货币银行学 试题2.docx

货币银行学 试题2.docx

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货币银行学试题2

1.Whichofthefollowingcorrectlystatestherelationshipregardingbanks'balancesheets:

A.TotalBankLiabilities=TotalBankcapital+TotalBankAssets.

B.TotalBankAssets=TotalBankLiabilities+TotalBankCapital.

C.TotalBankAssets=TotalBankLiabilities–TotalBankCapital.

D.TotalBankAssets=TotalBankCapital–TotalBankLiabilities.

2.

2..2.Whichofthefollowingcorrectlystatestherelationshipregardingbanks'balancesheets:

A.TotalBankLiabilities=TotalBankcapital+TotalBankAssets

B.TotalBankAssets=TotalBankCapital–TotalBankLiabilities

C.TotalBankAssets=TotalBankLiabilities–TotalBankCapital

D.TotalBankAssets=TotalBankLiabilities+TotalBankCapital.

3.

3.ConsideringthebalancesheetforallcommercialbanksintheU.S.,thenetworthofbanksis:

A.About20timestotalliabilitiesB.About7timestotalassets.

C.Aboutthesameastotalassets.D.About10timestotalliabilities.

4.Abank'sreservesdonotinclude:

A.U.S.Treasurybills.B.Currencyinthebank.

C.Thebank'sdepositsattheFederalReserve.D.CurrencyinATMmachines.

5.

5.Bank'sholdmarketablesecuritiesaspartoftheirassets.ForU.S.banksthesemarketablesecuritiesdonotinclude:

A.CommonstocksB.ThebondsoftheU.S.Treasury.

C.U.S.TreasuryBills.D.Alloftheabove

6.ForU.S.Commercialbanks:

A.Loansmakeupaboutone-thirdoftotalassets.

B.Loansmake-upone-halfoftotalassets.

C.Loansmakeupabouttwo-thirdsoftotalassets.

D.Loansmakeuptwo-thirdsofliabilities.

7.

77.Thefederalfundsmarket:

A.Istheinter-bankmarketwhereexcessreservesfromonebankcanbeloanedtoanotherbank.

B.IsthelendingtobanksbytheU.S.Treasurywhenbanksfaceliquidityemergencies.

C.IsthetermusedforbankborrowingfromtheFederalReserveSystem.

D.IstheborrowingbyAmericanbanksfromforeignlenders.

8.Whichofthefollowingisabankliability:

A.Reserves.B.U.S.Treasurybonds.

C.Loans.D.Federalfundborrowings.

9.Repurchaseagreementsareusuallyusedbybanksthat:

A.Haveaneedforlong-termequityfinancing.B.Havenegativenetworth.

C.Needcashforaveryshortperiodoftime.

D.Cannotobtainfinancingfromanyothersource.

10.Ifabanksellsoffallofitsassetsandpaysallofitsliabilitiestheamountremainingwouldbe:

A.Netprofit.B.Networth.C.Reserves.D.Excessreserves.

11.Ifabankhas$200millioninassetsandanetworthof$25million,itsdebttoequityratiois:

A.10to1B.7to1C.8.75to1D.8to1

12.Abank'sReturnonEquityiscalculatedby:

A.Dividingthebanksliabilitiesbythebank'scapital.

B.Dividingthebank'snetprofitaftertaxesbythebank'scapital.

C.Takingthebank'sassetsplusthenetprofitaftertaxesanddividingthissumbythebank'scapital.

D.Dividingthebank'snetprofitaftertaxesbythesumofthebank'sassetsanditsliabilities.

13.

Thedifferencebetweenabank'sreservesandtheirrequiredreservesis:

A.Equity.B.Excessreserves.

C.Netinterestincome.D.Nothing,theyarethesamething.

14.

14Ifabankhasdepositsof$300million,reservesthattotal$40millionandhasarequiredreserverateof10percent:

A.Thebankisshortofrequiredreserves.B.Thebankhasexcessreservesof$10million.

C.Thebankhasexcessreservesof$5million.D.Thebankhasanetprofitof$10million.

15.Onewayforabanktodealwithcreditriskisto:

A.Addamark-uptothecostoffundsforaspecificborrowerbasedontheborrower'scredithistory.

B.Chargeallborrowersfromthesameindustryanaveragerateforthatindustry.

C.Avoidmakingloanstoborrowersfromabroadspectrumandtospecializegeographicallyandinspecificindustries.

D.Limitthenumberofloansmadeinanyyear.

16.

16.Theprocedurethatestimatestheinterestratesensitivityofabank'sassetsandliabilitiesiscalled:

A.Managingcreditrisk.B.Gapanalysis.

C.Tradingriskminimization.D.Bankmanagerialfinance.

E.Estimatingoperatingriskdifferential

17.FinancialIntermediation:

A.Isfarlessimportantthandirectfinancethroughstockandbondmarkets.

B.Ismuchmoreimportantthandirectfinancethroughstockandbondmarkets.

C.IsonlymoreimportantthandirectfinanceinTheUnitedStates.

D.BandC

18.

18.Whentheamountofdirectandindirectfinancingaresummed,theresultisusually:

A.Approximately75%ofGDP.B.EqualtoonehalfoftheamountinGDP.

C.TheamountinM2.C.Greaterthan100%ofGDP.

19.

Emergingmarketeconomies,comparedtoindustrializedeconomies:

A.Havefinancialmarketsthatarethesameincompositionbutdifferinsize.

B.Havefinancialmarketsthatdifferincompositionbutnotinsize.

C.Havefinancialmarketsthatdifferincompositionandsize.

D.Havefinancialmarketsthataresimilarincompositionandsize.

20.

Whichofthefollowingisaroleofafinancialinstitutionactingasafinancialintermediary:

A.Poolingtheresourcesofsmallsavers.B.Formulatingoversightregulations.

C.Sendingoutfreecalendarsattheholidays.D.Lobbyinglegislators.

21.

Withouttheabilityoffinancialintermediariestopooltheresourcesofsmallsavers:

A.Borrowersneedinglargeamountsofmoneywouldfinditlesscostlytoobtainthefunds.

B.Theeconomywouldlikelygrowfaster.

C.Peoplewouldlikelysavemore.

D.Theriskassociatedwithlendingwouldincrease.

E.AandC.

22.Thefactthatafinancialintermediarycanusethesamecontractformanycustomersisanexampleof:

A.EconomiesofScope.B.TheLawofDiminishingMarginalReturns

C.TheLawofIncreasingOpportunityCost.D.EconomiesofScale

23.Abankcanusuallyofferasaverahigherreturnforthesameriskbecause:

A.Thebankcanusuallypurchaseassetsatahighercostthananyonesaver.

B.Thebankcanpooltheresourcesoflargersaversandpurchaselowerdenominatedassets.

C.Economiesofscalecanbeappliedbythebankinitspurchaseofassets.

D.noneoftheabove.

24.

24Ifabankhas2000depositors,eachofwhomdeposits$500inthebank,andthebankmakes100loansof$10,000each:

A.Eachdepositorhascontributed$100toeachloan.

B.Eachdepositorhascontributed$5toeachloan.

C.Eachdepositorhascontributed$50toeachloan.

D.Eachdepositorhascontributed$500toeachloan.

25.

25.Ifinformationinafinancialmarketisasymmetric,thismeans:

A.Borrowersandlendershaveperfectinformation.

B.Borrowerswouldhavemoreinformationthanlenders.

C.Borrowersandlendershavethesameinformation.

D.Lenderslackanyinformation.

26.

26.Della'sDonutShopgoesoutofbusinessduetodecreasingsalesresultingfromthedramaticincreaseinpeopleonlowcarbohydratediets.ThedecreaseinbusinessalsoresultsinDella'sdefaultingontheloantheyhavewiththebank.Thisisanexampleof:

A.Asymmetricinformationinfinancialmarkets.

B.Lackofperfectinformationinfinancialmarkets.

C.Moralhazardinfinancialmarkets.

D.Adverseselection.

27.

27.Inafinancialmarketwhereinformationissymmetric:

A.Thesameinformationwouldbeknownbybothpartiesinatransaction.

B.Onepartytoatransactionknowsinformationtheotherpartydoesnot.

C.Theabilitytoobtaininformationisavailabletoonlyoneparty.

D.Alloftheabove.

28.

OneoftheconclusionsfromAkerlof'spapertitledTheMarketforLemonswas:

A.Highqualitygoodsandlowqualitygoodswillco-existinthemarket.

B.Lackingtheabilitytodistinguishhighfromlowquality,thequalitythemarketwillendupofferingwillbetheaveragequality.

C.Highqualityisalwaysdemandedbyconsumersoverlowquality.

D.Lackingtheabilitytodistinguishhighfromlowquality,lowqualitymaydrivehighqualityoutofthemarket.

E.AandB

29.

29Requiringalargedeductibleonthepartofaninsuredisonewayinsurerstreattheproblemof:

A.Free-riding.B.Moralhazard.C.Adverseselection.D.TheLemonsmarket.

30.

30.Oftenabankwillrequirealoanofficertomakepersonalvisitsoncustomerswithloansoutstanding.Thisisencouragedbecause:

A.Thebankworriesaboutcompetitorstryingtostealtheircustomers.

B.Thebankwantstomakesurethebusinessisstillthere.

C.Thebanklikelyhasexcessfundsavailableandhopestomakeanotherloantothebusiness.

D.Thisisaneffectivemonitoringtechniqueandshouldreducemoralhazard.

31.Deflationcompoundsinformationproblemsbecause:

A.Itincreasesacompany'snetworth.

B.Itreducesthedollarvalueofassetswhilethedollarvalueofliabilitiesstaysconstant.

C.Ittendstounderstateacompany'sassetsandoverstatetheirliabilities.

D.Italwaysharmslenders.

32.ThedualbankingsystemintheU.S.todayrefersto:

A.Abank'sabilitytoissuecheckingandsavingaccounts.

B.Theabilityofbankstobeeitherfederallyorstatechartered.

C.Abank'sabilitytoownanotherfinancialinstitution.

D.Adepositinstitutioncanbebothabankandasavingsandloan.

33.

33TheU.S.isunusualwhencomparedtoCanadaorJapaninthat:

A.TheU.S.banksareprivatelyowned,wherebanksintheothercountriesarepublicinstitutions.

B.TheU.S.hasfewerbanksthanJapanbutmorethanCanada.

C.TheU.S.hasmorebanksthaneitherJapanorCanada.

D.TheU.S.hasmorebanksthanJapanbutfewerthanCanada.

34.

34.Abankexertssomecontroloverwhowillregulateitbecause:

A.Banksspendalotofmoneycontributingtopoliticalcampaigns.

B.Thebankpaysthesalaryoftheregulator.

C.Bankshavetherighttodecideonwhichregulatorwilloverseet