Williamson1979transactioncost economics交易费用经济学合同关系的治理中英文.docx

1、Williamson1979transactioncost economics交易费用经济学合同关系的治理中英文TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS: THE GOVERNANCE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS交易费用经济学：合约关系的治理The new institutional economics is preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction costs. 新制度经济学都已经先研究了交易费用的起源、发生、和分支。Indeed, if transac

2、tion costs are negligible, the organization of economic activity is irrelevant, since any advantages one mode of organization appears to hold over another will simply be eliminated by costless contracting. 事实上，如果交易费用是可以忽略的，经济活动的组织就是不相关的，因为一种组织模型对于另一种的优势将仅被低成本的合约所消除。But despite the growing realizatio

3、n that transaction costs are central to the study of economics,1 skeptics remain. 但是怀疑主义说坚持说，尽管日益增长的事实，交易成本仍是经济研究的中心。 Stanley Fischers complaint is typical: Transaction costs have a well-deserved bad name as a theoretical device. partly because there is a suspicion that almost anything can be ration

4、alized by invoking suitably specified transaction costs.2 Stanley Fischer的抱怨是典型的：交易成本作为理论设计拥有一个罪有应得的恶名。这（部分）因为，对于任何东西都可以通过适当引入指定的交易成本而使其合理化这个观点，表示怀疑。Put differently, there are too many degrees of freedom; the concept wants for definition. 换句话说，自由有太多的角度；这个概念需要定义。Among the factors on which there appea

5、rs to be developing a general consensus are: 在这些因素里发展了一个普遍一致性是：(1) opportunism is a central concept in the study of transaction costs;3（1）机会主义是交易成本研究的核心概念； (2) opportunism is especially important for economic activity that involves transaction-specific investments in human and physical capital;4（2）机

6、会主义对于经济活动特别重要，包括涉及对人力和物质资本的交易专用性投资；(3) the efficient processing of information is an important and related concept;5 and （3）信息的有效加工过程是一个重要且相关的概念；(4) the assessment of transaction costs is a comparative institutional undertaking.6 （4）交易成本的评估是相对制度上的任务。Beyond these general propositions, a consensus on

7、transaction costs is lacking.除了这些一般的假设，还是缺失交易成本的一致意见。 Further progress in the study of transaction costs awaits the identification of the critical dimensions with respect to which transaction costs differ and an examination of the economizing properties of alternative institutional modes for organiz

8、ing transactions. 交易成本研究的进一步发展，需要对关于交易成本有什么不同的关键维度的识别，以及对组织交易的替代制度模式性质的节约属性进行检验。Only then can the matching of transactions with modes be accomplished with confidence. 只有这样，随后交易和模式的匹配才能很好地完成。This paper affirms the proposition that transaction costs are central to the study of economics, identifies th

9、e critical dimensions for characterizing transactions, describes the main governance structures of transactions, and indicates how and why transactions can be matched with institutions in a discriminating way. 这篇文章验证了这个假设：交易成本是经济研究的核心，确认了交易的关键维度，描述了交易的主要治理结构，表明了交易如何以及为什么能以一种有差别的形式与制度相匹配。I am mainly

10、concerned with intermediate-product market transactions. 我主要关心中间产品市场交易。Whereas previously I have emphasized the incentives to remove transactions from the market and organize them internally (vertical integration),7 the analysis here is symmetrical and deals with market, hierarchical, and intermedia

11、te modes of organization alike. 然而之前我已经强调了从市场转移交易的激励，和组织它们内部化（垂直一体化），这篇文章是解决市场，层级，和类似于中间组织的模式。The question of why there is so much vertical integration remains interesting, but no more so than the question of why there are so many market- (and quasi-market) mediated transactions. “为什么有这么多的垂直一体化”这个问题

12、仍然非常有趣，但是更主要的问题是“为什么有那么多的市场-（和准市场）中间交易”。A discriminating analysis will explain which transactions are located where and give the reasons why. 我们将会使用判别分析解释是哪一种交易位于哪里，以及给出为什么的理由。The overall object of the exercise essentially comes down to this: for each abstract description of a transaction, identify

13、the most economical governance structure-where by governance structure I refer to the institutional framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided. 这篇文章本质上的主要目标可以归纳为：对于每一种关于交易的抽象描述，识别最经济的治理结构在这里的治理结构我指的是决定了交易完整性的制度框架。Markets and hierarchies are two of the main alternatives.市场和层级是两种

14、主要的替代物。Some legal background to the study of transactions is briefly reviewed in Section I. 交易研究的一些法律背景主要在第一部分进行简要回顾。Of the three dimensions for describing transactions that I propose, investment attributes are the least well understood and probably the most important. 我提出的描述交易的三个维度，其中投资的特征是最少被理解的，但

15、可能是最重要的。The special relevance of investments is developed in the context of the economics of idiosyncrasy in Section II. 投资的特殊相关性是在第二部分的经济学的特质中进行研究。A general contracting schema is developed and applied to commercial contracting in Section III. 一般的合约模式在第一部分进行研究，并在第三部分应用于商业的合约中。Applications to labor,

16、regulation, family transactions, and capital markets are sketched in Section IV. 劳动，规则，家族交易，和资本市场的应用在第四部分进行概述。Major implications are summarized in Section V. 第五部分总结主要的启示。 Concluding remarks follow.结论紧接着之后。I. SOME CONTRACTING BACKGROUND一些合约背景 Although there is widespread agreement that the discrete-t

17、ransaction paradigm-sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear performance8-has served both law and economics well, there is increasing awareness that many contractual relations are not of this well-defined kind.9尽管广泛地认可这个离散的交易范式“通过清晰的协议而产生；通过清晰的绩效发生”已经很好地服务于法律和经济中，但已逐渐地意识到有很多的合约关系并没有被很好地进行定义。

18、A deeper understanding of the nature of contract has emerged as the legal- rule emphasis associated with the study of discrete contracting has given way to a more general concern with the contractual purposes to be served对于 随着离散合约研究与法律规则重点结合而产生的对合约本质更深入的理解，已经让路于对于合约目的的更普遍的关注。Ian Macneil, in a series

19、 of thoughtful and wide-ranging essays on contract, usefully distinguishes between discrete and relational transactions.11 Ian Macneil ，在一系列有深度的和广泛的关于合约的论文中，有效地去区分离散的和相关的交易。He further supplies twelve different concepts with respect to which these differ. 12 关于它们的不同，他进一步提供了12个不同的概念。Serious problems o

20、f recognition and application are posed by such a rich classificatory apparatus. 这种丰富的分类提出了识别和应用的一些严肃问题。More useful for my purposes is the three-way classification of contracts that Macneil offers in his most recent article, where classical, neoclassical, and relational categories of contract law ar

21、e recognized. 对这篇文章目标中最有用的是麦克尼尔在他最近文章中提出的合约三种方式的分类，分别是古典的，新古典主义，和关系类别的合约法，并被认可了。A. Classical Contract Law古典合约法As Macneil observes, any system of contract law has the purpose of facilitating exchange. 就像Macneil所观察的那样，合约法的任一系统有促进交换的目的。 What is distinctive about classical contract law is that it attemp

22、ts to do this by enhancing discreteness and intensifying presentiation,13 where presentiation has reference to efforts to make or render present in place or time; to cause to be perceived or realized at present.14古典合约法的特色是试图通过优化离散性和增强“陈述”来完成交易，在这儿“陈述”涉及到努力“在出现的地方或时间中去完成或渲染; 在现在去引起感知或认识”。The economic

23、 counterpart to complete presentiation is contingent-claims contracting-which entails comprehensive contracting whereby all relevant future contingencies pertaining to the supply of a good or service are described and discounted with respect to both likelihood and futurity.15完成陈述的对应经济人/物是偶然索赔的合约包含综合

24、的合约，在这儿描述了所有关于货物或服务供应的未来意外事件，和关于可能性和未来性的贴现。Classical contract law endeavors to implement discreteness and presentiation in several ways. 古典合约法努力以一些方式来落实离散性和陈述。For one thing, the identity of the parties to a transaction is treated as irrelevant. In this respect it corresponds exactly with the ideal m

25、arket transaction in economics.16 第一，识别一个交易的当事人被认为是毫不相关的。在这个方面它很精准地符合经济学中“理想的市场交易”。Second, the nature of the agreement is carefully delimited, and the more formal features govern when formal (for example, written) and informal (for example, oral) terms are contested. 第二，协议的本质被仔细地划定了界线，当正式（如，书面）和非正式（

26、如，口头）的条目被提出了质疑时，更正式的特质会来进行治理。 Third, remedies are narrowly prescribed such that, should the initial presentiation fail to materialize because of nonperformance, the consequences are relatively predictable from the beginning and are not openended.17 第三，补救措施被狭隘地规定了，由于违约初始陈述未能实现,其后果是从一开始就可相对地预测，且并不是无限制

27、的”。Additionally, third-party participation is discouraged.18 The emphasis, thus, is on legal rules, formal documents, and self-liquidating transactions.此外，不鼓励第三方参与。因此，重点在于法律法规、正式的文件，和自偿性交易。B. Neoclassical Contract Law新古典合约法Not every transaction fits comfortably into the classical-contracting scheme.

28、 并不是所有的交易都能很好地满足古典合约方案。In particular, long-term contracts executed under conditions of uncertainty are ones for which complete presentiation is apt to be prohibitively costly if not impossible. 尤其在不确定条件下执行长期合约，完全陈述是非常昂贵的，这不是不可能的。Problems of several kinds arise. 那么，一些问题就出现了。First, not all future cont

29、ingencies for which adaptations are required can be anticipated at the outset. 首先，并不是所有在将来需要做出应变意外事件都可以事先被预料。Second, the appropriate adaptations will not be evident for many contingencies until the circumstances materialize. 第二，直到情况出现，否则适当的适应对于很多意外之事是不明显的。Third, except as changes in states of the wo

30、rld are unambiguous, hard contracting between autonomous parties may well give rise to veridical disputes when state-contingent claims are made. 第三，除了世界的改变是明确的，当存有正式的索赔时，在自主政党之间的硬性合约可能会出现纠纷。In a world where (at least some) parties are inclined to be opportunistic, whose representations are to be bel

31、ieved?在这个世界上（至少部分）政党倾向于机会主义，那么谁的陈述可以被相信呢？Faced with the prospective break down of classical contracting in these circumstances, three alternatives are available. 在这些情况下面古典合约的分解，有三个可行的替代方法。One would be to forgo such transactions altogether. 一是放弃这种交易。A second would be to remove these transactions from

32、 the market and organize them internally instead. Adaptive, sequential decision making would then be implemented under common and with the assistance of hierarchical incentive and control systems. 第二种是将这些交易从市场中移除，并用组织内部化作为替代。自适应的、序贯决策将在常见分层激励和控制系统的援助下实现。Third, a different contracting relation which

33、preserves trading but provides for additional governance structure might be devised. This last brings us to what Macneil refers to as neoclassical contracting.第三，可能会设计出一种，保存了交易但提供了额外治理结构的不同的合约关系。这最后一种给我们带来了Macneil所涉及的新古典主义合约。As Macneil observes, Two common characteristics of long-term contracts are the existence of gaps in their plannin