NBA 停摆的研究Research for the NBA Lockout.docx

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NBA 停摆的研究Research for the NBA Lockout.docx

NBA停摆的研究ResearchfortheNBALockout

ResearchfortheNBALockout

Abstract

ForQuestionOne:

Inthispaper,wearefromthesalarycapandallocationproportiontoargumentNBAlockoutinevitability.Inthepartofthesalarycap,toanalyzetheteameachfiscalsituation.Iftheleaguecarriesoutsalarycap,thecapitalwillget$3.44billioninrevenue.Wecanseethat,thisisonlygoodforthecapital,andthebenefitoftheteamwilllossserious.

Itisinevitablethatitwillcausebothsidesoftheconflict,andmakeastrongdisaffection;inthepartofdistributionproportion.Thefirst,weanalyzetheinfluenceoftheplayerswithBRIdistributionproportion,takeanexampleofwith45%oftheBRI,6yearstheycangainfor10.306billionincome.Iftheplayersgiveupaseasoncompetitiontolosssalaryandmakethemanagement'scompromise,5yearslatter,thecangainfor108.78billionincome.Comparewiththat,reduceproportionwillbecauseofdissatisfactionwiththeplayer,Inaddition,therehavefinancialcrisissituation,andthiswillcertainlyworsenthesituationofnegotiationsbetweenthetwosides.Accordingtothisstatement,thereisnodoubtthatNBAwillstrike.

ForQuestionTwo:

Inordertoargumenttheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofthenewagreement,weusedtheanalytichierarchyprocess.Firstwechoosethemostrepresentativeofsixtermsagreementstopromoteagreementsynthesisasacriterionlayer.Analysisofhowthebenefitofthemanagement,thelaborandtheleague.Theempowermentofconstructingjudgmentmatrixandvalidation,toobtaintheresult,theordertovalueisthatthemanagement>thelabor>theleague=0.4307>0.3956>0.1737.Thatsuggeststhenewprotocolisobviouslymuchmorebeneficialforthecapitalsandthelaborsthanfortheleague;andabitmorebeneficialforthecapitalsthanforthelabors.

KeyWords:

NBAlockout,salarycap,allotmentratio,AnalyticHierarchyProcess

Contents

ResearchfortheNBALockout1

Abstract1

Contents2

1.Analysis-1-

1.1AnalysisfornecessityoftheNBAlockout-1-

1.2Analysisforthenewlaboragreement-1-

2.ModelingandSolving-1-

2.1QuestionOne-1-

2.1.1SalaryCapModel-1-

2.1.2AllocationProportionModel-4-

2.2QuestionTwo-6-

2.2.1AnalyticHierarchyProcessModeling-6-

2.2.2BuildingComparisonandJudgmentMatrix-7-

2.2.3Solution-7-

3.ProvideSuggestionsfortheSeniorManagementsoftheNBA-9-

4.References-10-

5.Appendix-10-

1.Analysis

1.1AnalysisfornecessityoftheNBAlockout

NBAhasalwayshadtwobattlefields:

oneisthearenathatwarbetweentheteams,theotherisbetweentheplayersandtheownersoflaborrunning.Afterseveraltalks,bothsidesinahardsalarycapandcutthetwomainplayerswagerateconflicts,therearestillhugedifferencesandrefusedtobudge.

Therefore,weassigntheproportionofthesalarycapandthenecessitytoshutdowntheNBAwasanalyzeddemonstrated.

1.2Analysisforthenewlaboragreement

Accordingtothedisagreementsontheclausesoftheleague,theemployers,andtheemployees,andtothevariationsofnewclauses,wechosethemostrepresentativeclausestobethekey,namelyshearedrevenue,qualifyingoffer,yearsoflaborcontract,minimumteams’wage,middlespecialcase,andplayers’welfare.ThenmodelbyAHP(AnalyticHierarchyProcess)canbebuilt.

2.ModelingandSolving

2.1QuestionOne

TheoldcollectivebargainingagreementofNBAhasexpired,butbecausethedelayindeliveryisdifficulttocompromisebetweentheNBAleagueandtheplayers,thenewcollectivebargainingagreementdidn’tcomeoutstill.NBAalwayshashadtwobattlefields:

oneisthecompetitionbetweentheteams;theotherisbetweentheplayersandtheirbosses.Afterseveraltalks,bothsidesarestillhavinghugedifferencesandrefusedtobudgebetweeninhardsalarycapandcutdownplayers’wage.

Therefore,wemakeananalysisandappraisalofthenecessitytoNBAlockoutaccordingtothesalarycapandtheirallocationproportioninthismodel.

2.1.1SalaryCapModel

Bylookingupsomeinformationandaccordingthesimplymathematicalarithmetic,wehavegainedtheNBAtermsallrelatedincome(BRI),andallplayers’wages(P)in2009to2010.

Thesalarycapisdefined:

(1)

Accordingformula

(1),wecanfigureouttheplayers’wagewhichisoverthesalarycapbyformula

(2):

(2)

Weknowthatwhentheplayers’wagesareoverthesalarycap’s61%andthebosseshastopaytheluxurytax.Theluxurytaxisdefined:

(3)

Sothebosseshavetopaythemoneytotheplayersandtheleague,theformulaisdefined:

(4)

WepresentatableabouttheBRI,P,SC,C,T,asTable1:

Table1:

Financeofteamsduring2009-2011

Teams

BRI/

10Thousand

P/

10Thousand

C/

10Thousand

S/

10Thousand

T/

10Thousand

NewYorkKnicks

22600

8600

2870

700.5

3570.5

L.A.Lakers

21400

9100

3370

1200.5

4570.5

ChicagoBulls

16900

7400

1670

0

1670

BostonCeltics

15100

8800

3070

900.5

3970.5

HoustonRockets

15300

6700

970

0

970

DallasMavericks

14600

8100

2370

200.5

2570.5

MiamiHeat

12400

7800

2070

0

2070

PhoenixSuns

14700

6900

1170

0

1170

SacrementoKings

13500

8400

2670

500.5

3170.5

TorontoRaptors

13800

7200

1470

0

1470

OrlandoMagic

10800

8600

2870

700.5

3570.5

GoldenStateWarriors

11900

7000

1270

0

1270

DetroitPistons

14700

6400

670

0

670

PortlandTrailBlazers

12700

6400

670

0

670

ClevelandCavaliers

16100

9000

3270

1100.5

4370.5

UtahJazz

12100

7600

1870

0

1870

Philadelphia76ers

11000

6900

1170

0

1170

OklahomaCityThunder

11800

6200

470

0

470

WashingtonWizards

10700

7300

1570

0

1570

DenverNuggets

11300

7900

2170

0.5

2170.5

NewJersyNets

89000

6400

670

0

670

L.A.Clippers

10200

6200

470

0

470

AtlantaHawks

10500

7000

1270

0

1270

SacrementoKings

10300

7200

1470

0

1470

CharlotteBobcats

9800

7300

1570

0

1570

NewOrleansHornets

10000

7400

1670

0

1670

IndianaPacers

9500

7100

1370

0

1370

MemphisGrizzlies

9200

5900

170

0

170

MinnesotaTimberwolves

9500

6700

970

0

970

MilwaukeeBucks

9200

6900

1170

0

1170

all

380500

220400

48500

5304

53804

FromTable1,wecanseethatbecauseoftheNBAsoftsalarycapandmake100%oftheteambeyondthemaximumsalarycap,evensomeoftheteambeyondtheluxurytaxminimumbottomline,andmaketheindividualteamonthepunishmentaccordingto1:

1toleague.Thisisalsothelaborandthemanagementoftheimportantcontradictionbetweenproduce.Theleagueisstrongthatsalarycap,itisunderstood,theleaguetowanttoachievemaximum$62millionfortoughsalarycap.Accordingtothishypothesissalarycaptocalculate,themanagementcandrawtheinterestsofitis:

Itshowsthatiftheleaguecarriesoutahardsalarycap,thecapitalwillobtain344milliondollars.

Butaslabor,ahardsalarycapmeansthatthesigningofteambehaviorwillbigtieddown.Inadditiontostarplayersbesides,theinterestsoftheotherplayerscouldbeaffectedbyseveredamage.Asinthelimitedspaceinsalary,thebossiscertainlycanonlygiveprioritytothestarsofthecontract,therestoftheplayers,natureisnotenoughsalary.Suchaseveryteam'ssalarycapare50milliondollars,30milliondollarstothesuperstar.Thesurplus$20millionshouldbesharedwithatleast11players.Suddenly,fewerpeoplewillgetus$400-$6millioncontract.Evenplayersthanthesalarycontractmayearnless.Itisnotdifficulttoimaginethisisaheavyblow.Sowillthelaboroftheleagueoftheproposedtoughsalarycapofastrongreaction.

Sotheleagueofhardsalarycapisnotthebestpolicy.

2.1.2AllocationProportionModel

Allocationproportionisthecoreofcollectivebargaining,dividedofBRIhasbeenconcernedabout,whetheritistheplayersunion'sforbear,andagainreducethesharingratio,firmoremployerstheadvantageofthesituationrequiresreversaloftheplayers,BRIhasbecomethemainfocusbetweenthegame.Bothsideshaverealizedthat57%havebeenimpossibletomaintain,butthereisstillmuchintothefiguresarethedifferences:

Leagueplayerswillingtogiveuppartoftheoverallinterestsoftheinterests,butwillnotgiveupastrongposition;employerstolarge-scalelossasanexcusetoslashplayersalarydemandscausedbythehugeburden.BRIisdividedintotheproportionofthefinalseasontodeterminewhethertherehasbecometheultimatebargainingchip.

Firstly,lookateffectoftheBRIfortheplayers.Table2showstheplayer'ssalaryunderdifferentratiooftheBRI

Table2:

Player'ssalaryunderdifferentratiooftheBRI

OldlaboragreementBRIthandistribution

TheassumptionofthecollectivebargainingagreementBRIthandistribution

Playersincome

57%

55%

53%

51%

49%

47%

45%

43%

Playersrevenue/Hundredmillion

21.757

21.368

20.591

19.814

19.037

18.259

17.483

16.706

Themanagementcan

gain

0

0.777

1.554

2.331

3.108

3.885

4.662

5.439

Takesthe

Pointsthan

0

4%

7%

11%

14%

18%

21%

25%

Table2showstheBRIforthe2010-11seasons,$3,817,000,000,dividedintotheoldratioof57%,soalltheplayers’shareoftotalrevenuewas21.8billionU.S.dollars.Asifemployersadheretothecurrentratioof51%ofthenewshare,thentheplayersshareofwageswillbereducedto$1,946,700,000,equivalentto89%before,11percentpaycut,sowonderfulwishfulthinking,employerswillbejealous,Moreover,accordingtoinsideinformation,employersalsowanttoreducetheratioto45%,thatisfundedonlyfromtheUnionmorethanthetotalincomereceived5.3438millionU.S.dollarsforcla

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