Relevance Theory.docx

Relevance Theory.docx

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RelevanceTheory

（inG.WardandL.Horn（eds）HandbookofPragmatics.Oxford:

Blackwell,607-632）

RELEVANCETHEORY*

DeirdreWilsonandDanSperber

1.Introduction

RelevancetheorymaybeseenasanattempttoworkoutindetailoneofGrice’scentralclaims:

thatanessentialfeatureofmosthumancommunication,bothverbalandnon-verbal,istheexpressionandrecognitionofintentions（Grice1989:

Essays1-7,14,18;RetrospectiveEpilogue）.Indevelopingthisclaim,Gricelaidthefoundationsforaninferentialmodelofcommunication,analternativetotheclassicalcodemodel.Accordingtothecodemodel,acommunicatorencodesherintendedmessageintoasignal,whichisdecodedbytheaudienceusinganidenticalcopyofthecode.Accordingtotheinferentialmodel,acommunicatorprovidesevidenceofherintentiontoconveyacertainmeaning,whichisinferredbytheaudienceonthebasisoftheevidenceprovided.Anutteranceis,ofcourse,alinguisticallycodedpieceofevidence,sothatverbalcomprehensioninvolvesanelementofdecoding.However,thelinguisticmeaningrecoveredbydecodingisjustoneoftheinputstoanon-demonstrativeinferenceprocesswhichyieldsaninterpretationofthespeaker'smeaning.[1]

Thegoalofinferentialpragmaticsistoexplainhowthehearerinfersthespeaker’smeaningonthebasisoftheevidenceprovided.Therelevance-theoreticaccountisbasedonanotherofGrice’scentralclaims:

thatutterancesautomaticallycreateexpectationswhichguidethehearertowardsthespeaker’smeaning.GricedescribedtheseexpectationsintermsofaCo-operativePrincipleandmaximsofQuality（truthfulness）,Quantity（informativeness）,Relation（relevance）andManner（clarity）whichspeakersareexpectedtoobserve（Grice1961;1989:

368-72）:

theinterpretationarationalhearershouldchooseistheonethatbestsatisfiesthoseexpectations.RelevancetheoristsshareGrice’sintuitionthatutterancesraiseexpectationsofrelevance,butquestionseveralotheraspectsofhisaccount,includingtheneedforaCo-operativePrincipleandmaxims,thefocusonpragmaticprocesseswhichcontributetoimplicaturesratherthantoexplicit,truth-conditionalcontent,theroleofdeliberatemaximviolationinutteranceinterpretation,andthetreatmentoffigurativeutterancesasdeviationsfromamaximorconventionoftruthfulness.[2]Thecentralclaimofrelevancetheoryisthattheexpectationsofrelevanceraisedbyanutterancearepreciseenough,andpredictableenough,toguidethehearertowardsthespeaker’smeaning.Theaimistoexplainincognitivelyrealistictermswhattheseexpectationsofrelevanceamountto,andhowtheymightcontributetoanempiricallyplausibleaccountofcomprehension.Thetheoryhasdevelopedinseveralstages.AdetailedversionwaspublishedinRelevance:

CommunicationandCognition（Sperber&Wilson1986a;1987a,b）andupdatedinSperber&Wilson1995,1998a,2002;Wilson&Sperber2002.Here,wewilloutlinethemainassumptionsofthecurrentversionofthetheoryanddiscusssomeofitsimplicationsforpragmatics.

2.Relevanceandcognition

Whatsortofthingsmayberelevant?

Intuitively,relevanceisapotentialpropertynotonlyofutterancesandotherobservablephenomena,butofthoughts,memoriesandconclusionsofinferences.Inrelevance-theoreticterms,anyexternalstimulusorinternalrepresentationwhichprovidesaninputtocognitiveprocessesmayberelevanttoanindividualatsometime.Accordingtorelevancetheory,utterancesraiseexpectationsofrelevancenotbecausespeakersareexpectedtoobeyaCo-operativePrincipleandmaximsorsomeotherspecificallycommunicativeconvention,butbecausethesearchforrelevanceisabasicfeatureofhumancognition,whichcommunicatorsmayexploit.Inthissection,wewillintroducethebasiccognitivenotionofrelevanceandtheCognitivePrincipleofRelevance,whichlaythefoundationfortherelevance-theoreticapproachtopragmatics.

Whenisaninputrelevant?

Intuitively,aninput（asight,asound,anutterance,amemory）isrelevanttoanindividualwhenitconnectswithbackgroundinformationhehasavailabletoyieldconclusionsthatmattertohim:

say,byansweringaquestionhehadinmind,improvinghisknowledgeonacertaintopic,settlingadoubt,confirmingasuspicion,orcorrectingamistakenimpression.Inrelevance-theoreticterms,aninputisrelevanttoanindividualwhenitsprocessinginacontextofavailableassumptionsyieldsapositivecognitiveeffect.Apositivecognitiveeffectisaworthwhiledifferencetotheindividual’srepresentationoftheworld–atrueconclusion,forexample.Falseconclusionsarenotworthhaving.Theyarecognitiveeffects,butnotpositiveones（Sperber&Wilson1995:

§3.1-2）.[3]

Themostimportanttypeofcognitiveeffectachievedbyprocessinganinputinacontextisacontextualimplication,aconclusiondeduciblefromtheinputandthecontexttogether,butfromneitherinputnorcontextalone.Forexample,onseeingmytrainarriving,Imightlookatmywatch,accessmyknowledgeofthetraintimetable,andderivethecontextualimplicationthatmytrainislate（whichmayitselfachieverelevancebycombiningwithfurthercontextualassumptionstoyieldfurtherimplications）.Othertypesofcognitiveeffectincludethestrengthening,revisionorabandonmentofavailableassumptions.Forexample,thesightofmytrainarrivinglatemightconfirmmyimpressionthattheserviceisdeteriorating,ormakemealtermyplanstodosomeshoppingonthewaytowork.Accordingtorelevancetheory,aninputisrelevanttoanindividualwhen,andonlywhen,itsprocessingyieldssuchpositivecognitiveeffects.[4]

Intuitively,relevanceisnotjustanall-or-nonematterbutamatterofdegree.Thereisnoshortageofpotentialinputswhichmighthaveatleastsomerelevanceforus,butwecannotattendtothemall.Relevancetheoryclaimsthatwhatmakesaninputworthpickingoutfromthemassofcompetingstimuliisnotjustthatitisrelevant,butthatitismorerelevantthananyalternativeinputavailabletousatthattime.Intuitively,otherthingsbeingequal,themoreworthwhileconclusionsachievedbyprocessinganinput,themorerelevantitwillbe.Inrelevance-theoreticterms,otherthingsbeingequal,thegreaterthepositivecognitiveeffectsachievedbyprocessinganinput,thegreateritsrelevancewillbe.Thus,thesightofmytrainarrivingoneminutelatemaymakelittleworthwhiledifferencetomyrepresentationoftheworld,whilethesightofitarrivinghalfanhourlatemayleadtoaradicalreorganisationofmyday,andtherelevanceofthetwoinputswillvaryaccordingly.

Whatmakesaninputworthpickingoutfromthemassofcompetingstimuliisnotjustthecognitiveeffectsitachieves.Indifferentcircumstances,thesamestimulusmaybemoreorlesssalient,thesamecontextualassumptionsmoreorlessaccessible,andthesamecognitiveeffectseasierorhardertoderive.Intuitively,thegreatertheeffortofperception,memoryandinferencerequired,thelessrewardingtheinputwillbetoprocess,andhencethelessdeservingofourattention.Inrelevance-theoreticterms,otherthingsbeingequal,thegreatertheprocessingeffortrequired,thelessrelevanttheinputwillbe.Thus,relevancemaybeassessedintermsofcognitiveeffectsandprocessingeffort:

（1）      Relevanceofaninputtoanindividual

a.       Otherthingsbeingequal,thegreaterthepositivecognitiveeffectsachievedbyprocessinganinput,thegreatertherelevanceoftheinputtotheindividualatthattime.

b.       Otherthingsbeingequal,thegreatertheprocessingeffortexpended,thelowertherelevanceoftheinputtotheindividualatthattime.

Hereisabriefandartificialillustrationofhowtherelevanceofalternativeinputsmightbecomparedintermsofeffortandeffect.Mary,whodislikesmostmeatandisallergictochicken,ringsherdinnerpartyhosttofindoutwhatisonthemenu.Hecouldtrulytellheranyofthreethings:

（2）      Weareservingmeat.

（3）      Weareservingchicken.

（4）      Eitherweareservingchickenor（72–3）isnot46.

Accordingtothecharacterisationofrelevancein

（1）,allthreeutteranceswouldberelevanttoMary,but（3）wouldbemorerelevantthaneither

（2）or（4）.Itwouldbemorerelevantthan

（2）forreasonsofcognitiveeffect:

（3）entails

（2）,andthereforeyieldsalltheconclusionsderivablefrom

（2）,andmorebesides.Itwouldbemorerelevantthan（4）forreasonsofprocessingeffort:

although（3）and（4）arelogicallyequivalent,andthereforeyieldexactlythesamecognitiveeffects,theseeffectsareeasiertoderivefrom（3）thanfrom（4）,whichrequiresanadditionaleffortofparsingandinference（inordertoworkoutthattheseconddisjunctisfalseandthefirstisthereforetrue）.Thus,（3）wouldbethemostrelevantutterancetoMary,forreasonsofbotheffortandeffect.Moregenerally,whensimilaramountsofeffortarerequired,theeffectfactorisdecisiveindeterminingdegreesofrelevance,andwhensimilaramountsofeffectareachievable,theeffortfactorisdecisive.

Thischaracterisationofrelevanceiscomparativeratherthanquantitative:

itmakesclearcomparisonspossibleinsomecases（e.g.

（2）–（4））,butnotinall.Whilequantitativenotionsofrelevancemightbeworthexploringfromaformalpointofview[5],itisthecomparativeratherthanthequantitativenotionthatislikelytoprovidethebeststartingpointforconstructingapsychologicallyplausibletheory.Inthefirstplace,itishighlyunlikelythatindividualshavetocomputenumericalvaluesforeffortandeffectwhenassessingrelevance“fromtheinside”.Suchcomputationwouldit