曼昆经济学原理英文版文案加习题答案22章word精品.docx

曼昆经济学原理英文版文案加习题答案22章word精品.docx

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曼昆经济学原理英文版文案加习题答案22章word精品

22

FRONTIERSOF

MICROECONOMICS

WHATSNEWINTHESEVENTHEDITION:

AnewCaseStudyonLeft-DigitBiashasbeenaddedandanewIntheNewsfeatureon"CanBrainScieneeImproveEconomics?

"hasbeenadded.

LEARNINGOBJECTIVES:

Bytheendofthischapter,studentsshouldunderstand:

howtoexamineproblemscausedbyasymmetricinformation.

themarketsolutionstoasymmetricinformation.

whydemocraticvotingsystemsmaynotrepresentthepreferencesofsociety.

whypeoplemaynotalwaysbehaveasrationalmaximizers.

CONTEXTANDPURPOSE:

Chapter22isthelastchapterinthemicroeconomicsportionofthetext.Itisthesecondoftwounrelatedchaptersthatintroducestudentstoadvaneedtopicsinmicroeconomics.Thesetwochaptersareintendedtowhettheirappetitesforfurtherstudyineconomics.

ThepurposeofChapter22istogivestudentsatasteofthreetopicsonthefrontierofmicroeconomicresearch.Thefirsttopicaddressedisasymmetricinformation,asituationwhenonepersoninaneconomicrelationshiphasmorerelevantknowledgethantheotherpersondoes.Thesecondtopicispoliticaleconomy,theapplicationofeconomictoolstotheunderstandingofthefunctioningofgovernment.Thethirdtopicaddressedisbehavioraleconomics,theintroductionofpsychologyintothe

studyofeconomicissues.

KEYPOINTS:

391

*Inmanyeconomictransactions,informationisasymmetric.Whentherearehiddenactions,principalsmaybeconcernedthatagentssufferfromtheproblemofmoralhazard.Whentherearehidden

characteristics,buyersmaybeconcernedabouttheproblemofadverseselectionamongthesellers.Privatemarketssometimesdealwithasymmetricinformationwithsignalingandscreening.

«Althoughgovernmentpolicycansometimesimprovemarketoutcomes,governmentsarethemselvesimperfectinstitutions.TheCondorcetparadoxshowsthatthemajorityrulefailstoproducetransitivepreferencesforsociety,andArrow'simpossibilitytheoremshowsthatnovotingsystemwillbeperfect.Inmanysituations,democraticinstitutionswillproducetheoutcomedesiredbythemedianvoter,regardlessofthepreferencesoftherestoftheelectorate.Moreover,theindividualswhosetgovernmentpolicymaybemotivatedbyself-interestratherthannationalinterest.

«Thestudyofpsychologyandeconomicsrevealsthathumandecisionmakingismorecomplexthanisassumedinconventionaleconomictheory.Peoplearenotalwaysrational,theycareaboutthefairnessofeconomicoutcomes（eventotheirowndetriment）,andtheycanbeinconsistentovertime.

CHAPTEROUTLINE:

Thisisagreatchaptertogetstudentsinterestedinfurtherstudyofeconomics.Itisimportantforthestudentstolearnthateconomicsisagrowinganddevelopingscieneeandthateconomistsarealwayslookingfornewareastostudyandnewphenomenatoexplain.

I.AsymmetricInformation

A.Manytimesinlife,onepersonholdsmoreknowledgeaboutwhatisgoingonthananother.Such

adiffereneeinaccesstorelevantinformationisknownasaninformationasymmetry

B.Examples

1.Aworkerknowsmorethanhisemployeraboutthelevelofhisworkeffort.Thisisanexampleofahiddenaction.

2.Asellerofausedcarknowsmorethanthebuyerdoesaboutthecar'scondition.Thisisanexampleofahiddencharacteristic.

C.Whenthereisasymmetricinformation,thepartywithouttherelevantknowledgewouldliketohavesuchknowledge,buttheotherpartymayhaveanincentivetoconcealit.

D.HiddenActions:

Principals,Agents,andMoralHazard

1.ImportantDefinitions

a.Definitionofmoralhazard:

thetendencyofapersonwhoisimperfectly

monitoredtoengageindishonestorotherwiseundesirablebehavior.

b.Definitionofagent:

apersonwhoisperforminganactforanotherperson,calledtheprincipal.

c.Definitionofprincipal*apersonforwhomanotherperson,calledtheagent,isperformingsomeact.

2.Theemploymentrelationshipistheclassicexample.

a.Workers（agents）maybetemptedtoshirktheirwork-relatedresponsibilitiesbecausetheiremployers（theprincipals）donotmonitortheirbehaviorclosely.

b.Employerscanrespondbyprovidingbettermonitoring,payinghigherwages,ordelayingpartoftheworker'spayuntillaterintheworker'slife.

3.FYI:

CorporateManagement

a.Fromaneconomicstandpoint,themostimportantfeatureofthecorporateformoforganizationistheseparationofownershipandcontrol.

b.Thiscreatesaprincipal-agentproblemwheretheshareholdersaretheprincipalsandthe

managersaretheagents.

c.Managers'goalsmaynotalwayscoincidewithshareholders'goalofprofitmaximization.

d.Asaresult,manymanagersareprovidedcompensatio