平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)17.ppt
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Fernando&YvonnQuijanoPreparedby:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation17CHAPTERCopyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation2of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.CHAPTER17OUTLINE17.1QualityUncertaintyandtheMarketforLemons17.2MarketSignaling17.3MoralHazard17.4ThePrincipalAgentProblem17.5ManagerialIncentivesinanIntegratedFirm17.6AsymmetricInformationinLaborMarkets:
EfficiencyWageTheoryChapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation3of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1asymmetricinformationSituationinwhichabuyerandasellerpossessdifferentinformationaboutatransaction.TheMarketforUsedCarsTheMarketforUsedCarsFigure17.1Whensellersofproductshavebetterinformationaboutproductqualitythanbuyers,a“lemonsproblem”mayariseinwhichlow-qualitygoodsdriveouthighqualitygoods.In(a)thedemandcurveforhigh-qualitycarsisDH.However,asbuyerslowertheirexpectationsabouttheaveragequalityofcarsonthemarket,theirperceiveddemandshiftstoDM.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation4of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheMarketforUsedCarsTheMarketforUsedCars(continued)Figure17.1Likewise,in(b)theperceiveddemandcurveforlow-qualitycarsshiftsfromDLtoDM.Asaresult,thequantityofhigh-qualitycarssoldfallsfrom50,000to25,000,andthequantityoflow-qualitycarssoldincreasesfrom50,000to75,000.Eventually,onlylowqualitycarsaresold.asymmetricinformationSituationinwhichabuyerandasellerpossessdifferentinformationaboutatransaction.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation5of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheMarketforUsedCarsThelemonsproblem:
Withasymmetricinformation,low-qualitygoodscandrivehigh-qualitygoodsoutofthemarket.ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationAdverseSelectionadverseselectionFormofmarketfailureresultingwhenproductsofdifferentqualitiesaresoldatasinglepricebecauseofasymmetricinformation,sothattoomuchofthelow-qualityproductandtoolittleofthehigh-qualityproductaresold.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation6of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationTheMarketforInsuranceTheMarketforCreditPeoplewhobuyinsuranceknowmuchmoreabouttheirgeneralhealththananyinsurancecompanycanhopetoknow,evenifitinsistsonamedicalexamination.Asaresult,adverseselectionarises,muchasitdoesinthemarketforusedcars.Creditcardcompaniesandbankscan,tosomeextent,usecomputerizedcredithistories,whichtheyoftensharewithoneanother,todistinguishlow-qualityfromhigh-qualityborrowers.Manypeople,however,thinkthatcomputerizedcredithistoriesinvadetheirprivacy.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation7of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheImportanceofReputationandStandardizationAsymmetricinformationisalsopresentinmanyothermarkets.Herearejustafewexamples:
Retailstores:
Willthestorerepairorallowyoutoreturnadefectiveproduct?
Dealersofrarestamps,coins,books,andpaintings:
Aretheitemsrealorcounterfeit?
Roofers,plumbers,andelectricians:
Whenarooferrepairsorrenovatestheroofofyourhouse,doyouclimbuptocheckthequalityofthework?
Restaurants:
Howoftendoyougointothekitchentocheckifthechefisusingfreshingredientsandobeyinghealthlaws?
Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation8of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1Asymmetricinformationisprominentinthefree-agentmarket.Onepotentialpurchaser,theplayersoriginalteam,hasbetterinformationabouttheplayersabilitiesthanotherteamshave.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation9of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MARKETSIGNALING17.2marketsignalingProcessbywhichsellerssendsignalstobuyersconveyinginformationaboutproductquality.Tobestrong,asignalmustbeeasierforhigh-productivitypeopletogivethanforlow-productivitypeopletogive,sothathigh-productivitypeoplearemorelikelytogi