战略性贸易政策理论研究最新进展The latest development of strategic trade policy theory.docx
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战略性贸易政策理论研究最新进展Thelatestdevelopmentofstrategictradepolicytheory
战略性贸易政策理论研究最新进展(Thelatestdevelopmentofstrategictradepolicytheory)
Thelatestdevelopmentofstrategictradepolicytheory
2008-7-2115:
55,XuLihua,FengZongxian
Since1980s,internationaleconomistanalyzingmethodforthestudyofinternationaltradepolicyhasundergonegreatchanges,therearethreemainreasons:
first,changetheroleoftradeintheU.S.economyandtheU.S.roleintheworldeconomy;changecharacteristicsofsecondtradeitself,affecttherelationshipbetweentheUnitedStatesandothercountries;thirdeconomicschangingviews,especiallytheanalysisoftheindustrialstructureandtheimpactofcompetitionwithtradepolicyeconomistsviewpoint.Thetraditionaltradetheorybasedonperfectcompetitioncannotexplainthenewphenomenainthefieldofinternationaltrade,suchasintraindustrytrade,researchanddevelopment,andtheexternaleconomicproblems.Thenewtradetheoryexplainstheseproblemsbyintroducingimperfectcompetitionandincreasingreturnstoscale,andprovidestheappropriatereasonsforgovernmentinterventioninthefieldofinternationaltrade.AmericaneconomistKrugman(1953-),astherepresentativeoftheinternationaltradetheory,theformationoflong-termthinkingtobreakthetraditionalemphasisoninternationaleconomy,ignoredbytraditionaltradetheoryofthetwocharacteristicsofeconomiesofscaleandimperfectcompetition,putforwardthenewtheoryofinternationaltrade.
Thenewtradetheoryisoftenreferredtoasthenameofstrategictradepolicybecausethetradetheoryisadirectindicationofitspolicyviews.Thebasiccontentofthestrategictradepolicymainlyincludes:
Strategicexportpolicy,strategicimportpolicyandexportprotectionpolicy.Thinkofthesebasictheories,intheimperfectcompetitionandscaleeconomy,thegovernmentcanrelyonproductionandexportsubsidies,researchanddevelopmentsubsidies,importtariffsandprotectthedomesticmarketandothermeanstosupportthenationalstrategicindustrydevelopment,cultivateandenhanceitscompetitivenessintheinternationalmarketandobtainscaleeconomicbenefits,andtheopportunitytocompeteforcompetitor'smarketshareandprofit.
I.expansionofthebasicmodelofstrategictradepolicy
Strategictradepolicyhasattractedmuchattentionsinceitsinception,andmanyscholarshaveextendedandquestioneditsbasicmodelandbasicviews.
Bagwell(1992)andStaigen(1994)toreducetheproductcostuncertaintyintotheSpencer-Brandersubsidymodel,provedtheoptimalitystrategyvariablesindependentR&Dsubsidiesandproductmarketcompetitionselection.Inthebasicmodel,thegovernmentisassumedtoactbeforetheenterprisedecision.Carnmichael(1987)considertheoppositesituation,heassumedthatdomesticandforeignfirmsselldifferentiatedproductsoligopolyinthirdmarkets,Bertrand(price)competitionamongenterprises,andmakethepricebeforethegovernmentdecidedtosubsidiesortax.Theresultsshowthatthetimingofdecisionshasanimpactonthegovernment'seventualsubsidyortaxandnationalwelfare.BranderandSpencer(1985)wereinvestigatedatthesametimegivetheirexportenterprisessubsidiesofthetwogovernments,theresultissimilartothe"prisoner'sdilemma",whichbothcountrieswanttoincreasetheirwelfarethroughsubsidies,andthefinalresultisbothcountriesthanwithoutsubsidiesofevil.Thisstudyshowsthatthestrategictradepolicyisabeggarthyneighbourpolicies,easilyleadtotradedisputesoftradebetweenthetwosides.
Somescholarshaveinvestigatedtherelationshipbetweencost,industrialconcentrationandstrategictradepolicy.CanadaNgoVanLongaandAn-toineSoubeyrar(1997)believesinexportsubsidiesinCournotcompetitioncanimprovenationalwelfare,butifdomesticfirmsrelativetoforeignfactorynumberenough,enoughdomesticdemandcurveconvex,thentheoptimalpolicyisthenationalexporttax.
Strategictradepoliciesweredevelopedindevelopedcountries,andsomescholarsmadeanewapproachtotheapplicabilityofthetheorytodevelopingcountries.ScholarsrepresentedbyCarlos(late)arguethatstrategictradepolicyissuitablefordevelopingcountries.Anotherviewisthatstrategictradepolicyisnotsuitablefordevelopingcountries.Inaddition,scholarshavediscussedtherelationshipbetweenstrategicsubsidiesandcorporateprofits,consumersurplusandnationalwelfare,aswellastherelationshipbetweenstrategictradepolicyandthescaleofinterests,StackMBerg'scompetition,andsoon.Inaword,theexpansionofthebasicmodelandthebasictheoryofthestrategictradepolicyhasgreatlyenrichedtheconnotationofthetheory.
Two,thelatestresearchprogressofstrategictradepolicytheory
1.competitiveadvantageandstrategictradepolicy
TheUK'sDavidCollieaandDaviddeMezab(2003)inthe"competitiveadvantageofstrategictradepolicy"inthechaseextensionofthefamousMeza(1986),Neary(1994),andBandyopadhyay(1997)oftheresearchresults,andpointsoutthatBrander-Spencer(1985)modelshowsthat,
Lowcostcountriesofferhigherexportsubsidies/exporttaxesthanthecostcountriesdo.
Inthetraditionaltrademodel,freetradepolicyisthebestineverycountry.Butintheabsenceofretaliation,manycountriesarekeentoabandonfreetradepolicy,whichgivesareasonableexplanationofthestrategictradepolicy.Ifthereisanoligopoly,therewillberent,soitisintheinterestsofthestatetocreateabiasedcompetitionenvironment.Sincethegovernment'smotiveistotransferprofitstodomesticmanufacturers,thesubsidiesallocatedtothemostprofitablemanufacturersarethehighest,andthelowercostcountriesprovidehighersubsidiestotheirfirms.Strategiccomplementaritymeansthatwhenanenterprisecutsproduction,anotherenterprisedoesthesame,resultinginhigherpricesandbenefits.Thisshowsthatlow-costenterprisesproducethelargestoutput,sothegovernmentsetsthehighestexporttax.Theauthorbelievesthatlow-costcountriesaremorelikelytoprofitfromgovernmentintervention,andthatwhateverthegovernment'spolicyis,theabsolutevalueoflow-costcountriesisgreaterthanthecostofrivalcountries.
2.incomeconstraints,strategictradepolicyandindustrialpolicy
Thestrategictradepolicytheoryemphasizesthedifferencebetweenthecommitmentabilityofcompaniesandthegovernment,whichisoneofthekeyfactorsormotivationsforinterferingwiththeoligopolymarket.Differentscholarsintheextensionofthetheory,althoughnotonlyconsidertheindustrialpolicywhilealsotakingintoaccountthetradepolicy,butarebasedontheassumptionthatnosubsidiescanraiselocalpasswithoutdistortingtaxes,$1ofpublicfundsthemarginalsocialcostof1.butinpractice,raisesubsidydistortsthethecosttotheeconomy,whichmeansthat$1ofpublicfundstheopportunitycostisgreaterthanthetoJ.PeterNearyandDermotLeahyinBritain(2004)isconsideredacompany'sprofitandsocialvalueofpresubsidy,describesthesituationofdynamicoligopolycompetitionunderthetradeandindustrialpolicy,pointedoutthatindifferentcircumstances,thefundthemarginalsocialcostsmaybegreaterthan1orlessthan1.,forexample,whenthereareraisedbytwistingpartcausedbythelossofselfequitysubsidiesordomesticcompaniesAllforeigners,thefund'smarginalsocialcostisgreaterthan1;andwhentheoptimalprofitofdomesticcompanieshavenoincomeconstraintconditionsisnotsufficienttoattractforeigncompaniestoenterthemarket,andthereisnofixedcostofdistortingsubsidiesdonotexist,thefundwillcostmarginalagencyislessthan1.J.PeterNearyandDermotLeahy(2004)investigatedthepresenceandabsenceofstrategictradeandindustrialpolicyincomeconstraints,pointsoutthattheoptimaltotalnetsubsidyfundsexpenditureandthemarginalsocialcostiscomparedwiththechangesinthereversedirection,whenthemarginalcostwillrisewhentheagencyfunds,thetotalnetdeclineinspendingonsubsidiesisoptimal.
3.,thesubstitutionrelationbetweenstrategicallianceandstrategictradepolicy
GermanKarlMorasch(2000)investigateswhethertheloosecompetitionpolicycanbeusedasanalternativetothestrategictradepolicyinthecontextofstrategicalliances.Theallianceistobuildstrategiccontractstochangemarketoutput.Underthegeneralconditions,theeffectoftheimplementationofthestrategictradepolicydependsonthefollowingfactors:
domesticconsumptionshare,thenatureofcompetitionintheproductmarket,theinitialnumberofmanufacturersintheindustryandthefeasibilityoftheinternationalunion.
KarlMorasch(2000)believesthatiftheInternationalUnionisviable,withoutconsideringthenatureofcompetitionintheproductmarket,thealliancewillbeparticularlygoodforlowsharedomesticconsumption,aswellasforafewoligarchs.Iftheallianceenterprisescangainastrategicadvantageoverhiscompetitors,thestrategicalliancecanplaythesamestrategictradepolicy,strategicallianceislikelytoreplacetheloosecompetitionpolicyofstrategictradepolicy.Theobviousadvantagesofstrategicalliancesloosecompetitionpolicyisthatthegovernmentdoesnotrequirecompleteinformationaboutthestructureormarketenterprisesgraspthecostmanagement,butnoteasytoincurforeignretaliation,becausecomparedwiththesubsidypolicyofcompetitionpolicyisnottoointeresting.
Asofnow,discussthestrategicallianceininternationalcompetitioneffectislimitedtooligopolybetweencompetitorsjointR&Dspilloverseffecto