Transcript of a Press Briefing on the World Economic OutlookWord格式.docx

1、Welcome to everyone watching via the webcast and on the Online Media Briefing Center. We will be taking questions from journalists both in the room here in Washington and via the Media Briefing Center.Let me introduce the participants. We have Olivier Blanchard, Economic Counsellor and Director of R

2、esearch at the IMF; Jrg Decressin, Senior Advisor of Research at the IMF, and Abdul Abiad, who is with the World Economic Studies Division of the Research Department.Olivier will have some brief opening remarks. We will have them available at end of the briefing and then we will take your questions.

3、Mr. Blanchard - Thank you, Bill. Good morning.The world economic recovery is gaining strength but it remains unbalanced and that is what I am going to develop in the next few minutes. The best way to make the point is to give you three numbers. For the world economy, for both 2011 and 2012, we expec

4、t the growth rate to be about 4 percent, a fairly high growth rate, but if you look at the details you find that for advanced economies we forecast only about 2 percent for each of the two years, and for the emerging and developing countries we forecast 6 percent for each of the next two years, so 4

5、 , 2 , 6.Let me start with the good news, the strengthening of the recovery. Earlier there were fears of a double dip. We did not share them, but they were there. They have not materialized. The main worry was that in advanced economies, after an initial recovery which was driven by the inventory cy

6、cle and fiscal stimulus, this would come to an end and growth would fizzle. That has not happened. The inventory cycle is largely over, fiscal stimulus has turned in most places to fiscal consolidation, but private demand, consumption, and investment have taken the relay. That is very good news. It

7、the double dip recession is something which did not happen; could have happened, and the fact it did not is good news.Fears have turned to commodity prices. Commodity prices have increased more than expected, reflecting a combination of strong demand growth and a number of supply shocks. When you th

8、ink about these increases, you think about the 1970s and the terrible stagflation that we had then. We do not think at this time that these increases will derail the recovery.If you look at advanced countries, the decrease in the share of oil, the disappearance of wage indexation either de jure or d

9、e facto, and the anchoring of inflation expectations all combine to suggest small effects on either growth or core inflation. In emerging market countries, the challenge is stronger, largely because the share of food in consumption is larger, and the credibility of some of the emerging market centra

10、l banks is still weak.So, in these countries, they have to be more careful. It could be that inflation may be a bit higher for some time, but as our forecasts indicate, we do not expect this to have a major adverse effect on growth. Let me remind you of our 6 percent forecast for this set of countri

11、es.Now let me turn to the bad news, which is about the unbalanced aspect of the recovery. In most advanced economies, output is still far below potential. Unemployment is high, and low growth implies that it will remain so for many years to come. The source of low growth can be traced to both pre-cr

12、isis excesses and to wounds from the crisis. In many countries, especially the US, the housing market is depressedthere is no other word for itleading to anemic housing investment. This will continue for some time.The crisis itself has led to a large deterioration in fiscal positions, forcing a shif

13、t from fiscal stimulus to fiscal consolidation, and at the same time not eliminating market worries about fiscal sustainability. Finally, in many countries, banks are struggling to achieve higher capital ratios in the face of increasing nonperforming loans.The problems of peripheral Europe, which co

14、mbine these interactions between low growth, fiscal woes, and financial pressures, are particularly acute. Reestablishing fiscal and financial sustainability, in the face of low or negative growth and high interest rates, is a substantial challenge and will take time. And, while they are extreme, th

15、e problems of peripheral Europe point to a more general problem and a fundamental one, an underlying low rate of growth of potential output. Adjustment, be it fiscal, financial, or otherwise, is very difficult to do when growth is low.Now the policy advice to advanced countries remains largely the s

16、ame as it was last October or even previous WEOs, insofar as it has been only partly heeded This includes, for advanced economies: increased clarity on banks exposures with, importantly, ready recapitalization plans if and where needed; smart fiscal consolidation that is not too fast, which would ki

17、ll growth, and not too slow, which would kill credibility; redesign of financial regulation and supervision; and, especially in Europe, an increased focus on reforms to increase potential growth.Now let me turn to emerging market countries. In emerging market countries the crisis has not left deep m

18、arks or deep wounds. Their fiscal and financial positions were typically stronger to start, and adverse effects of the crisis have been more muted. High underlying growth and low interest rates are making fiscal adjustment much easier than in advanced countries. Exports have largely recovered, and w

19、hatever shortfall in external demand some of these countries experienced they have made up through an increase in domestic demand. Capital outflows, which dominated during the crisis, have turned to capital inflows both due to better growth prospects in that part of the world and to higher interest

20、rates.So the challenge for emerging market countries is very different from that facing advanced countries, namely it is to avoid overheating in the face of a closing output gap and higher capital flows. What should be the response? The response should be twofold: first, on the macro side, to rely o

21、n a combination of higher interest rates and fiscal consolidation to maintain output at potential; second, to use a combination of reserve accumulation and macro-prudential tools, including, where needed, capital controls, to avoid increases in systemic risk stemming from inflows.Now, countries are

22、often tempted to resist the exchange rate appreciation, which is likely to come with higher interest rates and higher inflows. But within limits appreciation is good: appreciation increases real income, is part of the desirable adjustment, and should not be resisted.Let me return to the overall pict

23、ure. Overall, the macro policy agenda for the world economy remains the same, but with time, probably more urgent. For the recovery to be sustained, advanced countries must achieve fiscal consolidation. To do so, and to maintain growth, they need to rely on increased external demand. Symmetrically,

24、emerging market countries must rely less on external demand and more on domestic demand.Appreciation of emerging market countries currencies relative to advanced countries currencies is a central key to this global adjustment; it is not the only key but it is a central key. The need for careful desi

25、gn of policies at the national level, coordinated at the global level, may be as important today as it was at the peak of the crisis two years ago.Thank you very much.Mr. Murray: We are going to take questions from the audience. Please identify yourselves for our viewers.Questions 1.About Italy econ

26、omy I see from your projections that you expect a much slower fiscal adjustment for Italy than the government expects. You have a deficit of 3.5 percent still in 2012 whereas the government is at 3 or below 3. I would like you to explain this. Italy is also the slowest growing country in the G-7, pr

27、obably among most advanced countries. Could you please explain the reason for this slow growth and what would be your policy advice to Italy in terms of promoting faster growth?Mr. Decressin: - As far as fiscal policy is concerned, we understand that the objective of the Italian government is to red

28、uce the deficit to 3 percent, or below, by the year 2013. In fact, Italy by the year 2013 is going to be pretty close to reaching that objective according to our forecast, closer than many other Euro Area economies. It will, however, still need some additional measures in order to reach that objecti

29、ve, given also the relatively subdued growth rate that we are forecasting for 2011 and 2012 of just between 1 and 1 1/4 percent.Now, you asked why that is the case. Italy has been struggling with growth for a while. The growth rate has been relatively low for an extended period now and we trace it t

30、o structural rigidities in the economy. On that front, we have been pushing for policies to improve education, also the way the justice apparatus works, local services, and also to reform dual labor markets; that is to say, labor markets that offer strong protection to some but less protection to ot

31、hers.2. About Japanese economyI want to ask about the Japanese economy and the earthquake and tsunami issue. You assumed that the power shortage and nuclear power plant accident would be resolved in a few months, two or three months, but some experts worry about it continuing much more, about half a year or more. Are you afraid that the Japanese economy would be growing more slowly?Secondly, I want to ask about the supply chain issue. Japanese automobile （part makers） make parts and some US companies and other companies do not make products fully. What is your a