特斯拉AEB功能失效分析.docx

特斯拉AEB功能失效分析.docx

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特斯拉AEB功能失效分析

ODIRESUME

Investigation:

PE16-007

DateOpened:

06/28/2016DateClosed:

01/19/2017

Investigator:

KareemHabibReviewer:

JeffQuandt

Approver:

StephenRidella

Subject:

Automaticvehiclecontrolsystems

MANUFACTURER&PRODUCTINFORMATION

Manufacturer:

TeslaMotors,Inc.

Products:

MY2014-2016TeslaModelSandModelX

Population:

43,781

ProblemDescription:

TheAutomaticEmergencyBraking（AEB）orAutopilotsystemsmaynotfunctionasdesigned,increasingtheriskofacrash.

FAILUREREPORTSUMMARY

ODI

Manufacturer

Total

Complaints:

0

0

0

Crashes/Fires:

0

0

0

InjuryIncidents:

0

0

0

FatalityIncidents:

0

0

0

ACTION/SUMMARYINFORMATION

Action:

ThisPreliminaryEvaluationisclosed.

Summary:

OnMay7,2016,a2015TeslaModelScollidedwithatractortrailercrossinganuncontrolledintersectiononahighwaywestofWilliston,Florida,resultinginfatalinjuriestotheTesladriver.DataobtainedfromtheModelSindicatedthat:

1）theTeslawasbeingoperatedinAutopilotmodeatthetimeofthecollision;2）theAutomaticEmergencyBraking（AEB）systemdidnotprovideanywarningorautomatedbrakingforthecollisionevent;and3）thedrivertooknobraking,steeringorotheractionstoavoidthecollision.OnJune28,2016,NHTSAopenedPE16-007to“examinethedesignandperformanceofanyautomateddrivingsystemsinuseatthetimeofthecrash.”

TheOfficeofDefectsInvestigation（ODI）analyzedthefollowingsubjectsaspartofNHTSA’sexaminationofthedesignandperformanceofTesla’sAutopilotsystem:

1）AutomaticEmergencyBraking（AEB）systemdesignandperformanceinthesubjectTeslaandpeervehicles;2）human-machineinterfaceissuesrelatedtoAutopilotoperatingmode;3）datafromcrashincidentsrelatedtoTesla’sAutopilotandAEBsystems;and4）changesTeslahasimplementedintheAutopilotandAEBsystems.

NHTSA’sexaminationdidnotidentifyanydefectsinthedesignorperformanceoftheAEBorAutopilotsystemsofthesubjectvehiclesnoranyincidentsinwhichthesystemsdidnotperformasdesigned.AEBsystemsusedintheautomotiveindustrythroughMY2016arerear-endcollisionavoidancetechnologiesthatarenotdesignedtoreliablyperforminallcrashmodes,includingcrossingpathcollisions.TheAutopilotsystemisanAdvancedDriverAssistanceSystem（ADAS）thatrequiresthecontinualandfullattentionofthedrivertomonitorthetrafficenvironmentandbepreparedtotakeactiontoavoidcrashes.Tesla'sdesignincludedahands-onthesteeringwheelsystemformonitoringdriverengagement.Thatsystemhasbeenupdatedtofurtherreinforcetheneedfordriverengagementthrougha"strikeout"strategy.Driversthatdonotrespondtovisualcuesinthedrivermonitoringsystemalertsmay"strikeout"andloseAutopilotfunctionfortheremainderofthedrivecycle.

Asafety-relateddefecttrendhasnotbeenidentifiedatthistimeandfurtherexaminationofthisissuedoesnotappeartobewarranted.Accordingly,thisinvestigationisclosed.TheclosingofthisinvestigationdoesnotconstituteafindingbyNHTSAthatnosafety-relateddefectexists.Theagencywillmonitortheissueandreservestherighttotakefutureactionifwarrantedbythecircumstances.Formoreinformationabouttheanalysis,seetheattachedreport.

Investigation:

PE16-007CloseResumePage1of1

1.0INTRODUCTION

OnMay7,2016,a2015TeslaModelScollidedwithatractortrailercrossinganuncontrolledintersectiononahighwaywestofWilliston,Florida,resultinginfatalinjuriestotheTesladriver.DataobtainedfromtheModelSindicatedthat:

1）theTeslawasbeingoperatedinAutopilotmodeatthetimeofthecollision;2）theAutomaticEmergencyBraking（AEB）systemdidnotprovideanywarningorautomatedbrakingforthecollisionevent;3）thedrivertooknobraking,steeringorotheractionstoavoidthecollision;and4）thelastrecordeddriveractionwasincreasingthecruisecontrolsetspeedto74mphlessthantwominutespriortoimpact.Thecrashoccurredonacleardaywithdryroadconditions.OnJune21,2016,NHTSAdeployedaSpecialCrashInvestigationsteamtothecrashsitetoevaluatethevehicleandstudythecrashenvironment.NHTSA’scrashreconstructionindicatesthatthetractortrailershouldhavebeenvisibletotheTesladriverforatleastsevensecondspriortoimpact.OnJune28,2016,NHTSAopenedPE16-007to“examinethedesignandperformanceofanyautomateddrivingsystemsinuseatthetimeofthecrash.”

TheOfficeofDefectsInvestigation（ODI）analyzedthefollowingsubjectsaspartofNHTSA’sexaminationofthedesignandperformanceofTesla’sAutopilotsystem:

1）AEBdesignandperformanceinthesubjectTeslaandpeervehicles;2）human-machineinterfaceissuesrelatedtoAutopilotoperatingmode;3）datafromcrashincidentsrelatedtoTesla’sAutopilotandAEBsystems;and4）changesTeslahasimplementedintheAutopilotandAEBsystems.

2.1AEBSYSTEM

2.2AEBtechnologies.AutomaticEmergencyBrakingincludesthefollowingcrashavoidancetechnologies:

ForwardCollisionWarning（FCW）,DynamicBrakeSupport（DBS）,andCrashImminentBraking（CIB）.AnFCWispresentedtothedriverifthesystempredictsacrashwithanobjectinthevehicle’sforwardpathisimminent.Tobeeffective,suchalertsareprovidedwithsufficientlead-timeforthedrivertoassessthepotentialhazard,andtorespondwiththeappropriatebrakingorsteeringneededtoavoidthecrash.Ifthedriverchoosestoavoidthecrashbybraking,butdoesnotapplysufficientbrakingtodoso,DBSautomaticallysupplementstheirapplication.Ifthedriverdoesnottakeactiontoavoidthecrash,CIBautomaticallyappliesthevehicle’sbrakessothatitmaybemitigatedoravoided.

2.3Background.AEBtechnologieshavebeeninuseforover10years.InSeptember2007,aNHTSA-sponsoredprojectwasinitiatedbytheCrashAvoidanceMetricsPartnership（CAMP）“todeveloptestmethodsforevaluatingcrashimminentbrakingsystemsandtoestablishbenefitsestimationmethodsforassessingtheireffectivenessatreducingtheseverityofpotentialinjuriesinvehiclecrashes.”1Thefinalreportfromthisproject,releasedinSeptember2011,validatedtheeffectivenessofradar,cameraandradar/camerafusionsystemsasrear-endcollisionmitigationoravoidancetechnologies.2Thereportalsoidentifiedseveralcrashmodesthatwerenotvalidatedbytheproject,includingstraightcrossingpath（SCP）3andleftturnacrosspath（LTAP）collisions:

1CrashImminentBraking（CIB）FirstAnnualReport.（2010）.DOTHS811340.NationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration.Washington,DC.

2ObjectiveTestsforImminentCrashAutomaticBrakingSystemsFinalReportVolume1of2.（2011）.DOTHS811521.NationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration.Washington,DC.

3TheclassicexampleofanSCPcrashisalaterallyapproachingvehicleinatrafficintersection.Challengesassociatedwiththesecrashmodesincreaseasspeedsoftargetand/orhostvehicleincrease.

ThetestmethodsrepresentingStraightCrossingPath[emphasisadded],LeftTurnAcross–OppositeDirection,OppositeDirection,andpole/treecrashscenarioswerealldesignatedas‘TestMethodNotValidated–BeyondScopeofCIBProject.’Whiletestscenariosweredevelopedanddemonstratedforthesecrashconditions,CIBsystemperformance,regardlessofsystemconfigurationorsettings,werenotcapableofreliablyrespondingtothesetests.Duetothedifficultyinpredictingthepre-crasheventsthatleaduptothesecrashtypes,thedifficultyinbalancingCIBactivationsforthesecrasheswithpotentialincreasesinundesirablefalseactivation,andmanyotherfactors,thesescenariosarealsonotlikelytobenear-termdeployablefeaturesofCIBsystemsandmaybebetteraddressedthroughotheractivesafetytechnologies.4

Figure1showsastraightcrossingpathtestconductedaspartoftheCIBproject.Thereportprovidesthefollowingassessmentofthetestresult,“Thelimitedtimethetargetisinthefieldofviewpriortoimpactchallengesthesystem’sabilitytoperformthreatassessmentandapplytheCIBsystem.Atargetisusuallyrecognizedverylateornotatallpriortoimpact.”5

Figure1.CIBProjectStraightCrossingPathTestScenario.

Sincemodelyear（MY）2010,NHTSAhasconductedtestingofFCWsystemperformanceaspartofitsNewCarAssessmentProgram（NCAP）.Thetestsincludetherear-endcollisioncrashmodesvalidatedbytheCIBproject:

LeadVehicleStopped（LVS）,LeadVehicleMoving（LVM）,andLeadVehicleDecelerating（LVD）.OnNovember5,2015,theagencyannounceditwouldbeaddingAEBsystemevaluationstoNCAPeffectiveforthe2018modelyear.InMarch2016,NHTSAissuedajointstatementwiththeInsuranceInstituteforHighwaySafety（IIHS）providinginformationrelatedtothecommitment

4ObjectiveTestsforImminentCrashAutomaticBrakingSystemsFinalReportVolume1of2,page84（2011）.DOTHS811521.NationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration.Washington,DC.

5ObjectiveTestsforImminentCrashAutomaticBrakingSystemsFinalReportVolume2of2,pageL-51（2011）.

DOTHS811521A.NationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration.Washington,DC.

by20automobilemanufacturers,representing99percentoftheU.S.new-carmarket,tovoluntarilymakeAEB“standardonvirtuallyalllight-dutycarsandtruckswithagrossvehicleweightof8,500lbs.orlessnolaterthanSeptember1,2022,andonvirtuallyalltruckswithagrossvehicleweightbetween8,501lbs.and10,000lbs.nolaterthanSeptember1,2025.”Thepredictedsafetybenefitscitedinthestatementarelimitedtorear-endcrashes:

IIHSresearchshowsthatAEBsystemsmeetingthecommitmentwould