巴菲特股市长期回报优于黄金和债券.docx

1、巴菲特股市长期回报优于黄金和债券巴菲特：股市长期回报优于黄金和债券Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institutio

2、n would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as income.即使是在美国，政府强烈希望维持本币稳定，但是，我1965年接管伯克希尔哈撒韦以来，美元也已贬值高达86%。当年花1美元能买到的东西，今天至少要

3、花7美元。因此，这些年来，一个免税机构须取得4.3%的债券投资年收益，才能保持购买力不变。假如管理层还将一切利息收入视为“收益”，他们一定是在开玩笑。For taxpaying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investo

4、r paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investors visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. Its

5、noteworthy that the implicit inflation tax was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. In God We Trust may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our governments printing press has been all too human.对于像你我这样的应税投资者，情况就更糟了。过

6、去的四十七里，美国国债不断地滚动，年回报率5.7%。听起来好像还不错。但对于个人所得税率平均为25%的的个人投资者而言，这5.7%的回报率所能带来的实际收益是零。投资者缴纳的、可见的所得税将拿走上述回报率中的1.4个百分点，通胀因素这个隐形的“税种”将吞噬其余4.3个百分点。值得指出的是，尽管投资者可能认为显性的所得税是主要的负担，但其实，隐形的通胀“税”是 所得税的三倍还多。没错，每张美元上都印着“我们信仰上帝”这句话，但启动美国政府印钞机的是凡夫俗子的手。High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the in

7、flation risk they face with currency-based investments - and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.当然，高利率能弥补依托于货币的投资工具所带来的通胀风险。而且，

8、20世纪80年代初时的利率确实很好地做到了这一点。不过，要抵消消费者购买力面临的风险，当前的利率水平还差得远。因此，眼下应谨慎投资债券。Under todays conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage

9、 and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our abs

10、olute minimum.在目前的环境下，我不看好依托于货币的投资。不过，伯克希尔持有的这类投资仍然达到了相当的数额，其中主要是短期品种。不管实际利率水平是多么低，在伯克希尔，对充足流动性的需求总是被置于极其重要的地位，将来其重要性也不会降低。为满足这一需求，我们主要持有美国国债即便是在最混乱的经济环境下，美国国债也是唯一靠得住的投资品种。我们正常的流动性水平是200亿美元；100亿美元是我们的绝对下限。Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-r

11、elated securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain - either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall

12、. Though weve exploited both opportunities in the past - and may do so again - we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free r

13、isk.抛开流动性和监管要求，我们一般不愿购买基于货币的证券，除非它们有可能提供超乎寻常的收益原因可能是在间歇的垃圾债券暴跌期，某只公司债定价过低；也可能是因为利率已升至高位，如果利率下跌，高评级债券有可能实现大幅资本升值。过去，这两类机会我们都抓到过未来也可能再次抓住这样的机会但当前我们与这样的前景显然背道而驰。今日的情形正如华尔街人士谢尔比库洛姆戴维斯多年前的一句俏皮话所言：“以如今的价格，宣称提供无风险回报的债券实际提供的是无回报的风险。Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar

14、 has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purc

15、hasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as income.即使是在美国，政府强烈希望维持本币稳定，但是，我1965年接管伯克希尔哈撒韦以来，美元也已贬值高达86%。当年花1美元能买到的东西，今天至少要花7美元。因此，这些年来，一个免税机构须取得4.3%的债券投资年收益，才能保持购买力不变。假如管理层还将一切利息收入视为“收益”，他们一定是在开玩笑。For taxpaying investors like you a

16、nd me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded nothing in the way

17、of real income. This investors visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. Its noteworthy that the implicit inflation tax was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor pro

18、bably thought of as his main burden. In God We Trust may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our governments printing press has been all too human.对于像你我这样的应税投资者，情况就更糟了。过去的四十七里，美国国债不断地滚动，年回报率5.7%。听起来好像还不错。但对于个人所得税率平均为25%的的个人投资者而言，这5.7%的回报率所能带来的实际收益是零。投资者缴纳的、可见的所得税将拿走上述回报率中的1.4个百

19、分点，通胀因素这个隐形的“税种”将吞噬其余4.3个百分点。值得指出的是，尽管投资者可能认为显性的所得税是主要的负担，但其实，隐形的通胀“税”是 所得税的三倍还多。没错，每张美元上都印着“我们信仰上帝”这句话，但启动美国政府印钞机的是凡夫俗子的手。High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments - and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job ni

20、cely. Current rates, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.当然，高利率能弥补依托于货币的投资工具所带来的通胀风险。而且，20世纪80年代初时的利率确实很好地做到了这一点。不过，要抵消消费者购买力面临的风险，当前的利率水平还差得远。因此，眼下应谨慎投资债券。Under todays conditions, therefore, I do

21、not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S.

22、 Treasury bills, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.在目前的环境下，我不看好依托于货币的投资。不过，伯克希尔持有的这类投资仍然达到了相当的数额，其中主要是短期品种。不管实际利率水平是多么低，在伯克希尔，对充足流动性的需求总是被置于极其重要的地

23、位，将来其重要性也不会降低。为满足这一需求，我们主要持有美国国债即便是在最混乱的经济环境下，美国国债也是唯一靠得住的投资品种。我们正常的流动性水平是200亿美元；100亿美元是我们的绝对下限。Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain - either because a particular credit is

24、mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though weve exploited both opportunities in the past - and may do so again - we are now 180 degrees removed

25、 from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk.抛开流动性和监管要求，我们一般不愿购买基于货币的证券，除非它们有可能提供超乎寻常的收益原因可能是在间歇的垃圾债券暴跌期，某只公司债定价过低；也可能是因为利率已升至高位，如果利率下跌，高评级债券有可能实现大幅资本

26、升值。过去，这两类机会我们都抓到过未来也可能再次抓住这样的机会但当前我们与这样的前景显然背道而驰。今日的情形正如华尔街人士谢尔比库洛姆戴维斯多年前的一句俏皮话所言：“以如今的价格，宣称提供无风险回报的债券实际提供的是无回报的风险。The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyers hope that someone else - who also knows that the assets w

27、ill be forever unproductive - will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.第二类投资指的是永远也不会有产出的资产，投资者买入时只是希望其他投资者这些人同样也明白这类资产永远都不会有产出将来会以更高的价格接手。最典型的就是郁金香，17世纪时，它一度成为此类买家的最爱。This type of investment requires an expanding pool o

28、f buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can produce - it will remain lifeless forever - but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.这类投资需要买家群体不断壮大，而人们之所

29、以决定买入，是因为他们相信未来买家群体还会继续壮大。这类资产的持有者并不指望资产本身能有什么产出它永远都不会有产出而是相信未来，别人会更迫切地希望接手。The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two signi

30、ficant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce a

31、t its end.这类资产中的一个大类就是黄金，它当前极受避险投资者的追捧。这些投资者对其他几乎所有资产都不放心，特别是纸币（正如前述，鉴于纸币的购买力，他们的担心不无道理）。不过，黄金有两个显著的缺点。它用途有限，也不能自我繁殖。的确，黄金有一些工业和装饰用途，但这些用途的需求有限，不足以消化新的产量。而且，如果某个投资者一直持有一盎司黄金，最终依然还是只持有一盎司黄金。What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past de

32、cade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As bandwagon investors join any party, they create their own truth - for a while.大多数投资者买入黄金是因为他们相信上述担心会升级。过去十年证明这一信念是正确的。此后，金价的继续走高是源于这波走势激发的、更旺盛的购买热情，很多人都将金价上涨视为这种投资观点得到了验证。随着“跟风”投资者的涌入，他们短期内会建立起自己的真理。Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis