国外翻译论文文档格式.docx

1、 translatingMessages from dolphinese presupposes that the content and the purportOf the utterances of dolphins is neithrer entirely beneath, nor utterly beyond,A human conception of communicative acts. There is, in fact, no guarantee That grasping the nature of the pragmatics of dolphin communicativ

2、e Performance is not totally outside the scope of human imagination.For all that cross-linguistic translation （translation proper） is notoriously Problematic and fraught with difficulties, translators from English to German, Hungarian to French, Russian to Swahili, Chinese to Gujerati, and So on, at

3、 least do not face problems of such a magnitude as do translators From dolphinese. Though translation proper is a cross-cultural puzzle, and Scepticism about full translatability without distortion is, rightly, wide-Spread among those who theorise about translation, there is no chance that The perfo

4、rmance of communicative acts in another human society, no Matter how strange and uncanny it may look at first sight when viewed From across a cultural boundary, could be beyond human imagining. When human beings communicate, they perform acts that fall into theRange of what other hunan beings, even

5、those from vastly different cultural Backgrounds, are in principle capable of empathizing with. This presumption （and I stress that it is a presumption） defines the limits of a cautious universalism or, more precisely, an intellectual position between univerSalism and relativism. What members of one

6、 culture can be imagined by Members of another culture, even if they do otherwise.it is to this extent That human communication is universal.Since the early work of Austin （1962）, and subsequently of Searle （1969,979）, the idea that utterances are forms of doing has become to all intents and purpose

7、s an interdisciplinary commonplace. The view, spearheaded By the notion of performative utterances （Austin, 1962）, according to which All utterances are means of performing intended actions has taken solid Hold in recent pragmatic approaches to semiotics （Parret, 1983）, linguistics （Levinson, 1983;

8、Brown & Levinson, 1978） it has also made its influence Felt in anthropology （Gumperz, 1982） and, of course, in theory of translation （Hatim & Mason, 1990）. The performative intention behind, and embeddedIn, every utterance （in fact, every communicative act） is usually reified使具体化Under the label of i

9、llocutionary force （Searle, 1969）; that is, the illocutionary force of an utterance its most salient pragmatic purpose is the Performative intention which the utterance serves.Since a discussion of illocutionary force entails an analytic appraisal of Supposed intentions judged by extemal functional

10、criteria, I prefer toDesignate this performative aspect of utterances by the term illocutionaryFunction. A cautious form of universalism would grant that the lllocutionary Function of every human act of communication is, in principle, knowable （though, incidentally, the same cautious intellectual po

11、sition would Express a degree of skepticism about the knowability of the illocutionary Functions of communication acts performed by non-human animals）.Furthermore, in the light of the earlier presumption about human empathy,A qualified universalism would have to stretch to the belief that illocution

12、ary Functrons can be comprehended across the most diverse cultural boundaries. This Belief does not, however, extend to supposing that the cross-cultural Appraisal of illocutionary functions is easy. On the contrary, cultural Relativity makes this a highly sensitive and problematic issue. Because th

13、e speech act theory initiated by Austin and Searle is firmlyEmbedded in a tradition of Westem philosophy, the concept of illocutionary force , attempts at taxonomies （生物）分类学,分类系统of illocution （Searl , 1979）, as well as Examples of illocutionary acts, tend to be discussed in terms of An implicitly Un

14、iversalist framework: the culture-specificity and cross-cultural diversity Of what I would prefer to call illocutionary functions is an issue that can Hardly even arise in such a framework. In short, the familiar illocutionary Categories valid for the pragmatics of all human societies. With the spre

15、ad of the influence of speech act theory beyondPhilosophy - into linguistics and into anthropology _ came also aLoosening of the bonds between illocutionary acts and pan-humanisticTheorizing （Ballmer & Brennenstuhl, 1980; Wierzbicka, 1985a, b, 1991）. In Particular, the work of Wierzbicka is directed

16、 at a substantial relativising Of the notion of speech acts and, along with it, of notions of illocutionary Function. For instance, her contrastive studies of how speech acts are Performed in English and Polish, respectively, have a specifically de-universalising aim; as she herself puts it, in refe

17、rence to the behaviour of Speakers: It is not people in general who behave in the way described, it is the speakers of English. In terms of my own position, equally balanced Between linguistics and anthropology, the earlier mentioned compromise Between universalism and relativism appears to offer th

18、e most plausible Altemative: the illocutionary functions manifested in one language/culture Are autonomous cultural/linguistic categories （relativism）, but are imaginable by members of other cultures （qualified universalism） and, to some Extent, are cross-culturally translatable, though not, of cour

19、se, without Translation loss. Illocutionary functions are, in the simplest terms, the things that peopledo in making utterances. There is always something teleological about these Functions, and about the utterances serving these functions: to formulate an Illocutionary function is to express an ass

20、essment of the aim or purpose of An utterance. Thus, to assert that Have you read this book? has the Illocutionary function of a question is to attribute to such an utterance, in General, the aim or purpose of eliciting information from an interlocutor.True enough, on occasion one may conclude that

21、the real or ulterior aim Of uttering such a question is to patronize and belittle （perhaps even to Embarrass）; but patronise, belittle and embarrass, too, contribute to the Formulation of a teleological illocutionary function. Two implications of these observations are worth spelling out. . First, t

22、he Example of utterances of Have you read this book? points up a necessary Distinction between grammatical form and pragmatic use: all utterances of Have you read this book? are interrogative in grammatical form, but not All its utterances share the plain illocutionary function of eliciting informaT

23、ion. Second, the various illocutionary functions that Have you read this Book? can be imagined to fulfil in different contexts all have designations in the language/culture to which these illocutionary functions pertain.From linguistic evidence alone, one would have to conclude that members Of a cul

24、ture share a consensual awareness of the illocutionary functions Operative in their language/culture. Investigating illocutionary functions In, say, English can safely take the form of a parallel investigation of English Terms for doing things with English utterances （Ballmer & Brennenstuhl,1980）. H

25、owever, when it comes to designating the illocutionary functionsof a given language/culture by labels drawn from another language, theSituation is rather different: often such labels can at best be highlyapproximate glosses for illocutionary functions which have indigenousDesignations but are diffic

26、ult to translate and require explanation byParaphrase. Though the cultural remove between Westem Europe andHungary can hardly be seen as vast （certainly not in comparison with theCultural distance between, say, Britain and China, or the United States and Indigenous Amazonian tribes）, the illocutiona

27、ry function designated in Magyar by the term felkoszonteni （roughly, to greet and express goodWishes to someone on a special occasion） provides a good example of theCulture-specificity and cross-cultural non-transferability of illocutionaryFunctions. What Hungarians do with utterances in performing

28、the actDesignated as felkoszonteni, though it may partially overlap withtoasting someones health, is simply not the kind of thing people do inBritish culture. Implicit in what has been said so far is that illocutionary function is a Property of utterances; this, however, instantly raises the questio

29、n:Utterances of what? In so far as greeting refers to a particular type ofIllocutionary function （differently conceived and differerntly perfonned inDifferent cultures）, and because greetings vary in extent from the monosyl Labic Hi! in English to the multi-turn exchanges in Wolof （lrvine, 1974:170-

30、175）, it follows that illocutionary function may pertain to a variety ofDifferent sizes of linguistic unit. Some of these units clearly consist of aSuccession of sentences while others appear to fall below what would beConsensually recognized by linguists as a complete sentence. The issue of definit

31、ions of sentence across the vast variety of linguistic Theories from traditional grammar to the plethora of current approaches is Too complex to take up here; yet a commitment to some definition is Unavoidable. I propose, therefore, to adopt a notion of sentencehood Whereby sentence corresponds to the minunum linguistic unit endowedWith illocutionary function. That is to say, I take the view that utterances Operating in context as complete, self_contained s