奖金强度的影响工作的满意外文翻译.docx

奖金强度的影响工作的满意外文翻译.docx

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奖金强度的影响工作的满意外文翻译

奖金强度的影响工作的满意外文翻译

原文:

PayEnough,Don’tPayTooMuchorDon’tPayatAll?

TheImpactofBonusIntensityonJobSatisfaction

KonstantinosPouliakas

Theprincipal-agentmodel,withitsconvincingillustrationofthetrade-offthatarisesbetweenriskandincentiveprovisionwhenattemptingtoaligntheConflictinginterestsoftwocontractingparties,remainscentralforourunder-standingofthecompensationstrategiesemployedbyfirmsMirlees,1976;Holmstrom,1979.Accordingtothestandardmodelofagencytheory,theintroductionoffinancialincentivesaspartofanagent’sremunerationpackagewillincreasehis/herproductivity,asitisassumedthatindividualsderiveutilityfromincomewhilsttheexertionofeffortentailsautilitycost.Importantly,iftheadditionaldisutilityofhighere?

ortiscompensatedbyanadequatewagepremium,animplacationofthetheoryisthatthemarginalutilitiesofworkersunderfixedandvariablecompensationschemesshouldbeequalizedinthelong-run.Whatthisimpliesisthatthereshouldbenodi?

erencebetweenthejobsatisfactionofemployeesreceivingmonetaryincentivesandthoseonnoncontingentpaymentarrangements,otherthingsequal.

Theaboveconclusionhasbeendisputedbyapsychologicaland,increas-ingly,economicsliterature,whichhasstressedthattheincorporationofnonpecuniarymotivesintotheeconomicparadigm,suchasthedesireforreciprocationorforengagingininterestingtasks,hasimportantimplicationsforanindividual’smotivationandjobsatisfactionDeci,1971;Lepperetal.1973;DeciandRyan,1985;Frey,1986,1997;Kreps,1997;FreyandJegen,2001.Inaddition,ithasbeenarguedthat‘wrong’monetaryincentivesmayncitedysfunctionalbehaviouralresponsesbyemployeesHolmstromandMilgrom,1991;Baker,1992;Prendergast,1999,orhaveadetrimentaleffectonemployeemoraleandjobsecurityviatheinequitableandriskypaydistributionsthatariseasaconsequenceBakeretal.,1988.

Oncethesemechanismsaretakenintoconsideration,itbecomesclearthatthetheoreticalimpactofmonetaryincentivesonworkereffortandjobsatisfactioncanbeambiguous.AscorroboratedinanumberofeconomicexperimentsFalkandKosfeld,2006;ErikssonandVilleval,2008,theincentiveeffectsofmonetaryrewardsarelikelytobecompromisedinaworldofimperfectlabourmobilitypopulatedbyheterogeneousagentswithvaryingpsychologicaldispositions.Totheextentthatincentiveschemesallowforoptimizationofeffort,facilitateworkerautonomyandenhanceself-determinationtheyshouldincreasejobsatisfaction,otherthingsequal.Yetincreasingearningsrisk,crowdingoutoftheinherentpleasantnessinperformingone’sjobandlowermoralecanleadtodisgruntledemployees.

Thestudyoftheeffectofmonetaryrewardsonjobsatisfactionisthereforeanempiricalissue,whichhasonlyuntilrecentlyreceivedanyattention.Inparticular,anumberofstudieshaveshownthatinBritainbonusesresultinhigherjobsatisfaction,althoughtheeffectofindividual-basedperformancerelatedpayPRPsystemsisnotasclear-cutonceunobservedheterogeneityistakenintoaccountDragoetal.,1992;McCauslandetal.,2005,Artz,2008,GreenandHeywood,2008;PouliakasandTheodossiou,2009.UsingUSdata,HeywoodandWei2006havealsoconfirmedthatalltypesofPRPbarpieceratesyieldgreaterjobsatisfactionrelativetotimerates.

Apotentialdeficiencyoftheabove-mentionedstudiesisthattheyonlyfocusonthediscretedifferenceinjobsatisfactionbetweenworkersreceivingPRPandthoseonalternativeschemes.Thus,theyignorethefactthatworkerperformanceandsatisfactionmayvaryaccordingtothemagnitudeofincentives.AssuggestedbyaseriesoffieldexperimentsperformedbyGneezyandRustichini2000[a],p.802,‘‘forallpositivebutsmallenoughcompensaions,thereisareductioninperformanceascomparedwiththezerocompensation,or,better,withthelackofanymentionofcompensation’’.Nevertheless,oncetheextrinsicmotivationislargeenough,itresultsinbetterperformancethanintheno-incentivecase.Thisnon-monotonicityinthereactionofworkerefforttobothpositiveandnegative//.usesorfines,respectivelyhasconsequentlybeentermedthe‘‘Weffect’’ofincentivesGneezy,2004.Bycontrast,therecentexperimentalstudyofPokorny2008findsaninverseU-shapedrelationshipbetweeneffortlevelsandincentiveintensity.

Thispaperattemptstotesttheabovecontrastinghypothesesbylookingbeyondthemereincidenceofincentivepayandexaminingtheimpactoftheintensityofincentivesi.e.theproportionofworkers’salarythatistiedtobonusesonjobsatisfactioninstead.Specifically,10waves1998?

2007oftheBritishHouseholdPanelSurveyBHPSareusedtoinvestigatetheassociationbetweenthepowerofbonuspaymentsandtheutilityderivedfromwork,holdingtheincidenceofindividual-basedPRPandotherimportantdetermi-nantsconstant.Aftercontrollingforindividualfixedeffectssuchasabilityormotivationthatmaybiastheinfluenceofpaymentschemesonjobsatisfaction,jobutilityisfoundtoriseonlyinresponseto‘large’bonuspayments.Evidenceisalsopresentedthatrevokingabonusfromoneyeartothenextislikelytohaveadetrimentaleffectonemployeeutility,andthatovertimejobsatisfactiontendstodiminishasemployeespotentiallyadapttothepaymentofbonusesTheempiricalevidenceofthepaperisthereforeconsistentwithGneezyandRustichini’s2000[a]assertionthatemployerswishingtomotivatetheirstaffshouldindeed‘‘payenoughordon’tpayatall’’.

Thestructureofthepaperisasfollows.Section2engagesinareviewoftheavailableliteratureontheeffectoffinancialincentivesonjobsatisfaction.InSection3thedatausedinthestudyaredescribedandpreliminarystatisticalcorrelationsareoutlined.Section4describesthebasiceconometricmethodologyusedinthepaper.Section5outlinesthemainempiricalresultsoftherelationshipbetweenincentiveintensityandtheutilityderivedfromemployment.Section6examinestheheterogeneityinthesamplefurther.Finally,Section7concludes.

Thegrowingeconomicsliteratureonsubjectivewell-beingFreyandStutzer,2002;BlanchflowerandOswald,2004;VanPraagandFerrer-i-Carbonell,2004;EPICURUS,2007;Frey,2008hasemphasizedthatmeasuresofjobsatisfactionaresignificantpredictorsofemployeebehaviour[//.tsFreeman,1978,absenteeismClegg,1983orworkerproductivityJudgeetal.,2001].Itfollowsthatunderstandingtheinfluenceofmonetaryincentivesonjobsatisfactionisimportantgiventhatthecompositionofanemployee’sremunerationpackageisanintegralelementofhis/heroverallworkingconditions.

ThefactthatfirmstypicallyemployawidearrayofincentiveinstrumentshasbeenattributedtothefundamentalagencyproblemthatplaguestheemploymentrelationshipGibbonsandWaldman,1999.Inordertocombattheproblemofmoralhazard,firmsdesignincentivecontractsthatseektoachievegoalcongruencewiththeiremployeesMirlees,1976;Holmstrom,1979.

Furthermore,asshownbyLazear1986,2000,theintroductionoffinancialrewardsshouldinducemorehighlygearedworkerstoputforthextraefforttothepointwherethemarginalvalueaddedequatesthemarginalcostoftheadditionallabour.Inlong-runequilibrium,however,onewouldnotexpecttoobserveanydifferencesinthemarginalutilitiesofcomparableworkersunderfixedorvariablepaymentschemes,astheexpectedvalueofthehigherwagespaidunderPRPshouldbejustsuffcienttocompensatefortheadditionalearningsriskandthedisutilityofextraeffortMas-Colelletal.,1995.

Oncethestandardassumptionsoftheagencymodelarerelaxed,though,therearemanyreasonstoexpectthatPRPislikelytohaveanon-negligibleimpactonjobsatisfaction.Expectancy-basedtheoriesoforganizationalpsychologyhaveassertedthatattitudesaboutworkareshapedfromtherewardsproducedbyperformance,whicharevaluedoutcomesinthemselvesLawlerandPorter,1967.Furthermore,ithasbeenarguedthatPRPisanintegralelementofso-called‘highperformanceworkplacepractices’,whichhavebeenfoundtobepositivelyrelatedtojobsatisfactionBauer,2004.

OtheraspectsofPRPmay,nonetheless,diminishproductivityandworkersatisfaction.Ithasbeenillustratedthatwronglydevisedcompensationschemescanhavecounterproductiveconsequences,astheymayencourageworkersto‘game’thecompensationsystemtotheiradvantagebymultitaskingBaker1992orbyengaginginrent-seekingbehaviouraimedatinfluencingthesubjectiveevaluationsoflinemanagersPrendergast,1999.Holmstrom’s1982seminalpaperhasalsoshowedthatutilizingteamproductionincentiveschemessuchasprofit-sharingmaydiluteindividualperformanceasaresultoffree-riding.InthefaceofevidencesuggestingthatthejobsatisfactionofemployeesisintrinsicallylinkedtotheirrelativepaystatusClarkandOswald,1996;Clark,1999;Ferrer-i-Carbonell,2005;Clarketal.,2008[a],thedemoralisingdispersionandvariabilityinwagesthatensuesfromPRPschemesisalsolikelytoaffectattitudestoworkinanegativefashion.Furthermore,ithasoftenbeenclaimedthatfinancialincentivesunderminecollaborationandteamwork,emphasizethepowerasymmetrybetweenmanagementandtheworkforce,andreduceemployeerisk-takingandinnovationKohn,1993.

Addedtotheaboveisaprominentnon-economiccriticismofPRPwhichisBasedontheso-calledcognitiveevaluationormotivationcrowding-outhypothesisDeciandRyan,1985;FreyandJegen,2001.AccordingtothistheoryofSocialpsychologyonceitisacknowledgedthatindividualsmayderiveintrinsicsatisfactionfromtheirjobs,explicitrewardsthatareperceivedascontrollingdevi