人民币国际化外文文献及文献综述.docx

人民币国际化外文文献及文献综述.docx

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人民币国际化外文文献及文献综述

本份文档包含：

关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述

一、外文文献

标题:

TheinternationalizationoftheRMB,capitalmarketopenness,andfinancialreformsinChina

作者:

Aizenman,Joshua

期刊:

BOFITDiscussionPapers

卷:

4；期:

1；页:

4-26；年份:

2015

TheinternationalizationoftheRMB,capitalmarketopenness,andfinancialreformsinChina

Abstract

ThispaperprovidesanoverviewofChinesefinancialandtradeintegrationinrecentdecades,andthechallengesfacingChinainthecomingyears.Chinahadbeenaprimeexampleofexport-ledgrowth,benefitingfromlearningbydoing,andbyadoptingforeignknow-how,supportedbyacomplexindustrialpolicy.Whiletheresultantgrowthhasbeenspectacular,itcomeswithhiddenbutgrowingcostsanddistortions.TheChineseexportedgrowthpathhasbeenchallengedbyitsownsuccess,andtheGlobalFinancialCrisisforcedChinatowardrebalancing,whichisaworkinprogress.ReflectingontheinternationalizationoftheCNY,oneexpectstherapidacceleratingofthecommercialinternationalizationoftheCNY.Incontrast,therearenoclear-cutreasonstorushwiththefullCNYfinancialinternationalization:

ThegainsfromCNYfinancialinternationalizationareoverrated.

Keywords:

exportledgrowth,CNYinternationalization,mercantilism,financialintegration,FDI.

ThispaperoverviewstheChinesefinancialandtradeintegrationinrecentdecades.WestartbyevaluatingthehistoryofChinesegrowth-cum-financialpolicies,arguingthattheexport-ledgrowthofChinawasahighlysuccessfulpolicy,ashasbeenvividlyillustratedbytheunprecedentedcatchingupofChinesesizewiththeU.S.[eitherincurrentdollaroradjustedforPPP].Yet,theremarkablesuccessofthisprocesssoweditsend,andtheneedforChinatorebalanceitseconomy.Looking

forward,wepointoutthelogicofsequencingfinancialreforms.WhileoneexpectstherapidaccelerationofcommercialinternationalizationoftheCNY,andthegrowinguseofCNYinthesphereofChinesecommercialandoutwardFDItransactions,therearenoclear-cutreasonstorushwiththefullCNYinternationalization.ChancesarethatthegainsfromarapidCNYfinancialinternationalizationareoverrated,andignoringthedownsidesofthisprocesswouldbetoChinese（andprobablyglobal）peril.

1Thebuoyant2000s

Chinahasbeenaprimeexampleofexport-ledgrowth,benefitingfromlearningbydoing,andbyadoptingforeignknow-how,supportedbyacomplexindustrialpolicy.Thispolicyhasbeencharacterizedbycontrolledopenness,andinternalfinancialrepression.Thefinancialrepressionhastaxedthesavinginterestrate,allowingprimeborrowers,includingtheChinesestate-ownedenterprise（SOE）,elasticaccesstocheapandsustainablefunding.FDIhasbeenwelcome,subjecttoChina'srulesofthegame.TheserulesleveragedthecarrotofChinesemarketsizeandcheaplabor,inducingtheforeigninvestortooperateinChinainjointventurepartnershipwithChineseproducers（Holmesetal.2013）.Theoutcomehasbeenrapidlearningbydoingandtransferofknow-howandtherapidclimbofChinaontheladderofindustrialsophistication,challengingforeignproducersintheChineseandthird-countrymarketsdowntheroad.1

Arguably,amodemversionofmercantilismhasbeenatwork（AizenmanandLee2007,2008）.TherapidgrowthandthegrowingtradeandcurrentaccountsurplusesasafractionoftheGDPhasoccurredintandemwithmassivehoardingofinternationalreserves（IR）combinedwithmassivesterilizationofexpendingtradesurplusesandfinancialinflows.Thesepoliciesaimedatdelayingandslowingtherealappreciationassociatedwithsuccessfulrapidgrowth.Whiletheresultantgrowthhasbeenspectacular,itcomeswithhidden,butgrowing,costsanddistortions.Figure1,inthetoppanel,providesdiamondchartsnapshotsofChinesegeneralizedtrilemmaconfiguration:

Financialintegration（leftwardfromthediamond'scenter）,Monetaryindependence（verticallyupwardfromthediamond'scenter）,Exchangeratestability

（rightwardfromthediamond'scenter）,andIR/GDP（verticallydownwardfromthediamond'scenter）.ThefirstthreescalesarecapturingMundell'sopeneconomytrilemmaconfigurations,normalizedbetween0and1（Aizenman,Chinn,andIto2010）.TheIR/GDPaimsatcapturingthegrowinguseofinternationalreservestobufferagainstfinancialinstability.ThechartexhibitstheremarkablestabilityoftheChineseexchangerateduringthe1990sandthe2000s,bufferedbyrapidincreasesinIR/GDP,whilemaintainingcontrolledfinancialintegrationandmonetaryindependence.Figure1alsoputsChineseexperienceinthecontextoftheaverageexperienceofemergingAsia[excludingChina]andemergingLatinAmericaduringthesamedecades（themiddleandthelowerpanel,respectively）.ThechartsvalidatethegreaterfocusofChineseexperienceonexchangeratestabilityandIRhoarding,whileoverallmaintaininglimitedfinancialintegrationrelativetootheremergingmarkets.

Intherun-uptothefinancialcrisis,theworldeconomywascharacterizedbyenormouscurrent-accountimbalances（Figure2）.China'ssurplusalonewas0.7%ofworldGDPin2008,whiletheUnitedStateshadadeficitofmorethan1%ofworldGDPthatyear.Thecurrentaccountbalancesoftheworld'ssurpluscountries（e.g.,China,Germany,Japan,oilexporters）exceeded2.5%ofglobalGDPin2008,co-fundingthecurrentaccountbalancesoftheworld'sdeficitcountries,mostlytheUnitedStates,non-Asianemergingmarkets,andtheEuroareaexcludingGermany.

Intheearly2000s,somesuggestedlargeimbalancescouldbesustainedfortheforeseeablefuture.Dooley,Folkerts-Landau,andGarber（2003,2005）arguedanAsianperiphery,primarilyChina,couldpursueadevelopmentstrategyofexport-ledgrowthsupportedbyundervaluedexchangeratesandcapitalcontrolsformanyyears.LargecurrentaccountsurplusesandofficialcapitaloutflowsintheformofaccumulatedreserveassetclaimsontheUnitedStateswouldcharacterizetheAsianperipheryforperhapsadecadeormore.Moreover,thestrategywasa"win"forthecenter（e.g.,theUnitedStates）aswell,sincevirtuallyunlimiteddemandforitsfinancialassetswouldallowittorunlargecurrentaccountdeficits,livingbeyonditsmeansforyears.

Atsomepoint,theAsianperipherywouldgrowsufficientlytograduatetothecenter.Itwouldthenundertakefinancialliberalizationandadoptgreaterexchange-rateflexibility.Butwhenthathappened,anothersetofdevelopingcountrieswouldstepforwardtobecomethenewperiphery,pursuingthesameexport-ledgrowthstrategyagainstthecenterashadChinaandtheAsianperiphery,andbeforethem,post-warEuropeandJapan.Asaresult,globalimbalances,withtheperipheryrunninglargecurrent-accountsurplusesandthecenterlargecurrent-accountdeficits,wouldbearegularfeatureoftheinternationalmonetarysystemforyearstocome.Dooleyetal.（2005）providedanassetmarketinterpretationofthewin-winviewofglobalimbalances:

U.S.deficitssuppliedinternationalcollateraltopoorercountriesontheperipheryeagertoundertakecapitalformation;thecollateralfreedthemfromarelianceoninefficientdomesticfinancialmarkets.2

Themodemmercantilistview,embracedbyAizenmanandLee（2007,2008）andothers,providedalesssanguineinterpretationforthepersistentglobalimbalancesthatemergedinthe2000s.WhileAizenmanandLee（2007）confirmedthatthehoardingofinternationalreservesthataccompaniedcurrent-accountsurpluseswasdominatedbyaprecautionarymotivepriorto2001,afindingconsistentwithAizenmanandMarion's（2003）earlierinterpretations,thereappearedtobearegimechangeafterward.AizenmanandLee（2008）pointedtothegrowingimportanceofmonetarymercantilismasthemainreasonfortheregimechange.Accordingly,followingtheAsiancrisisof1997-8,whichmitigatedChinesecompetitivenessinthelate1990s,andtheChineseaccessiontotheWTOinearly2000s,Chinaintensifieditsdrivetowardexport-ledgrowth.LikeearliermercantilisteffortstoexpandexportmarketsandaccumulategolddescribedbyAdamSmith（1776）,aftertheyear2000,countriessuchasChinastartedpushingexportstopromotegrowth,rackingupcurrent-accountsurplusesandgrowingstockpilesofinternationalreserves.Thenumberswereimpressive.Ontheeveofthefinancialcrisis,China'srealGDPgrowthhadreachedabout14%（Fig.3）,itscurrent-accountsurplushadgrownto10%ofGDP,anditsinternationalreserveshadreachedalmost45%ofGDPpriortothecrisis,peakingatabout50%in2010（Fig.3）.However,unlikeDooley'setal.（2003,2005）win-win

viewofglobalimbalancesbufferedbyinternationalreservehoarding,AizenmanandLee（2008）notedthatmodemmercantilismcouldleadtounintendedadverseconsequences,suchascompetitivehoarding.ThisconcernisinlinewiththefindingsofCheungandQian（2009）andAizenmanetal.（2014）supportingregionalrivalryinhoardinginternationalreserves.

TheviewthatlargeEast-Westglobalimbalancescouldbesustainedforalongperiodwasnotsharedbyeveryone.Eichengreen（2007）andFeldstein（2008）,forexample,arguedtheAsianperipherywasnotmonolithic;somememberoftheperipherymightabandonfixedexchangeratesagainstthedollarsoonerthanlater,eitherwillinglyorinresponsetospeculativepressures,therebyreducingEast-Westglobalimbalances.ObstfeldandRogoff（2005）alsosawlargeimbalancesasunsustainable,andworriedwhethertheywouldunwindgraduallyorabruptly.Alfaro,Kalemli-Ozcan,andVolosovych（2011）observedthatglobalimbalanceswherepoorercountriesfinancedricheronesweredrivenmainlybygovernmentdecisionsandofficialcapitalflows,sinceprivatefundstendedtomoveintheoppositedirection,attractedbyhighergrowthratesinpoorercountries.Theyraisedconcernsabouttheglobalefficiencyandsustainabilityofthesetrends.

AizenmanandSun（2010）alsoraiseddoubtsthatlargeglobalimbalancescouldbesustainable.TheyarguedthatwithChinagrowingattripletherateoftheUnitedStates,theU.S.current-accountdeficitsneededtoabsorbChina'ssurplusesincomingyears,intheabsenceofotherbigcountrieswillingtorunlargedeficits,wouldbeunrealisticallyhighandhenceself-limitinginthenot-too-distantfuture.

2TheglobalfinancialcrisisandChina'sadjustment

Theglobalfinancialcrisisofthelate2000sputanabruptendtothehappy-go-luckyattitudetoU.S.an