CommonsINSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS.docx

1、CommonsINSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICSINSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICSby John R. CommonsAmerican Economic Review, vol. 21 (1931), pp.648-657.The difficulty in defining a field for the so-called institutional economics is the uncertainty of meaning of an institution. Sometimes an institution seems to mean a framework

2、 of laws or natural rights within which individuals act like inmates. Sometimes it seems to mean the behavior of the inmates themselves. Sometimes anything additional to or critical of the classical or hedonic economics is deemed to be institutional. Sometimes anything that is economic behavior is i

3、nstitutional. Sometimes anything that is dynamic instead of static, or a process instead of commodities, or activity instead of feelings, or mass action instead of individual action, or management instead of equilibrium, or control instead of laissez faire, seems to be institutional economics.All of

4、 these notions are doubtless involved in institutional economics, but they may be said to be metaphors or descriptions, whereas, a science of economic behavior requires analysis into similarities of cause, effect or purpose, and a synthesis in a unified system of principles. And institutional econom

5、ics, furthermore, cannot separate itself from the marvelous discoveries and insight of the classical and psychological economists. It should incorporate, however, in addition, the equally important insight of the communistic, anarchistic, syndicalistic, fascistic, co-operative and unionistic economi

6、sts. Doubtless it is the effort to cover by enumeration all of these unco-ordinated activities of the various schools which gives to the name institutional economics that reputation of a miscellaneous, nondescript yet merely descriptive, character of so-called economic behavior, which has long since

7、 relegated the crude Historical School.If we endeavor to find a universal circumstance, common to all behavior known as institutional, we may define an institution as collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual action. Collective action ranges all the way from unorganized cu

8、stom to the many organized going concerns, such as the family, the corporation, the trade association, the trade union, the reserve system, the state. The principle common to all of them is greater or less control, liberation and expansion of individual action by collective action.This control of th

9、e acts of one individual always results in, and is intended to result in, a gain or loss to another or other individuals. If it be the enforcement of a contract, then the debt is exactly equal to the credit created for the benefit of the other person. A debt is a duty enforced collectively, while th

10、e credit is a corresponding right created by creating the duty. The resulting social relation is an economic status, consisting of the expectations towards which each party is directing his economic behavior. On the debt and duty side it is the status of conformity to collective action. On the credi

11、t and right side it is a status of security created by the expectation of the said conformity. This is known as incorporeal property. Or, the collective control takes the form of a tabu or prohibition of certain acts, such as acts of interference, infringement, trespass; and this prohibition creates

12、 an economic status of liberty for the person thus made immune. But the liberty of one person may be accompanied by prospective gain or loss to a correlative person, and the economic status thus created is exposure to the liberty of the other. An employer is exposed to the liberty of the employee to

13、 work or not to work, and the employee is exposed to the liberty of the employer to hire or fire. The typical case of liberty and exposure is the goodwill of a business. This is coming to be distinguished as intangible property. Either the state, or a corporation, or a cartel, or a holding company,

14、or a co-operative association, or a trade union, or an employers association, or a trade association, or a joint trade agreement of two associations, or a stock exchange, or a board of trade, may lay down and enforce the rules which determine for individuals this bundle of correlative and reciprocal

15、 economic relationships. Indeed, these collective acts of economic organizations are at times more powerful than the collective action of the political concern, the state. Stated in the language of ethics and law, to he developed below, all collective acts establish relations of rights, duties, no r

16、ights and no duties. Stated in the language of individual behavior, what they require is performance, avoidance, forbearance by individuals. Stated in the language of the resulting economic status of individuals, what they provide is security, conformity, liberty and exposure. Stated in language of

17、cause, effect or purpose, the common principles running through all of them are the principles of scarcity, efficiency, futurity, the working rules of collective action and the limiting and complementary factors of economic theory. Stated in language of the operation of working rules on individual a

18、ction, they are expressed by the auxiliary verbs of what the individual can, cannot, must, must not, may or may not do. He can or cannot, because collective action will or will not come to his aid. He must or must not, because collective action will compel him. He may, because collective action will

19、 permit him and protect him. He may not, because collective action will prevent him. It is because of these volitional auxiliary verbs that the familiar term working rules is appropriate to indicate the universal principle of cause, effect or purpose, common to all collective action. Working rules a

20、re continually changing in the history of an institution, and they differ for different institutions; but, whatever their differences, they have this similarity that they indicate what individuals can, must, or may, do or not do, enforced by collective sanctions. Analysis of these collective sanctio

21、ns furnishes that correlation of economics, jurisprudence and ethics which is prerequisite to a theory of institutional economics. David Hume found the unity of these thee social sciences in the principle of scarcity and the resulting conflict of interests, contra to Adam Smith who isolated economic

22、s from the others on assumptions of divine providence, earthly abundance and the resulting harmony of interests. Institutional economics goes back to Hume. Taking our cue from Hume and the modern use of such a term as business ethics, ethics deals with the rules of conduct arising from conflict of i

23、nterests, arising, in turn, from scarcity and enforced by the moral sanctions of collective opinion; but economics deals with the same rules of conduct enforced by the collective economic sanctions of profit or loss in case of obedience or disobedience, while jurisprudence deals with the same rules

24、enforced by the organized sanctions of violence. Institutional economics is continually dealing with the relative merits and efficiency of these three types of sanctions. From this universal principle of collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual action arise not only the e

25、thical concepts of rights and duties and the economic concepts of security, conformity, liberty and exposure, but also of assets and liabilities. In fact, it is from the field of corporation finance, with its changeable assets and liabilities, rather than from the field of wants and labor, or pains

26、and pleasures, or wealth and happiness, or utility and disutility, that institutional economics derives a large part of its data and methodology. Institutional economics is the assets and liabilities of concerns, contrasted with Adam Smiths Wealth of Nations. But collective action is even more unive

27、rsal in the unorganized form of custom than it is in the organized form of concerns. Custom has not given way to free contract and competition, as was asserted by Sir Henry Maine. Customs have merely changed with changes in economic conditions, and they may to-day be even more mandatory than the dec

28、rees of a dictator, who perforce is compelled to conform to them. The business man who refuses or is unable to make use of the modern customs of the credit system, by refusing to accept or issue checks on solvent banks, although they are merely private arrangements and not legal tender, simply canno

29、t continue in business by carrying on transactions. These instruments are customary tender, instead of legal tender, backed by the powerful sanctions of profit, loss and competition, which compel conformity. Other mandatory customs might be mentioned, such as coming to work at seven oclock and quitt

30、ing at six. If disputes arise, then the officers of an organized concern - a credit association, the manager of a corporation, a stock exchange, a board of trade, a commercial or labor arbitrator, or finally the courts of law up to the Supreme Court of the United States - reduce the custom to precis

31、ion by adding an organized sanction. This is the common-law method of making law by the decision of disputes. The decisions, by becoming precedents, become the working rules, for the time being, of the particular organized concern. The historic common law of Anglo-American jurisprudence is only a sp

32、ecial case of the universal principle common to all concerns that survive, of making new law by deciding conflicts of interest, and thus giving greater precision and organized compulsion to the unorganized working rules of custom. The common-law method is universal in all collective action, but the

33、technical common law of the lawyers is a body of decisions. In short, the common-law method is itself a custom, with variabilities, like other customs. It is the way collective action acts on individual action in time of conflict. Thus collective action is more than control of individual action - it is, by the very act of