中国政府审计问题和改革外文翻译精品.docx

中国政府审计问题和改革外文翻译精品.docx

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中国政府审计问题和改革外文翻译精品

中文4010字

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

题目政府审计公告制度的现状分析及其对策

专业会计学

外文题目GovernmentauditinginChina:

Problemsandreform

外文出处《GovernmentauditinginChina:

Problemsand

reform》[N].incorporatingAdvancesinInternational

Accounting2008，（24）：

119-127

外文作者杨寿昌，贾森泽忠孝，莫里斯彭德尔伯里

原文：

GovernmentauditinginChina:

Problemsandreform

1.Introduction

For30yearsafteritsfoundationin1949,thePeople'sRepublicofChinawentthroughaseriesofmajormasspoliticalmovementswhichleftitextremelyisolatedfromtherestoftheworld,especiallycapitalistcountries.Atthebrinkofatotaleconomiccollapse,Chinashifteditsfocustoeconomicdevelopment,beganmarket-orientedeconomicreforms,andadoptedanopen-doorpolicyin1978.3Thesechangesrevivedbothgovernmentauditingandindependentauditing,whichhadbeenreplacedbyothermonitoringmechanismsinthe1950s.

Asrequiredbythe1982ConstitutionofthePeople'sRepublicofChina（PRC,1982）,theNationalAuditOffice（NAO）wassetupin1983asadepartmentoftheStateCouncil.Inaddition,regionalauditofficeswerealsosetupasdepartmentsofprovincial,municipalandcountygovernments.Aregionalgovernmentauditofficeisundertheleadershipofboththegovernmentauditofficeatahigherlevelanditssupervisingregionalgovernment.Forexample,theauditofficeofaprovincialgovernmentissubjecttothejointleadershipoftheNAOandtheprovincialgovernment.Underthedualleadershipsystem,foraprovincialgovernmentauditoffice,theNAOprovidesauditingandregulatoryguidanceandmonitoringwhiletheprovincialgovernmentprovidesresourcesandexercisespersonnelcontrol.Inaddition,theNAOoperatesanetworkofbranchofficesincentralgovernmentministriesandverylargemunicipalitiestoauditvariousgovernmentdepartments,agencies,stateownedenterprisesunderthecontrolofthecentralgovernment,andtheirassociatedinstitutions.ThesebranchauditofficeslocatedinministriesandverylargemunicipalitiesareunderthedirectleadershipoftheNAO.

AlthoughthisgovernmentauditsystemhasmadesignificantcontributionstowardChina'seconomicreformandopeninguptotheworldinthepast20years（ChineseAuditingSystemResearchGroup,1999）,italsosuffersfromthelackofauditindependence.Theexistingproblemsofgovernmentauditingmainlystemfromitbeingunderthedirectcontroloftheexecutivebody（theStateCouncil）.Underthissystem,variousgovernmentdepartmentsandofficialscan,boththeoreticallyandpractically,interferewithgovernmentauditing,thusweakeningtheobjectivityandfairnessoftheaudit.However,thepeople'scongressesatvariouslevelshavebeguntoattachsignificantimportanceto,andmakeincreasinguseof,theauditreport.Atthesametime,moreandmoretaxpayershavebeguntopayattentiontohowtheirmoneyisusedbythegovernment.WhiletheNAO'slackofindependencehasalwaysbeenaproblemeversinceitsestablishment,thisproblemiscreatingincreasingtensionsinthecurrentpoliticalsettingbecauseoftheaccountabilityneedsofthelegislatureandtaxpayers.Theaccountabilityrelationshipbetweenthegovernmentandthelegislatureiscompromisedbythefactthattheauditorisnotindependentofthegovernment.

Notwithstandingtheseproblems,theNAOhassteppedupthelevelofpublicdisclosureofauditfindingsinrecentyears.In2003,theNAOforthefirsttimedisclosedtothepublicthatseriousfinancialproblemsexistedinfourministriesofthecentralgovernment.Thisdisclosureandtheproblemsexposedattractedmuchmediaattentionandthephrase“AuditStorm”wasusedtorefertothedisclosureandtheissuesraised.This“AuditStorm”continuedin2004and2005whentheNAOinitsannualreportdisclosedtheseriousillegalactsinotherministriesofthecentralgovernment.However,althoughthisstormhasbeenusefulindrawingattentiontosomeoftheproblemsthathadoccurred,thelevelofauditindependencemeansthatonlyasmallpercentageofthetotalwereexposed.Also,evenwhereproblemsareexposed,thisdoesnotensurethatthesameproblemswillnotrecur.Thus,the“AuditStorm”hasheightenedtheawarenessoftheneedforgovernmentauditingreform.

2.Perceivedproblemsofthecurrentgovernmentauditingsystem

Mostintervieweesbelievedthatthecurrentproblemsofgovernmentauditinghavetheiroriginsinitsrelationtothegovernment,i.e.,theNAOisineffectaninternalauditingdepartmentunderthegovernment'sdirectcontrol.Thefollowingparagraphselaboratethemainproblemsidentifiedintheinterviews.

2.1.Lackofauditindependence

ThemajorityofourintervieweesacknowledgedsomedirectorindirectinterventionbypeopleororganisationsfromoutsidetheNAO.Thesehaveastrongnegativeimpactonauditplanning,thetrainingandappointmentofauditingpersonnel,thedeterminationofaudittasks,thedealingwithproblemsidentifiedintheaudit,andthedisclosureofauditresults.Asaresult,theNAOcanhardlyperformanyindependentauditing.Adirector-generalofaprovincialgovernmentauditofficecommented:

Theproblemsidentifiedintheauditshouldbedealtwithinaccordancewithlaw,butiftheproblemsinvolvethegovernment,theauditofficewillexperienceinterferencefromthegovernmentalofficialinchargeorfromotherauthorities.

Someintervieweesacknowledgedthelackofindependenceofgovernmentauditing,butatthesametimetheydidnotwanttoexaggeratetheproblem.Beingadepartmentdirectedbythegovernment,howcantheauditofficeworkindependentlyfreefromtheinterferenceofthegovernmentorthechiefgovernmentofficers（CGO）?

Istheresultofinterferenceinevitablydetrimental?

Theintervieweesfoundithardtoanswerthesequestions.Besides,theauditofficeandthegovernmentareatdifferentadministrativelevelsandmaynotalwayshaveconsistentperceptionsonauditing.Underthiscircumstance,aswasrevealedintheinterviews,theauditoffice,beingatthelowerlevel,wouldnormallyfollowthegovernment'swill—andthisisunderstandable.

Wearguethatifauditingissupposedtosatisfymerelytheneedsofthegovernment,orifgovernmentauditissupposedtoplayasupportingroletogovernmentalwork,thentheproblemoflimitedauditindependenceisrelativelypartial,becausegovernmentauditingstillachievesitsmainobjective.Butifthepeople'scongressandtaxpayersoutsidethegovernmentarealsoauditclients,andentrustthegovernmentauditofficetoinvestigatehowthegovernmentimplementedfiscalbudgetsapprovedbythepeople'scongress,thenthecontrolrelationshipbetweentheauditofficeandthegovernmentbecomesasevereproblem.Animmediateconsequenceofthelackofauditindependenceisthattheauditreportmaynolongerpossessobjectivityandfairnessanditisthereforelesslikelytogainthetrustandacceptancebythepeople'scongressandthepublic.

2.2.Restricteddisclosureofauditresults

Theintervieweesgenerallyfeltthatthedisclosureofauditresultsmightberestricted.AdeputyCGO（adeputymayor）ofamunicipalgovernmentcommentedintheinterview:

Theauditreportfollowsgovernmentalarrangements,butthisdoesnotnecessarilyindicatethatthegovernmentwillpreventthedisclosureofauditissues.WhoeveractsastheCGOfacesexternalpressureandthuss/hewilldisclosesomething,explainittothepeople'scongress,andalsosavethefaceoftheauditoffice.ButwilltheCGOdisclosealltheissuesorimportantissuesthen?

Willtheissuesconcerninghis/herannualreportbedisclosedastheyreallyare?

Onecannevertell.Adirector-generalfromtheNAOadmitted:

Infact,somegovernmentofficialsinterferewiththeauditofficeinreportingauditresultstothePeople'sCongress.Theyevendirectlydemandtheauditofficetoremovebigissuesthatviolateregulationsfromtheauditreport.

AnofficialfromtheNAOalsoadmittedintheinterviewthatsomelocalgovernmentsandrelatedauthoritiesinterferewiththedisclosureofauditfindingsandtheresolutionofauditresultsinordertoshirkresponsibilitiesandavoidexcessivedisclosurethatmightovershadowtheirpoliticalcareer.Theinterviewdatathussuggeststhattheauditofficeisnotonlyconstrainedbythegovernmentintermsofauditplanningandthedeterminationofaudittasks,butalsothedisclosureofauditresults.Thatis,theauditofficecannotmakeitsowndecisionsonwhattodisclose,howtodisclose,andwhentodisclose.Consequently,thereisnoassuranceontheauthorityandtransparencyofauditreports.Withthesubmissionofauditreportstothepeople'scongress,thisproblemofalackofindependenceandtransparencyhasarousedincreasedconcerns.SincetheConstitution（PRC,1982）andtheAuditLaw（PRC,1994a）lackclearandrigidrulesonthedisclosureofauditresults,thecontentanddegreeofdisclosureinthecurrentauditingsystemaredeterminedandcensoredbythegovernment'sdiscretionarydisclosurepoliciesongovernmentaffairsandarealsoheavilyaffectedbytheattitudesofCGOs.

2.3.Auditinggaps

Mostintervieweesmentionedthesameproblem;theauditisonlyappliedtogovernmentunitsatalowerlevelofthehierarchy.Thatis,theauditrarelyexaminestheresponsibilityandperformanceofthegovernmentitselforitsCGO,andhencethedepth,level,andscopeofauditingareratherrestricted.Thefollowingcommentmadebyanintervieweewhoisadirector-generalattheNAOisrepresentativeoftheviews.Fromalegalpointofview,therewillnotbeanyconstraintontheauditofdecisionsmadebyhigher-levelofficials,butinpracticeyoucannotreallyquestionthem.Ifintheauditprocesswediscoverprob