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1、 Climate Policy卷: 13；期: 3；页: 345-362；页数: 18；出版年份: 2013出版地: LondonISSN: 14693062A practitionerFankhauser, SamuelAbstractDrawing primarily on the UK experience, five practical lessons are identified for policy makers who seek to decarbonize their economies. First, decarbonization needs a solid legal b

2、asis to give it credibility and overcome time inconsistency problems. Second, putting a price on carbon is essential, but low-carbon policies also have to address wider market, investment, and behavioural failures. This in turn raises issues of policy complexity and coordination. Third, the low-carb

3、on economy is likely to be highly electrified. Clean electricity could be a cost-effective way of decarbonizing many parts of the economy, including transport, heating, and parts of industry. Decarbonization therefore starts in the power sector. Fourth, the low-carbon transition is primarily a revol

4、ution of production and not consumption. Both supply-side innovation and demand-side adjustments in lifestyle and behaviour are needed, though the former should dominate. Fifth, the transition to a low-carbon economy is economically and technologically feasible. Achieving it is a question of policy

5、competence and having the political will to drive economic and social change. Keywords: climate change policy; decarbonization; green growth; low-carbon transition; mitigation; UK 1. Introduction More and more countries are taking action against climate change. Nearly all major GHG emitters, includi

6、ng many emerging markets, now have climate change legislation on their statute books （Town- shend et ak, 2011）. It is debatable whether these efforts - and any international agreement that might reinforce them - will be sufficient to limit climate change to an acceptable level. However, given what i

7、s at stake, and the complexity of the task at hand, it is important that policy makers learn from one another and establish a code of good low-carbon practice. This article attempts to distil the main lessons from the UK. The climate change debate in the UK is fairly advanced, with a strong legal ba

8、sis for climate action, ambitious targets, and sophisticated institutional arrangements （Fankhauser, Kennedy, &Skea, 2009）. The UK also has a constantly evolving regulatory landscape, with occasional policy failures and U- turns, while a waning commitment among politicians and latent climate sceptic

9、ism in parts of the press are putting the institutional framework increasingly to the test. As such, the UK is a good case from which to learn lessons.1 There is a rich analytical literature on many aspects of climate change policy. For example, much has been written about the relative merit of diff

10、erent policy options （Hepburn, 2006; Pizer, 2002）, the design of emissions trading schemes （Fankhauser &Hepburn, 2010a, 2010b; Grll &Taschini, 2011; Murray, Newell, &Pizer, 2009）, policy performance （Ellerman &Buchner, 2008; Ellerman, Convery, de Perthuis, &Alberola, 2010; Martin, Preux, &Wagner, 20

11、09）, and low-carbon innovation （Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, &Heinous, 2009; Aghion, Boulanger, &Cohen, 2011; Aghion, Dechezleprtre, Heinous, Martin, &van Reenen, 2011; Dechezleprtre, Glachant, Hascic, Johnstone, &Mnire, 2011; Popp, 2002）. This article differs from the existing literature in that it

12、takes an explicitly practical approach. While drawing on the analytical literature, it looks at the specific case of a country that wants to reduce its GHG emissions, in this case the UK. The policy ambition is much deeper than a marginal change in emissions, which is the concern of much of the lite

13、rature. It is a comprehensive redesign of the modern economy. At the same time, the scope is narrower than that of the green growth literature, which includes wider notions of sustainable development besides low-carbon growth （Bowen &Fan- khauser, 2011）. All decarbonization efforts will face at leas

14、t four challenges. First, a strong legal and institutional basis for low-carbon policy must be put in place （Section 2）. Second, low-carbon objectives must be translated into a credible roadmap of sector, technology, and reform targets that can guide policy and determine whether the objectives are a

15、chievable （Section 3）. Third, the necessary policies to implement the roadmap must be put in place （Section 4）. Fourth, the wider socio-economic conse- quences of decarbonization must be managed （Section 5）. It is concluded in Section 6 that the low- carbon transition is achievable if these challeng

16、es are met and there is sufficient policy competence and political will. 2. Providing the legal and institutional basis The starting point for economy-wide decarbonization is a strong legislative basis. The fundamental reforms to energy, transport, industrial, agricultural, and fiscal policy that wi

17、ll follow will need statu- tory legitimacy. The adoption of a climate change law is also a way of forging the broad political con- sensus needed during implementation. It is striking how many of the climate change laws in major economies have been bipartisan efforts （Townshend et ak, 2011）. The UK C

18、limate Change Act of 2008, for example, was passed near-unanimously. Most climate change laws are unifying laws that bring together existing strands of regulation （e.g. on energy efficiency）, express a long-term objective, and create a platform for subsequent action. The UK Climate Change Act calls

19、for a cut in GHG emissions of at least 80%, relative to 1990, by 2050. This is based on an ambition to limit median global warming to 2C and keep the risk of extreme climate change （of say 4C） to a minimum. The Act also defines the mechanism through which the long- term target is to be met: a series

20、 of statutory, 5-year carbon budgets that set a binding ceiling for GHG emissions over that period. The UK has been subject to this economy-wide carbon constraint since 2008. One of the key purposes of the legislation is to make a statement of intent that can subsequently guide policy delivery and r

21、educe uncertainty for decision makers. Although action is required immedi- ately, building a low-carbon economy will take decades, a much longer term than policy makers can credibly commit. This creates problems for businesses, which will mistrust the long-term validity of the plan and hedge their b

22、ehaviour. An important role of climate change legislation is to overcome such time inconsistency problems and instil long-term credibility into the policy effort. The issue is akin to the credibility of inflation targets （Kydland &Prescott, 1977; Barro &Gordon, 1983; Rogoff, 1985）, and the instituti

23、onal remedies that have been proposed for both problems bear some resemblance to one another. An independent institution, the Committee on Climate Change （CCC）, was created to recommend and monitor carbon budgets, in the belief that technocrats are more likely to take a long-term view than politicia

24、ns. However, the carbon budgets are ultimately passed by Parlia- ment to give them statutory credibility. A judicial review is likely if the government systematically ignores the Committees advice or if key policy decisions are inconsistent with carbon objectives. 3. Defining a strategy for delivery

25、 For the high-level objectives of the climate law to be credible they need to be backed up by a sound implementation strategy. The UK, EU, and many other jurisdictions have developed concrete decarbo- nization roadmaps for this purpose （CCC, 2010; DECC, 2011; EC, 2011）. These are not blueprints that

26、 need to be implemented to the letter. The markets and private initiative will determine most of the details. However, they represent important strategies that will detennine the speed and direction of travel. These roadmaps are underpinned by a fair amount of technical analysis, which ensures that

27、the strat- egy is technologically and economically rational, as well as consistent with the ultimate emissions objective. Numerical simulation models are well suited to the calculation of the least-cost way of meeting a certain emissions target under given technology constraints. In the UK, both the

28、 CCC and the Department of Energy and Climate Change （DECC） have used such models to inform their low-carbon roadmaps. The model evidence used by the CCC, in particular, is quite detailed. Even so, model results are heavily complemented and qualified by professional judgement. Least-cost optimizatio

29、n models （e.g. MARKAL） are used to determine the correct choice of technol- ogies as a function of their cost profiles （CCC, 2010）, which are themselves derived from detailed engin- eering studies （e.g. Mott McDonald, 2011）. Least-cost models also inform the allocation of scarce resources among comp

30、eting uses; e.g. in determining whether the limited supply of sustainable biomass should be used for electricity generation, heating, or transport （CCC, 2011a）. Detailed models of the electricity market can simulate how the power sector will cope with a rising share of inter- mittent renewables and

31、inflexible nuclear capacity （Pyry, 2011）. Least-cost models provide estimates of the likely economic costs, although these bottom-up estimates should be complemented with general equilibrium or macro-econometric model mns （Barker et ak, 2007）. A key question that the roadmap should answer is about t

32、he speed of decarbonization: What is the most economically rational rate of bringing emissions down? The anticipated fall in the cost of low- carbon technologies and the effect of discounting suggests that a slow start will be followed by steep emissions reductions later.2 However, progress in reducing technology costs is a function of cumulative investment, not just the passage of time. Postponing low-carbon investment may therefore delay the point at which thes