment; the consensus was nevertheless that moves into Turkey by Volkswagen a