最新5学原理微观第五版测试题库 17.docx

最新5学原理微观第五版测试题库 17.docx

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最新5学原理微观第五版测试题库17

Chapter17

Oligopoly

TRUE/FALSE

1.Theessenceofanoligopolisticmarketisthatthereareonlyafewsellers.

ANS:

TDIF:

1REF:

17-0

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

OligopolyMSC:

Definitional

2.Gametheoryisjustasnecessaryforunderstandingcompetitiveormonopolymarketsasitisforunderstandingoligopolisticmarkets.

ANS:

FDIF:

2REF:

17-0

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Oligopoly|Gametheory

MSC:

Interpretive

3.Inacompetitivemarket,strategicinteractionsamongthefirmsarenotimportant.

ANS:

TDIF:

1REF:

17-0

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Gametheory|Competitivemarkets

MSC:

Interpretive

4.Forafirm,strategicinteractionswithotherfirmsinthemarketbecomemoreimportantasthenumberoffirmsinthemarketbecomeslarger.

ANS:

FDIF:

2REF:

17-0

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Oligopoly|Gametheory

MSC:

Interpretive

5.Supposethreefirmsformacartelandagreetochargeaspecificpricefortheiroutput.Eachindividualfirmhasanincentivetomaintaintheagreementbecausethefirm’sindividualprofitswillbethegreatestunderthecartelarrangement.

ANS:

FDIF:

2REF:

17-1

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

CollusionMSC:

Interpretive

6.Iffirmsinanoligopolyagreetoproduceaccordingtothemonopolyoutcome,theywillproducethesamelevelofoutputastheywouldproduceinaNashequilibrium.

ANS:

FDIF:

1REF:

17-1

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Oligopoly|Cooperation

MSC:

Interpretive

7.Whetheranoligopolyconsistsof3firmsor10firms,thelevelofoutputlikelywillbethesame.

ANS:

FDIF:

2REF:

17-1

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

OligopolyMSC:

Interpretive

8.Cartelswithasmallnumberoffirmshaveagreaterprobabilityofreachingthemonopolyoutcomethandocartelswithalargernumberoffirms.

ANS:

TDIF:

1REF:

17-1

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

CartelsMSC:

Interpretive

9.Asthenumberoffirmsinanoligopolybecomesverylarge,thepriceeffectdisappears.

ANS:

TDIF:

2REF:

17-1

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

OligopolyMSC:

Interpretive

10.Ifallofthefirmsinanoligopolysuccessfullycolludeandformacartel,thentotalprofitforthecartelisequaltowhatitwouldbeifthemarketwereamonopoly.

ANS:

TDIF:

2REF:

17-1

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

CartelsMSC:

Interpretive

11.Asthenumberoffirmsinanoligopolyincreases,themagnitudeofthepriceeffectincreases.

ANS:

FDIF:

2REF:

17-1

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

OligopolyMSC:

Interpretive

12.Allexamplesoftheprisoner’sdilemmagamearecharacterizedbyoneandonlyoneNashequilibrium.

ANS:

FDIF:

3REF:

17-2

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Nashequilibrium|Prisoners'dilemma

MSC:

Interpretive

13.Iftwoplayersengagedinaprisoner’sdilemmagamearelikelytorepeatthegame,theyaremorelikelytocooperatethaniftheyplaythegameonlyonce.

ANS:

TDIF:

2REF:

17-2

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Prisoners'dilemma

MSC:

Interpretive

14.Thestoryoftheprisoners'dilemmacontainsagenerallessonthatappliestoanygrouptryingtomaintaincooperationamongitsmembers.

ANS:

TDIF:

1REF:

17-2

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Prisoners'dilemma

MSC:

Interpretive

15.Intheprisoners'dilemmagame,oneprisonerisalwaysbetteroffconfessing,nomatterwhattheotherprisonerdoes.

ANS:

TDIF:

1REF:

17-2

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Prisoners'dilemma

MSC:

Interpretive

16.Intheprisoners'dilemmagame,confessingisadominantstrategyforeachofthetwoprisoners.

ANS:

TDIF:

2REF:

17-2

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Prisoners'dilemma|Dominantstrategy

MSC:

Interpretive

17.Thegamethatoligopolistsplayintryingtoreachtheoligopolyoutcomeissimilartothegamethatthetwoprisonersplayintheprisoners'dilemma.

ANS:

TDIF:

1REF:

17-2

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

GametheoryMSC:

Interpretive

18.Inthecaseofoligopolisticmarkets,self-interestmakescooperationdifficultanditoftenleadstoanundesirableoutcomeforthefirmsthatareinvolved.

ANS:

TDIF:

1REF:

17-2

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

GametheoryMSC:

Interpretive

19.Whenprisoners'dilemmagamesarerepeatedoverandover,sometimesthethreatofpenaltycausesbothpartiestocooperate.

ANS:

TDIF:

2REF:

17-2

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Prisoners'dilemma

MSC:

Interpretive

20.Atit-for-tatstrategy,inarepeatedgame,isoneinwhichaplayerstartsbycooperatingandthendoeswhatevertheotherplayerdidlasttime.

ANS:

TDIF:

2REF:

17-2

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

GametheoryMSC:

Definitional

21.Onewaythatpublicpolicyencouragescooperationamongoligopolistsisthroughantitrustlaw.

ANS:

FDIF:

1REF:

17-3

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

AntitrustMSC:

Interpretive

22.TheShermanAntitrustActprohibitscompetingfirmsfromeventalkingaboutfixingprices.

ANS:

TDIF:

1REF:

17-3

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

ShermanAntitrustActof1890

MSC:

Interpretive

23.Resalepricemaintenancepreventsretailersfromcompetingonprice.

ANS:

TDIF:

1REF:

17-3

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Resalepricemaintenance

MSC:

Interpretive

24.Somebusinesspracticesthatappeartoreducecompetition,suchasresalepricemaintenance,mayhavelegitimateeconomicpurposes.

ANS:

TDIF:

2REF:

17-3

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Resalepricemaintenance

MSC:

Interpretive

25.In2007theU.S.SupremeCourtruledthatitwasnotnecessaryillegalformanufacturersanddistributorstoagreeonminimumretailprices.

ANS:

TDIF:

2REF:

17-3

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Resalepricemaintenance

MSC:

Definitional

26.Tyingcanbethoughtofasaformofpricediscrimination.

ANS:

TDIF:

1REF:

17-3

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

OligopolyTOP:

TyingMSC:

Interpretive

27.Policymakersshouldbeaggressiveinusingtheirpowerstoplacelimitsonfirmbehavior,becausebusinesspracticesthatappeartoreducecompetitionneverhaveanylegitimatepurposes.

ANS:

FDIF:

2REF:

17-4

NAT:

AnalyticLOC:

TheroleofgovernmentTOP:

Antitrust

MSC:

Interpretive

SHORTANSWER

1.Evenwhenallowedtocollude,firmsinanoligopolymaychoosetocheatontheiragreementswiththerestofthecartel.Why?

ANS:

Individualprofitscanbeincreasedattheexpenseofgroupprofitsifindividualscheatonthecartel'scooperativeagreement.

DIF:

2REF:

17-1NAT:

Analytic

LOC:

OligopolyTOP:

CartelsMSC:

Interpretive

2.Whateffectdoesthenumberoffirmsinanoligopolyhaveonthecharacteristicsofthemarket?

ANS:

Asthenumberoffirmsincreases,theequilibriumquantityofgoodsprovidedincreasesandpricefalls;themarketbeginstoresembleacompetitiveone.

DIF:

2REF:

17-1NAT:

Analytic

LOC:

OligopolyTOP:

OligopolyMSC:

Analytical

3.Assumethatdemandforaproductthatisproducedatzeromarginalcostisreflectedinthetablebelow.

Quantity

Price

0

$36

200

$33

400

$30

600

$27

800

$24

1000

$21

1200

$18

1400

$15

1600

$12

1800

$9

2000

$6

2200

$3

2400

$0

a.

Whatistheprofit-maximizinglevelofproductionforagroupofoligopolisticfirmsthatoperateasacartel?

b.

Assumethatthismarketischaracterizedbyaduopolyinwhichcollusiveagreementsareillegal.WhatmarketpriceandquantitywillbeassociatedwithaNashequilibrium?

ANS:

a.

Q=1200

b.

Q=1600,P=12

DIF:

3REF:

17-1NAT:

Analytic

LOC:

OligopolyTOP:

CartelsMSC:

Applicative

4.Describethesourceoftensionbetweencooperationandself-interestinamarketcharacterizedbyoligopoly.Useanexampleofanactualcartelarrangementtodemonstratewhythistensioncreatesinstabilityincartels.

ANS:

Thesourceofthetensionexistsbecausetotalprofitsaremaximizedwhenoligopolistscooperateonpriceandquantitybyoperatingasamonopolist.However,individualprofitscanbegainedbyindividualscheatingontheircooperativeagreement.Thisiswhycooperativeagreementsamongmembersofacartelareinherentlyunstable.ThisisevidentintheproblemOPECexperiencesinenforcingthecooperativeagreementonproductionandpriceofcrudeoil.

DIF:

2REF:

17-1NAT:

Analytic

LOC:

OligopolyTOP:

CartelsMSC:

Interpretive

5.Describetheoutputandpriceeffectsthatinfluencetheprofit-maximizingdecisionfacedbyafirminanoligopolymarket.Howdoesthisdifferfromoutputandpriceeffectsinamonopolymarket?

ANS:

Outputeffect:

Price>Marginalcost=>increasedoutputwilladdtoprofit

Priceeffect:

increasedquantityissoldatalowerprice=>lowerrevenue（profit?

）

Anoligopolistmusttakeintoaccounthowtheoutputandpriceeffectswillbeinfluencedbycompetitors'productiondecisions,oritmustassumecompetitors'productionwillnotchangeinresponsetoitsownactions.

DIF:

3REF:

17-1NAT:

Analytic

LOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Profitmaximization|OligopolyMSC:

Interpretive

6.Explainhowtheoutputeffectandthepriceeffectinfluencetheproductiondecisionoftheindividualoligopolist.

ANS:

Sincetheindividualoligopolistfacesadownward-slopingdemandcurve,sherealizesthatifsheincreasesoutput,alloutputmustbesoldatalowermarketprice.Assuch,therevenuefromsellingtheadditionalunitsatthelowermarketpricemustexceedthelossinrevenuefromsellingallpreviousunitsatthenewlowerprice.Otherwise,profitswillfallasoutput（production）isincreased.

DIF:

2REF:

17-1NAT:

Analytic

LOC:

OligopolyTOP:

Profitmaximization|OligopolyMSC:

Interpretive

7.FordandGeneralMotorsareconsideringexpandingintotheVietnameseautomobilemarket.Deviseasimpleprisoners'dilemmagametodemonstratethestrategicconsiderationsthatarerelevanttothisdecision.

ANS:

Theanswershouldpresenttwostrategiesforeachcompany,suchas“Expand”and“Don’t