7 Brian Rapperts paper.docx

7 Brian Rapperts paper.docx

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7BrianRappertspaper

NationalSecurity,Terrorism&theControlofLifeScienceResearch

BrianRAPPERT

DepartmentofSociology;UniversityofExeter;

ExeterEX44QJ;UnitedKingdom

Abstract.Thispaperassessesongoingattemptstobalancesecurityandopennessintheconductofcivilianbioscienceandbiomedicalresearch.Morespecificallyitexaminesthestateofcurrentpolicydiscussionsregardingthesecuritythreatsposedbylifescienceresearchresultsandtechniques.Concernabouttheir‘dualuse’potentialhasintensifiedtremendouslysince9/11andtheanthraxattacksintheUS.Despitetheconsiderableattentiontothisissuetoday,thispaperarguesthatcurrentdiscussionsareunclearandarguablyproblematicinrelationtovitalquestionsregardingtheproblemposedbylifescienceresearch,theultimategoalsofcontrols,andthedesirabilityofthecirculationofdualuseknowledge.Itseekstochallengethestateofdiscussionbyaskinghowthecurrentsecuritypresentationsofthethreatsposedbyemergingbiosciencedevelopmentsarethemselvesformedinrelationtodefinitionsofscientificpractice.Onthebasisofthisanalysis,considerationisgiventothepotentialandpitfallsassociatedwithcurrentinternationaleffortstodevisea‘codeofconduct’forbioscientists.

Introduction

Todayinmanycountries,renewedattentionisbeinggiventothepotentialforthebiologicalandmedicalsciencestofacilitatethedevelopmentofbiologicalweapons.[]Questionsarebeingaskedwhethersomeresearchistoo‘contentious’topursueandwhatsystemsshouldbeinplacetoevaluateandpossiblyrestrictlaboratoryactivities.Withthishascomeaquestioningofwhetherthescrutinyandcontrolsbeingundertakenaredamagingthesciencebase.Debatesaboutwhat,ifany,controlsmightbeprudentoftenturnonhowclassificationsanddistinctionsaremadeinrelationtoquestionssuchas:

Whatcountsas‘dangerous’research?

Inwhatwaysistheunderstandingoflifeprocessesnowbeinggeneratedopeningupnewwaysofinterferingwiththefunctioningofhumans,animals,andplants?

Whatresearchfindingsconstituteanovelcontributiontoadiscipline?

TowhatextentarethesecurityissuesassociatedwiththelifesciencessimilarordifferenttothoseassociatedwithotherWMDareasofconcernsuchasnuclearphysics?

Thispaperconsiderswhatisatstakeinthewaysuchquestionsarebeingposedandansweredtoday.Itdoessobyquestioninghow‘theproblem’withbioresearchisdefined.Inparticularitaskshowcurrentdepictionsofthethreatsposedbyemergingbiosciencedevelopmentsarethemselvesformedinrelationtounderstandingsofscientificpractice.Itaimstoidentifykeyissueshithertonotgivensufficientattention,theknotsandbindsassociatedwithtryingtoassessthedual-usecapacityofresearch,andproblemsforfutureconsideration.Followingfromananalysisoftheseissues,theprosandconsassociatedwithattemptstodevelopaninternationalcodeofconductforbioscientistsarediscussed.

Thispaperitselfemploysseveraldistinctionstosettheboundariesofanalysis.Thefirstisbetweenresearchcontrolsintendedtopreventtheunauthorizedacquisitionofbiologicalagentsortheiraccidentalreleasewiththosecontrolsintendedtopreventtheknowledgeandtechniquesgeneratedfrombeingmisused.Whilethefirstreferstothefairlywelltroddengroundofbiosecurity/biosafety,thesecondraisesmuchlessfamiliarmattersforthelifesciences.Itisthelatterwhichisthefocushere.Inaddition,thischapterisconcernedwiththeimplicationsofcontrolsfornon-militaryagencyfundedacademic[]（andtoalesserextent）industrialR&D.Finally,muchoftheargumentcentresonrecentactivitiesintheUS,thecountrywhichisontheforefrontofdebatingandadoptingresearchcontrols.AtthetimeofwritingwhileEuropeancountrieshadmadevariousregulatorybiosecurity/biosafetyreforms,discussionsareonlybeginningabout‘dangerousknowledge’.Asthesiteofaconsiderablepercentageoftheworld’slifescienceresearchandbecauseofitsongoinginterestininternationalizinganycontrolsadoptedintheUS,thisconcentrationisprudent.

1.TheLifeSciences&BiologicalWeapons

Discussionsaboutthedualusepotential–thatistheirpotentialforcivilianandmilitaryapplications–ofbiologicalandmedicalresearchtodayincludeconcernsthatsuchactivitiesmayfacilitatestateandnon-stateactorsmakingbacteriamoreresistanttoantibiotics,modifyingagents’virulenceandpathogenicity,synthesizingviruses,devisingnovelbioweapons,andreducingtheeffectivenessofthebody’sdefencesystem.[]Whilerenewedattentionisbeingpaidtotheproliferationofnuclearandchemicalexpertiseandequipment,thereislittledoubtthatmuchofcurrentpublicpolicyattentionregardingthesecurityimplicationsofsciencescentresonthelifesciences.

Theimpetusbehindandcharacterofthisfocusderivesfromaseriesofdistinctionsmadebetweenlifescienceresearchasother‘dualuse’areasofconcernsuchasnuclearscienceandcryptography.Inrecentlyassessingthethreatposedbybiologicalweaponsusedbyterrorists,forinstance,theUSNationalResearchCouncil（NRC）[]concludedthatthedual-usepotentialoflifescienceresearchismuchmoreofapotentialproblemthanthatposedbynuclearphysicsbecauseofcomparativedifferencesinthestepsandresourcesrequiredbetweenfundamentalscienceandtheproductionofweapon,thisincluding:

theaccessibilityofthematerialsrequired,theeaseofdistinguishingcivilianfrommilitaryrelevantactivities,thesizeandglobaldispersionofthecommunities,andtheextentoftheincorporationofsecurityissueswithintheexistingcultureofresearch.[]Inbrief,theNRCarguedthattheresourcesandknowledgerequiredfortheproductionofbiologicalweaponsismorethoroughlyandtroublingly‘dualuse’thanthatnecessaryfornuclearweapons.[]Muchthesameoverallconclusionwassaidtoapplytocryptography.Asanotherconsideration,thediffusenatureofthematerialsandexpertiseinthelifesciencesweresaidtolimittheviabilityofresearchcontrols.

Theimportofthesedistinctionsforsecurityresponsesdependsonthenatureofthewould-beuseroftheweaponsenvisioned.Whilemuchattentionhasbeengiventoterroristthreatsinrecentyears,thisdidnotfigureasaprominenttopicinthepast.[]Theaforementioneddifferencesinthedualusepotentialofresearchthoughwouldsuggestthematerialsandexpertisenecessaryforattackswithbiologicalweaponsarefarmorereadilyaccessiblethanthoserequiredfordevisingnuclearweapons.Forsomethough,theconcentrationonterrorismtodaymisplacesthemostlikelydevelopersofbioweapons:

thatbeingstatesinoffensiveprograms.Amongthedemandsoftencitedforproducingaviablebioweaponincludeobtainingavirulentstrainofanagent,culturingitinsufficientquantities,weaponisingtheagent（e.g.,throughaerosolisationtechniques）andthensecuringthemeansofdispersingit.Manysecurityanalystshavetakenthelimitedemploymentofbiologicalweaponsaroundtheworlddespitethehistoricalinterestinsuchcapacitiesasanindicationofthedifficultyofeffectivelyemployingthem.[]Insum,thereismuchdebatetodayaboutthecharacteristicsoflifescienceresearchandthelikelihoodofthethreatsposed.

1.1PolicyResponses

Muchoftheinitialpolicyresponsepost9/11andtheanthraxattacksintheUShasbeendirectedtowardsstrengtheningthephysicalcontainmentofpathogens.Forinstance,the2001USPatriotAct,theUSPublicHealthSecurityandBioterrorismPreparednessandResponseActof2002andthe2001UKAnti-terrorism,CrimeandSecurityActbroughtinenhancedcontrolsonwhocouldaccesstraditionaldangerouspathogensandtoxins（mainlyso-called‘selectagents’byUSCenterforDiseaseControlclassification）.

However,intheUSatleast,thedebatehasexpandedsignificantlybeyondissuesassociatedwithpersonnelandmaterialstoconsiderhowtheknowledgeandtechniquesgeneratedfromresearchmightposesecurityconcerns.Theoftensaidrelativelyeaseofmovingfromthesciencetotheproductionofbiologicalweaponsaswellasthepaceofscientificdevelopmentshasleadtoquestioningabouttheadvisabilityofpursuingsomelinesofresearch.Post9-11,experimentssuchastheinsertionoftheinterleukin-4geneintothemousepoxvirus,thecomparisonofvariolamajorandvacciniavirusesandtheartificialchemicalsynthesisofthepoliovirushaveroutinelyfiguredasexamplesofhownon-appliedresearchmightfacilitatethedevelopmentofbiologicalweapons.[]WiththepassageoftheHomelandSecurityActintheUS,renewedattentionhasbeengiventothepossibilityofintroducinga‘sensitivebutunclassified’securitycategorizationforcertainresearchfindings.[]Inearly2003,agroupof32largelyAmericanbasedscientificjournalsmettoagreeguidelinesforreviewing,modifying,andperhapsevenrejectingresearcharticleswhere‘thepotentialharmofpublicationoutweighsthepotentialsocietalbenefits.’[]In2004,theNRC’sreportBiotechnologyResearchinanAgeofTerrorismmadesignificantnewrecommendationsforthereviewandoversightofpotentiallydangerousresearchproposals.Whileitfoundexistinglegislationandregulationforprotectionofmaterialsandthevettingofpersonneladequate,itconcludedthatadditionalproceduresshouldbeinplacetoscreenso-called‘ExperimentsofConcern’.[]Currentlythiscategoryincludesactivitiessuchasincreasingthetransmissibilityofpathogens,enhancingvirulenceofagents,andrenderingvaccinesineffective;thoughtheCouncilhasstatedtheclassificationmighthav