网络团购外文翻译文献.docx

网络团购外文翻译文献.docx

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网络团购外文翻译文献

网络团购外文翻译文献

（文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译）

原文：

Segmentinguncertaindemandingroup-buyingauctions

Demanduncertaintyisakeyfactorinaseller’sdecision-makingprocessforproductssoldthroughonlineauctions.Weexploredemanduncertaintyingroup-buyingauctionsintermsoftheextentoflow-valuationdemandandhigh-valuationdemand.Wefocusontheanalysisofamonopolisticgroup-buyingretailerthatsellsproductstoconsumerswhoexpressdifferentproductvaluations.Wealsoexaminetheperformanceofagroup-buyingsellerwhofacescompetitiveposted-pricesellersinamarketforthesaleofthesameproducts,undersimilarassumptionsaboutuncertaindemand.BasedonaNashequilibriumanalysisofbidderstrategiesforbothoftheseseller-sidecompetitionstructures,weareabletocharacterizethegroupbuyingauctionbidders’dominantstrategies.Weobtainedanumberofinterestingfindings.Group-buyingislikelytobemoreeffectiveinsettingswherethereislargerlow-valuationdemandthanhigh-valuationdemand.Thestructureofdemandmatters.Thisfindinghasrelevancetothemarketplacefornewcameras,next-generationmicroprocessorsandcomputers,andotherhigh-valuationgoods,whichareunlikelytobeaseffectivelysoldingroup-buyingmarkets.Weobtainedadditionalresultsforthecaseofcontinuousdemand,andfindthatthereisabasisforthesellertoimproverevenuesviaeffectivegroup-buyingauctionpricecurvedesign.

Keywords:

Consumerbehavior,biddingstrategy,demanduncertainty,economicanalysis,electronicmarkets,group-buyingauctions,marketmechanism,posted-pricemechanism,simulation,uncertaintyrisk.

ThedevelopmentofadvancedITmakesitpossibletousenovelbusinessmodelstohandlebusinessproblemsinnewandinnovativeways.WiththegrowthoftheInternet,anumberofnewelectronicauctionmechanismshaveemerged,andauctionsaregenerallyknowntocreatehigherexpectedsellerrevenuethanposted-priceswhenthecostofrunninganauctionisminimalorcostless（Wang1993）.SomeofthenewmechanismswehaveseenincludetheonlineYankeeandDutchauctions,andthe“name-yourown-price”and“buy-it-now”mechanisms.AnexampleiseBay’sDutchauctionforthesaleofmultipleitemsofthesamedescription.Anotherofthesenewelectronicmarketmechanismsthatwehaveobservedisthegroup-buyingauction,ahomogeneousmulti-unitauction（Mitchell2002,Lietal.2004）.Internet-basedsellersanddigitalintermediarieshaveadoptedthismarketmechanismonsitessuchasLetsBuyItandeWinWin.Thesesitesoffertransaction-makingmechanismsthataredifferentfromtraditionalauctions.Intraditionalauctions,bidderscompeteagainstoneanothertobethewinner.Ingroup-buyingauctions,however,biddershaveanincentivetoaggregatetheirbidssothatthesellerordigitalintermediaryoffersalowerpriceatwhichtheyallcanbuythedesiredgoods（Hornetal.2000）.McCabeetal.（1991）haveexploredmulti-unitVickreyauctionsinexperimentalresearch,however,theydidnotconsiderthepossibilityofstochasticbidderarrivalordemanduncertainty.

Thispaperisthefirsttoexaminetheimpactsofdemanduncertaintyontheperformanceononlinegroup-buyingauctions.BasedonaNashequilibriumanalysisofbidderstrategiesforamonopolistsellerandacompetitiveseller,weareabletocharacterizethegroup-buyingauctionbidders’symmetricanddominantstrategies.Wefindthatgroup-buyingislikelytobemoreeffectiveinsettingswherethereislargerlow-valuationdemandthanhigh-valuationdemand.Thus,thestructureofdemandatdifferentlevelofwillingness-to-paybyconsumersmatters.Thishasrelevancetothemarketplacefornewcameras,next-generationmicroprocessorsandcomputers,andotherhigh-valuationgoods.Weobtainedadditionalresultsforthecaseofcontinuousdemandvaluations,andfoundthatthereisabasisforthesellertoimproverevenuesbasedontheeffectivedesignofthegroup-buyingauctionpricecurvedesign.

THEORY

Themodelforthegroup-buyingauctionmechanismwithuncertainbidderarrivalthatwewilldevelopspansthreestreamsofliterature:

demanduncertainty,consumerbehaviorandrelatedmechanismdesignissues;auctioneconomicsandmechanismdesigntheory;andcurrenttheoreticalknowledgeabouttheoperationofgroup-buyingauctionsfromtheISandelectroniccommerceliterature.

DemandUncertainty,ConsumerBehaviorandMechanismDesign

Demanduncertaintiestypicallyarecomposedofconsumerdemandenvironmentuncertainty（oruncertaintyabouttheaggregatelevelofconsumerdemand）andrandomnessofdemandinthemarketplace（reflectedinbrieftemporalchangesanddemandshocksthatarenotexpectedtopersist）.Consumeruncertaintyaboutdemandinthemarketplacecanoccurbasedonthevaluationofproducts,andwhetherconsumersarewillingtopayhigherorlowerprices.Itmayalsooccuronthebasisofdemandlevels,especiallythenumberoftheconsumersinthemarket.Finally,therearetemporalconsiderations,whichinvolvewhetheraconsumerwishestobuynow,orwhethertheymaybesamplingqualityandpricingwiththeintentionofbuyinglater.Wedistinguishbetweendifferentdemandlevelenvironments.Inaddition,itispossiblethattheseconsumerdemandenvironmentsmayco-exist,asisoftenthecasewhenfirmsmakestrategiesforpricediscrimination.Thispromptsasellertoconsidersettingmorethanonepricelevel,asweoftenseeinreal-worldretailing,aswellasgroup-buyingauctions.

Dana（2001）pointedoutthatwhenamonopolysellerfacesuncertaintyabouttheconsumerdemandenvironment,itusuallywillnotbeinhisbestinteresttosetuniformpricesforallconsumers.Theauthorstudiedascenarioinwhichthereweremorebuyersassociatedwithhighdemandandfewerbuyersassociatedwithlowdemand.Intheauthor’sproposedpricemechanism,thesellersetsapricecurveinsteadofasingleprice,soastobeabletoofferdifferentpricesdependingonthedifferentdemandconditionsthatappeartoobtaininthemarketplace.Itmaybeusefulinsuchsettingstoemployanautomatedpricesearchingmechanism,whichisdemonstratedtobemorerobusttotheuncertaindemandthanauniformpricemechanismwill,relativetoexpectedprofits.UnlikeDana’s（2001）workthough,wewillstudysettingsinwhichtherearefewerbuyerswhoexhibitdemandathigherpricesandmorebuyerswhoexhibitdemandatlowerprices.Thisisausefulwaytocharacterizegroup-buying,sincemostparticipatingconsumerstrulyareprice-sensitive,andthisiswhatmakesgroup-buyingauctioninterestingtothem.

NockeandPeitz（2007）havestudiedrationingasatoolthatamonopolisttooptimizeitssalespolicyinthepresenceofuncertaindemand.Theauthorsexaminedthreedifferentsellingpoliciesthattheyarguearepotentiallyoptimalintheirenvironment:

uniformpricing,clearancesales,andintroductoryoffers.Auniformpricingpolicyinvolvesnosellerpricediscrimination,thoughconsumersarelikelytoexhibitdifferentlevelsofwillingness-to-paywhentheyarepermittedtoexpressthemselvesthroughpurchasesatdifferentpricelevels.AcurrentexampleofuniformpricingpolicyisiTunes,whichhasbeenoffering99¢persongpricing.Theconsumerhastodealwithverylittleuncertaintyintheprocess,andthismaybeagoodapproachwhenthesellerwantsto“train”consumerstodevelopspecificbuyinghabits（asseemstohavebeenthecasewiththeonlinepurchaseofdigitalmusicinthepastfewyears）.

NockeandPeitz（2007）characterizedaclearancesalespolicyaschargingahighpriceinitially,butthenloweringthepriceandofferingtheremaininggoodstolowvalueconsumers,asisoftenseenindepartmentstoresalespolicy.Consumerswithahighvaluationforthesalegoodsmaydecidetobuyatthehighprice,sincetheendogenousprobabilityofrationingbythesellerishigheratthelowerprice.Apropostothis,consumerswhobuylateatlowpricestypicallyfindthatitisdifficulttofindthestyles,colorsandsizesthattheywant,andtheymayhavemoredifficultytocoordinatethepurchaseofmatchingitems（e.g.,matchingcolorsandstylesofclothing）.Introductoryoffersconsistofsellingalimitedquantityofitemsatalowpriceinitiallyinthemarket,andthenraisingprice.Avariantoccurswhentheselleroffersalowerpriceforthefirstpurchaseofgoodsorservicesthattypicallyinvolvemultiplepurchasesbytheconsumer（e.g.,bookclubmembershipsandcellphoneservices）.Consumerswhoplaceahighvaluationonasaleitemrationedinitiallyatthelowerpricemayfinditoptimaltobuythegoodsatthehigherprice.Introductoryoffersmaydominateuniformpricing,butareneveroptimalifthesellerusesclearancesales.

Inuncertainmarkets,buyerswillhaveprivateinformation.CheandGale（2000）pointedoutthatwhenconsumershaveprivateinformationabouttheirbudgetconstraintsandtheirvaluationofsalesitems,soamonopolist’soptimalpricingstrategyistoofferamenuoflotteriesonthelikelihoodofconsumerpurchasesofitsproductsatdifferentprices.Anotherapproachisintertemporalpricediscrimination.Byofferingdifferentpriceswithdifferentprobabilitiesfortheconsumertoobtainthegood,themonopolistcanprofitablysegmentconsumerseventhoughvaluationsegmentsalonearenotprofitable.

Evenwhenthesellercaneffectivelyidentifytheconsumerdemandlevelinthemarketplace,duetostochasticfactorsinthemarketenvironment,itstillmaybedifficultforthesellertoeffectivelypredictdemand.Asaresult,thesellermaytrytoimproveitsdemandforecastbyutilizingmarketsignalsthatmaybeobservedwhensalesoccur.However,therearelikelytobesomestocha