河南理工大学国际贸易中英翻译2.docx

河南理工大学国际贸易中英翻译2.docx

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河南理工大学国际贸易中英翻译2

ThelnternationalMonetarySystem

PresentedbyEdouardBalladur

attheInstituteforInternationalEconomics

Washington，25May1999

EversincethecollapseoftheBrettonWoodsarchitecture，theworldmonetarysystemhasbeentornbetweentwoconflictingforces．Themorepowerfulofthetwoistheconceptofflexibleexchangerates，whichestablisheditselfintheideologicalclimateofeconomicliberalismthatgaveitlegitimacy．Theother，somewhatweakerforce-originatesinthebeliefthattotalexchange—rateflexibilityisharmfultoeconomicgrowthandfreetrade．Ithaspromptedthemanyempirical,attemptstostabilizethesystemandmostimportant—-ithasledtothecreationoftheellro．

Theyetunsettleddebatebetweentheserivalconceptshasacquiredafreshintensity．Thequickeningpaceofglobalizationgivesevengreaterurgencytotheunderlyingquestion：

Canaglobalizedeconomyfunctioninthelongrunwithoutaglobalcurrency?

Implicitinthisqueryisacrucialchoicebetweentwoalternatives：

Willthedynamicsofglobalizationleadtotheestablishmentofaworldmonetarysystem，orwillmonetaryfragmentationeventuallytriggerareversalofglobalization?

Thisdebateseemsacademicduringquietspells—-butflaresupattheslightesttremor．Intruth，monetarycalmisanillusion：

somewhere，thereisalwaysallimbalancethatneedsclearing．Thecrisisintheemergingandtransitioneconomiesprovidesasoberingreminder：

tomymind，itillustratestheharmfulconsequencesofthepresentshortageofinternationalmonetarycooperation．

Itisuptoournations—-foremostamongthemtheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeannations—toremedythatdeficiency．Iamamongthosewhoareconvincedthattheadventoftheeurocreatesidealconditionsforarevivalofglobalmonetarycooperation．ItisahistoricopportunitythatarevampedG-7shouldseizeinordertoestablishfinancialstability．Withoutthelatter，thegainsofglobalizationmaybejeopardizedbyrisingprotectionism—-aphenomenonwhosesporadicmanifestationsalealreadyvisible．

LetmebeginwithadiscussionofthethreelessonsIhavedrawnfromtheAsiancrisis—since，in140manyrespects，thiscrisisistrulyemblematic．

Someobserversseeitasacrisisofmarketprinciplesandofunrestrictedcapitalmovements．Others，bycontrast，seeitasacrisisofgovernmentinterventionism．Stillothersreaditasacrisisof-theinternationalfinancialinstitutions．Inotherwords,“theglobalmarketpublicpolicies，ormulti．1ateralfinancialactionsaletoblame——dependingoilwhichinterpretationonechooses．Curiously，thesedifferentpointsofviewrunacrossconventionalschoolsofthoughtandpoliticaltrends．Ithinkthereisagoodreasonforthis：

theAsiancrisisis，infact，theout-comeofaninteractionbetweenthefailingsofmarkets，thefailingsofgovernments，andthefailingsoftheinternationalmonetarysystem．

TheinternationalcapitalmarkethasanunquestionableresponsibilityintheAsiancrisis．Internationalinvestors—chieflythecommercialbanks—a-greedtoinvestinAsiawithoutmeasuringtherisksincurred．Theyfueledspeculativebubblesinthee-mergingAsianeconomiesevenastheregionwassufferingalossofcompetitivenessandacreditexplosion．Whenthecrisiserupted，theinvestorswiththecommercialbanksonceagaininthelead—abruptlypulledout．Thelocalexchangeratesandrealeconomiesoverreacted，costingtheAsiancountriesanestimatedaverage7—8pointsofGDP．thescaleofthisoverreactionwascertainlyunwarranted，sinceitwaspartlycorrectedafewmonthslater,Thisisafarcryfromtherationalcapitalmovements---withtheirstabilizingvirtues—describedinpoliticaleconomytextbooks．Themarketsareintrinsicallyimperfect，asistheirinformation．

Governments，too，bearamajorresponsibilityintheAsiancrisis．Internationalinvestorsweredeludedbytheeconomicdistortionsthat、theAsiangovernmentshadintroduced（orhadallowtodevelop）intheworkingsoflocalmarkets．Suchdistortionsincludeunsuitableexchangeratesdefendedbythemonetaryauthorities，implicitguaranteestoinvestorsintheabsenceoffinancial——sectorregulation,andtaxbreaksorotherbenefitsreservedforcertainbusinesssectors．Theresultwasaninefficientallocationofresources，ofwhichSouthKorea—despiteitsunquestionableprofessionalisminsomeareas—probablyprovidesthebestillustration．Again，thisbearslittleresemblancetotheenlightenedstatethattheAsianmodel'sdefendersofferedusasabenchmarkbeforethecrisis．Governmentsareneitheromniscientnoralwaysbenign．Withexcessiveinterventionism，theyprovetobepoorinvestorsinthelongrun，occasionallycorrupt，andoftencaptivetopressuregroups．

Multilateralinstitutionsalsomustshouldersomeoftheblameforthecrisiswehavejustexperienced．Theirinterventionshavenotalwaysbeenappropriateforpreventingtherecentcrisesorindeedforsolving．them．Theymayhaveencouragedgovernmentsandlocalbanksaswellasinternationalinvestorst0takeexcessiverisksintheemergingcountries．Theapplicationofpredeterminedsolutionsmayalsohavehelpedaggravatethecrisesunderway．Mostimportant，however,theinternationalcommunityhastendedtointervenebelatedlybecauseofthedeclineoftheG-7andtheproblemsthiscreatedforinter-nationalmonetarycooperation．Theefficiencyofthemultilateralfinancialinstitutionswasseverelyunderminedasaresult．

Thecombinationofthesethreefactorsseemsaplausibleexplanationfortheescalatingintensityofthecrisesandtheever-greaterresourcesthattheinternationalcommunityhashadtodeploytodealwiththem．Inmyview，however，thedeclineoftheG-7andofmonetarycooperationbearsaspecialresponsibilityinthisdevelopment．Thedeclinehassubstantiallyweakenedthescopeofpreventiveactionbythemultilateralfinancialinstitutionsinresponsetogovernments’economicpoliciesandtounstableinvestorbehavior．Countrieswhosefinancialsystemshadnotbeenadjustedwereallowedtoliftallcontrolsoncapitalmovementswiththerestoftheworld，andinsomecasestheywereactuallyencouragedtodoso．

Whatistobedoneintheseconditions?

Wemightbetemptedtotaketheeasywayout-namely，toletthepresentlow—cooperationsituationprevail.Theargumentwouldbethattheworld'srisingmonetaryandfinancialinstabilityisduetofixedexchangeratesandthesupporttheyhavereceivedfromtheinternationalcommunity，notablytheInternationalMonetaryFund．ThecorollaryofthispositionisthatstrictcurbsshouldbeplacedonIMFinterventions．Inauniverseinwhichallagentswereperfectlyinformed，wemightassumethatthisrecipewouldensureinternationalmonetaryandfinancialstability—providedthateconomicpoliciesconverged．Butweknowthatthisisnotthecase．Inpractice，policyconvergence—whetherinthemonetaryorthefiscalsphere——hasnotprovedtobeasufficientguaranteeofmonetarystability．

Thealternativesolutionwouldbetostrengtheninternationalmonetarycooperation，andthefocusshouldbeonexchangerates．Notthatexchangeratesshouldbemanipulated—quitethecontrary．However，theydoexhibitthreecharacteristicsthatmakethemirreplaceableastoolsofinternationalmonetarycooperation．First，theyare，bynature，variablesofcommoninterest．Second，asrelativepricesofcurrencies，theyprovidereliableconfidenceindicatorsfortheeconomicpoliciescarriedoutinthedifferentcurrencyzones．Third．exchangeratesarevaluablesignalsofeconomicimbalances．

ThisleadsUStorecommendareformofthesystemaimedatprovidinggreaterstability—-butwithoutintroducinga“fixedfactor'’thatcouldcompromisethegrowthofunsynchronizedeconomicregions．Severalapproachesarcpossiblehere．Theyallhingeonthenotionofacooperativeeffortfocusedonthedollar-eurorink，whichformsthebasisoftheinternationalmonetarysystem．ThisimpliesanintensivedialoguebetweenUSandEuropeanauthorities．

Thefirstpurposeofthecooperationshouldbetoaddressthefollowingquestion：

Whatisthedesirablefluctuationbandforthedollaragainsttheeuro．inviewofthegoalsstatedearlier?

Ifthisquestionisleftunasked，whichisthecasetoday，then0rareisastrongriskthatthesystemwillcontinuetodrift——sparkingfinancialcrisessuchasthosewehaveseeninrecentyears．Theformsuchcooperationwouldtakecanbemoreorlesscoercive．

Themostambitiousformwouldbetoadopt“targetzones．”asFredBergstenadvocates．Theagreementwouldspecifythefluctuationbandsaroundcentralratesfortheeuro，‘thedollar，andtheyen，whichwouldberegularlyadjustedtoreflectdifferentialsininflationandineconomicfundamentals．Thecentralrateswouldbechosensoastoensuretheeconomies’internalandexternalbalance．Thebandshouldbewideenough（10—15percent）toabsorbtheexchange-ratevariationsduetoshort-termeconomicfluctuations．Itwouldbemadepublicinordertoconfinecentral-bankinterventionstosituationsinvolvingsevereimbalances．Thecentralbankswouldbeobligedtointerveneatthemargins．

Alessambitiousvariantoftargetzoneswouldbetoadopttheprincipleofcompulsoryactionwhentheexchangeratesapproachthefluctuationlimits，butwithoutmakingpublicthecentralratesandthefluctuationbands．ThisisthesolutionthatmostcloselyresemblestheLouvreAccordsof1987．Inpractice，itismoreflexiblethanthefirstoption，asitleavesthemonetaryauthoritiessomeleewayfordecidingwhenandhowtoact，whilekeepingtheircredibilityintactsincetheywouldbemakingnopubliccommitments．

Theestablishmentoftargetzonesseemsdesirabletome，astheyaretheonlycredibleframeworkfororganizingcurrencyfluctuations．Theproblemwithtargetzones，however,isthattheyhavenotwona