5学原理》微观第五版测试题库 17.docx
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5学原理》微观第五版测试题库17
Chapter17
Oligopoly
TRUE/FALSE
1.Theessenceofanoligopolisticmarketisthatthereareonlyafewsellers.
ANS:
TDIF:
1REF:
17-0
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
OligopolyMSC:
Definitional
2.Gametheoryisjustasnecessaryforunderstandingcompetitiveormonopolymarketsasitisforunderstandingoligopolisticmarkets.
ANS:
FDIF:
2REF:
17-0
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Oligopoly|Gametheory
MSC:
Interpretive
3.Inacompetitivemarket,strategicinteractionsamongthefirmsarenotimportant.
ANS:
TDIF:
1REF:
17-0
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Gametheory|Competitivemarkets
MSC:
Interpretive
4.Forafirm,strategicinteractionswithotherfirmsinthemarketbecomemoreimportantasthenumberoffirmsinthemarketbecomeslarger.
ANS:
FDIF:
2REF:
17-0
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Oligopoly|Gametheory
MSC:
Interpretive
5.Supposethreefirmsformacartelandagreetochargeaspecificpricefortheiroutput.Eachindividualfirmhasanincentivetomaintaintheagreementbecausethefirm’sindividualprofitswillbethegreatestunderthecartelarrangement.
ANS:
FDIF:
2REF:
17-1
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
CollusionMSC:
Interpretive
6.Iffirmsinanoligopolyagreetoproduceaccordingtothemonopolyoutcome,theywillproducethesamelevelofoutputastheywouldproduceinaNashequilibrium.
ANS:
FDIF:
1REF:
17-1
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Oligopoly|Cooperation
MSC:
Interpretive
7.Whetheranoligopolyconsistsof3firmsor10firms,thelevelofoutputlikelywillbethesame.
ANS:
FDIF:
2REF:
17-1
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
OligopolyMSC:
Interpretive
8.Cartelswithasmallnumberoffirmshaveagreaterprobabilityofreachingthemonopolyoutcomethandocartelswithalargernumberoffirms.
ANS:
TDIF:
1REF:
17-1
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
CartelsMSC:
Interpretive
9.Asthenumberoffirmsinanoligopolybecomesverylarge,thepriceeffectdisappears.
ANS:
TDIF:
2REF:
17-1
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
OligopolyMSC:
Interpretive
10.Ifallofthefirmsinanoligopolysuccessfullycolludeandformacartel,thentotalprofitforthecartelisequaltowhatitwouldbeifthemarketwereamonopoly.
ANS:
TDIF:
2REF:
17-1
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
CartelsMSC:
Interpretive
11.Asthenumberoffirmsinanoligopolyincreases,themagnitudeofthepriceeffectincreases.
ANS:
FDIF:
2REF:
17-1
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
OligopolyMSC:
Interpretive
12.Allexamplesoftheprisoner’sdilemmagamearecharacterizedbyoneandonlyoneNashequilibrium.
ANS:
FDIF:
3REF:
17-2
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Nashequilibrium|Prisoners'dilemma
MSC:
Interpretive
13.Iftwoplayersengagedinaprisoner’sdilemmagamearelikelytorepeatthegame,theyaremorelikelytocooperatethaniftheyplaythegameonlyonce.
ANS:
TDIF:
2REF:
17-2
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Prisoners'dilemma
MSC:
Interpretive
14.Thestoryoftheprisoners'dilemmacontainsagenerallessonthatappliestoanygrouptryingtomaintaincooperationamongitsmembers.
ANS:
TDIF:
1REF:
17-2
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Prisoners'dilemma
MSC:
Interpretive
15.Intheprisoners'dilemmagame,oneprisonerisalwaysbetteroffconfessing,nomatterwhattheotherprisonerdoes.
ANS:
TDIF:
1REF:
17-2
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Prisoners'dilemma
MSC:
Interpretive
16.Intheprisoners'dilemmagame,confessingisadominantstrategyforeachofthetwoprisoners.
ANS:
TDIF:
2REF:
17-2
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Prisoners'dilemma|Dominantstrategy
MSC:
Interpretive
17.Thegamethatoligopolistsplayintryingtoreachtheoligopolyoutcomeissimilartothegamethatthetwoprisonersplayintheprisoners'dilemma.
ANS:
TDIF:
1REF:
17-2
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
GametheoryMSC:
Interpretive
18.Inthecaseofoligopolisticmarkets,self-interestmakescooperationdifficultanditoftenleadstoanundesirableoutcomeforthefirmsthatareinvolved.
ANS:
TDIF:
1REF:
17-2
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
GametheoryMSC:
Interpretive
19.Whenprisoners'dilemmagamesarerepeatedoverandover,sometimesthethreatofpenaltycausesbothpartiestocooperate.
ANS:
TDIF:
2REF:
17-2
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Prisoners'dilemma
MSC:
Interpretive
20.Atit-for-tatstrategy,inarepeatedgame,isoneinwhichaplayerstartsbycooperatingandthendoeswhatevertheotherplayerdidlasttime.
ANS:
TDIF:
2REF:
17-2
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
GametheoryMSC:
Definitional
21.Onewaythatpublicpolicyencouragescooperationamongoligopolistsisthroughantitrustlaw.
ANS:
FDIF:
1REF:
17-3
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
AntitrustMSC:
Interpretive
22.TheShermanAntitrustActprohibitscompetingfirmsfromeventalkingaboutfixingprices.
ANS:
TDIF:
1REF:
17-3
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
ShermanAntitrustActof1890
MSC:
Interpretive
23.Resalepricemaintenancepreventsretailersfromcompetingonprice.
ANS:
TDIF:
1REF:
17-3
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Resalepricemaintenance
MSC:
Interpretive
24.Somebusinesspracticesthatappeartoreducecompetition,suchasresalepricemaintenance,mayhavelegitimateeconomicpurposes.
ANS:
TDIF:
2REF:
17-3
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Resalepricemaintenance
MSC:
Interpretive
25.In2007theU.S.SupremeCourtruledthatitwasnotnecessaryillegalformanufacturersanddistributorstoagreeonminimumretailprices.
ANS:
TDIF:
2REF:
17-3
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Resalepricemaintenance
MSC:
Definitional
26.Tyingcanbethoughtofasaformofpricediscrimination.
ANS:
TDIF:
1REF:
17-3
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
OligopolyTOP:
TyingMSC:
Interpretive
27.Policymakersshouldbeaggressiveinusingtheirpowerstoplacelimitsonfirmbehavior,becausebusinesspracticesthatappeartoreducecompetitionneverhaveanylegitimatepurposes.
ANS:
FDIF:
2REF:
17-4
NAT:
AnalyticLOC:
TheroleofgovernmentTOP:
Antitrust
MSC:
Interpretive
SHORTANSWER
1.Evenwhenallowedtocollude,firmsinanoligopolymaychoosetocheatontheiragreementswiththerestofthecartel.Why?
ANS:
Individualprofitscanbeincreasedattheexpenseofgroupprofitsifindividualscheatonthecartel'scooperativeagreement.
DIF:
2REF:
17-1NAT:
Analytic
LOC:
OligopolyTOP:
CartelsMSC:
Interpretive
2.Whateffectdoesthenumberoffirmsinanoligopolyhaveonthecharacteristicsofthemarket?
ANS:
Asthenumberoffirmsincreases,theequilibriumquantityofgoodsprovidedincreasesandpricefalls;themarketbeginstoresembleacompetitiveone.
DIF:
2REF:
17-1NAT:
Analytic
LOC:
OligopolyTOP:
OligopolyMSC:
Analytical
3.Assumethatdemandforaproductthatisproducedatzeromarginalcostisreflectedinthetablebelow.
Quantity
Price
0
$36
200
$33
400
$30
600
$27
800
$24
1000
$21
1200
$18
1400
$15
1600
$12
1800
$9
2000
$6
2200
$3
2400
$0
a.
Whatistheprofit-maximizinglevelofproductionforagroupofoligopolisticfirmsthatoperateasacartel?
b.
Assumethatthismarketischaracterizedbyaduopolyinwhichcollusiveagreementsareillegal.WhatmarketpriceandquantitywillbeassociatedwithaNashequilibrium?
ANS:
a.
Q=1200
b.
Q=1600,P=12
DIF:
3REF:
17-1NAT:
Analytic
LOC:
OligopolyTOP:
CartelsMSC:
Applicative
4.Describethesourceoftensionbetweencooperationandself-interestinamarketcharacterizedbyoligopoly.Useanexampleofanactualcartelarrangementtodemonstratewhythistensioncreatesinstabilityincartels.
ANS:
Thesourceofthetensionexistsbecausetotalprofitsaremaximizedwhenoligopolistscooperateonpriceandquantitybyoperatingasamonopolist.However,individualprofitscanbegainedbyindividualscheatingontheircooperativeagreement.Thisiswhycooperativeagreementsamongmembersofacartelareinherentlyunstable.ThisisevidentintheproblemOPECexperiencesinenforcingthecooperativeagreementonproductionandpriceofcrudeoil.
DIF:
2REF:
17-1NAT:
Analytic
LOC:
OligopolyTOP:
CartelsMSC:
Interpretive
5.Describetheoutputandpriceeffectsthatinfluencetheprofit-maximizingdecisionfacedbyafirminanoligopolymarket.Howdoesthisdifferfromoutputandpriceeffectsinamonopolymarket?
ANS:
Outputeffect:
Price>Marginalcost=>increasedoutputwilladdtoprofit
Priceeffect:
increasedquantityissoldatalowerprice=>lowerrevenue(profit?
)
Anoligopolistmusttakeintoaccounthowtheoutputandpriceeffectswillbeinfluencedbycompetitors'productiondecisions,oritmustassumecompetitors'productionwillnotchangeinresponsetoitsownactions.
DIF:
3REF:
17-1NAT:
Analytic
LOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Profitmaximization|OligopolyMSC:
Interpretive
6.Explainhowtheoutputeffectandthepriceeffectinfluencetheproductiondecisionoftheindividualoligopolist.
ANS:
Sincetheindividualoligopolistfacesadownward-slopingdemandcurve,sherealizesthatifsheincreasesoutput,alloutputmustbesoldatalowermarketprice.Assuch,therevenuefromsellingtheadditionalunitsatthelowermarketpricemustexceedthelossinrevenuefromsellingallpreviousunitsatthenewlowerprice.Otherwise,profitswillfallasoutput(production)isincreased.
DIF:
2REF:
17-1NAT:
Analytic
LOC:
OligopolyTOP:
Profitmaximization|OligopolyMSC:
Interpretive
7.FordandGeneralMotorsareconsideringexpandingintotheVietnameseautomobilemarket.Deviseasimpleprisoners'dilemmagametodemonstratethestrategicconsiderationsthatarerelevanttothisdecision.
ANS:
Theanswershouldpresenttwostrategiesforeachcompany,suchas“Expand”and“Don’t