连锁店的定价策略文献翻译.docx

连锁店的定价策略文献翻译.docx

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连锁店的定价策略文献翻译

原文：

Chain-StorePricingforStrategicAccommodation

Thechainstorehasbeenoneoftheprincipalfactorsinthemovementtowardsthesimplificationofdistributivefunctions.Assuch,ithascausedpronouncedconcernamongmanufactures,jobbers,andretailers.Ithasbeenthesubjectoflitigation,ofrecrimination,andofendlessdiscussion.Themanufacturerhashesitatedtomakefulluseofthechainstoresystemasanoutlet,becauseofhisdesirenottooffendthemembersofhisregulardistributivesystems.Thejobberhasmadeopenwaruponthechainbecauseithasfranklyattemptedtosupplanthim,andtoindependentretailerhasoftenfailedtorecognizethedecisivelineofdivisionbetweenpricemerchandisingandservicemerchandising.

Everyconcernwhichultimatelymarketsitsproductstotheconsumerisvitallyaffectedbythestatusofchainretailing;moreparticularlywiththepositionwhichitwilloccupyinthefuture.Thefollowingpagescontainabriefresumeofthepresentchainstoresituationinthefieldsofretailingwhereithasbecomewellestablished.

Trendsofdevelopment

Themostrapidgrowthofthechainstorehastakenplaceinthegrocery,drug,drygoods,tobacco,andconfectionerylines.Itisessentialtounderstandthereasonsforthis:

1.Thepublicdemandintheselinesiswelldefined;isnotsubjecttogreatfluctuationintimesofbusinessdepression;andineachcasethereisa“repeatmarket.”

2.Thearticleshandledfallmainlyintheclassofnecessities,orsemi-necessities.Thatis,theyareregardedasessentialbyaproportionofthemarketlargeenoughtoinsureasteadydemand.

3.Becauseofthestandardcharacterofthestocks,andthebroaddemand,ahighrateofturnovermaybemaintained,whichallowsthechaintomakeasmallbutsteadymarginofprofitatfrequentintervals.

4.Buyingorpurchasingisstandardizedandcentralizedatheadquarters.

5.Sincearticlesareofsmallunitvalue,andnotbulkyorheavy,thechainstoreisabletooperateonacashandcarrybasis-afactorofgreatimportanceinchainstoregrowth.

6.Merchandisingislargelyamatterofdisplayandpriceadvertising.

7.Standardizationofmethodshasmadeitpossibletocentralizemanagementatheadquartersandcontrolmemberstoresundermanagerswho,whiletheymayhaveapecuniaryinterestinsalesmadebytheirstores,havenothingtosayabouttheconductingofthem..

Ouranalyticfocusinthispaperisthegeographicscopeofpricing.Specifically,isitbetterforachain-storeretailertosetpricesaccordingtolocalmarketconditions（reflectingdifferencesincost,demandandcompetition）orsetcommonpricesthatapplyacrossallitsstores,i.e.adoptauniformpricingpolicy?

Arelikelyfirmdecisionsonthisinlinewithconsumerpreferences?

IncontrasttotheentrydeterrenceissueconsideredbySelten（1978）,MilgromandRoberts（1982）andKrepsandWilson（1982）,welooktoseewhetherpricingpolicy,otherthandeterringentry,mightinsteadbeemployedstrategicallytoaccommodateentrywhenitisinevitable.

Thegeographicscopeforpricingisaveryrealissueformultipleretailers.Itisevidentthatinpracticesomechain-storegroupsadoptuniformpricingwhileothersdonot.Insomesectors,allmultipleretailerspriceidenticallyacrosstheirstores,e.g.UKelectricalgoodsretailers（MMC,1997a,b）.Whileinothersectors,localpricingispractisedtotheextentthatproductpricesmightvaryconsiderablyfromonestoretoanother,e.g.theFTCfoundthatforofficesupplysuperstoresaveragepricesvariedbyasmuch16%dependingontheextentoflocalcompetitionintheUS.Moreover,thispricingpolicydistinctionappliesnotjusttodifferentsectorsbutcanapplywithinthesamesector,e.g.amongstUKsupermarketswhere,oftheleadingfifteengroups,eightpriceduniformlywhilesevenpricedaccordingtolocalconditions（CompetitionCommission,2000）.

Yet,inthesedaysofcomputer-basedpricingsystems,itcanhardlybesaidthatticketingcostsarehigh,orthatlocaldemandandcostconditionscannotbeeffectivelygauged.Hence,choosingauniformpricemustbeseenasaconsciousact.Ofcourse,uniformpricingmightnotbepracticablewhenretailingcostsaresubstantiallydifferentfromoneareatoanother.Nevertheless,formanymultipleretailersbothlocalanduniformpricingmightbefeasiblebutachoicehastobemadeonwhichtoadopt.Thisleadstotwoquestions,firstwhyitmighteverbepreferablefortheincumbenttoimposeaconstraintonitsownbehaviour,andsecondthecircumstancesunderwhichtheconstraintisdesirable.Ourkeyinsightonthefirstquestionisasfollows:

Afirmwillfinditselfmoreundercompetitioninsomemarketsthanothers.Bypracticinguniformpricing,itsoftenscompetitionbetweenitselfandrivalplayers.Thisentailssettingahigherpriceinthosemarketssubjectto（more）competition,attheexpenseoflowerpricesinmarketswhereitisnotsubject（orislesssubject）tocompetition,comparedwithapracticeofmarket-specificpricing.Thehigherpriceinturnmakestheactiononewhichrivalsfindattractive,soitdoesnotrequireagreement.Thusifthemarketsundercompetitionareimportantenoughtothefirm,itsnetgainispositive.Henceourpaper’sprimefocusisontheparametersassociatedwiththenatureandintensityofcompetitionthatmightinfluencethischoice.

Thereissomecommonalityinthisissuewithrelatedquestionsonthird-degreepricediscriminationinoligopoly（e.g.Holmes,1989）.Morespecifically,theissuesraisedheretieinwithwhyoligopolisticfirmswouldwishtolimitorevenentirelyavoidpricediscrimination,e.g.Winter（1997）andCorts（1998）,oradoptpracticeswhichprovidethesameoutcome,notablycontemporaneousMFCclauses,e.g.DeGraba（1987）andBesankoandLyon（1993）.

ThereareobviouslinksbetweenourpaperandCorts（1998）whichalsoconsidersthequestionofuniformversusdiscriminatorypricingunderduopoly（withinaratherdifferentframework）.However,inCorts’model,itturnsoutthatitisusuallynotinafirm’sunilateralinteresttopractiseuniformpricing.Therefore,whereuniformpricingisprofitable,strategiccommitmentsnottopricediscriminatearenormallyinvolvedandhencediscussionfocusesontheformthesemighttake.Bycontrast,withinourframework,andforaspecifiedrangeofparameters,wefindthatitisinthefirm’sowninterestnottodiscriminateandthatuniformpricingarisesasanequilibriumstrategy.Thisisimportant,andprovidesanewinsight,becauseitmeansthatuniformpricingneednotbeaccompaniedbyevidenceofstrategiccommitmenttothatpolicyinorderforittobeworthwhileandpractised.

1.Introduction

Ourresultthatfirmscancommonlybebetteroffunderauniformpricingregimecastsaninterestinglightonsomeotherpreviousmodels.Theresultisnotnew-itwasfirstencounteredinHolmes’（1989）“weakmarket-strongmarket”modelofpricediscriminationinoligopoly.However,intheirinvestigationofamodelsimilartoHolmes’,ArmstrongandVickers（2001）findthatifamarketissufficientlycompetitive,profitsalwaysincreasewithdiscrimination.Thisleadsthemtoconcludethat“Holmes’resultthatprofitsmayfallwithdiscriminationrequiresmarketstobereasonablyuncompetitive.”（p.597）.Ourmodelshowsthisisnotcompletelytrue.Inourframework,whichineffecthasaweakandastrongmarket,profitsmayfallwithdiscriminationwhateverthedegreeofcompetition.Thatis,howeveruncompetitivethemarket,uniformpricingcanbeprofitable.Whatisrequiredforthisiseachindividualmonopolymarket,inourcontext,tobesufficientlylarge.

Toconsiderhowdifferentcompetitiveconditionsaffectthescope-of-pricingdecision,themodeldevelopedherehasanincumbentmonopolychain-storeoperatingacrossafinitenumberoflocalmarkets,analogoustoSelten’swell-knownchain-storeparadoxanalysis.However,incontrasttoSelten’sframework,theselocalmarketsareassumedtodifferinrespectofthescaleofconsumerdemandandthisinturnaffectsentryconditions.Therearetwomarkettypes.Ineachofthelarger,“affluent”markets,entrybarriersareinsufficienttoprevententrybyanew,independentrival.Yet,insmaller,lessaffluentmarketsthechain-storeistakentohaveaprotectedmonopolyposition（arisingfromnaturalorinstitutionalbarriers）.Inthissetting,weshowthatachain-storewouldnotnecessarilyprefertouselocalpricingasaprofit-enhancingpricediscriminationtool.Competitiveconditionsexistintheformofaregiontradingoffthedegreeofsubstitutabilitybetweenentrantandincumbent’sproductsandthedegreetowhichduopolymarketsarelargerthanmonopolymarkets.Undertheseconditions,thechain-storewouldprefertocommittoapolicyofuniformpricingsincethisallowsforsoftercompetitionincontestedlocalmarketsandhenceraisesitsaggregateprofits.

Whiletheprospectofstrategicaccommodationthroughdampeningpricecompetitioninfluencesthepreferencebetweenlocalornationalpricing,achain-store’schoiceisnotinevitablyatvariancewiththatpreferredbysociety.Inparticular,astore’swillingnesstocommittonationalpricingcanincertaincircumstancesnotonlyenhanceitsprofitsbutalsoraisesocialwelfareifnotconsumersurplus.Yetmarketconditionscommonlyexistunderwhichwelfarewouldbeadverselyaffectedbythechain-storefollowingitspreferredchoice.

Althoughourmodelisundoubtedlyspecific,theresultsareconsiderablymoregeneral.Ourgeneralresultsare

（1）thatunderarangeofconditionsincludingverycompetitivemarkets,uniformpricingisprivatelyoptimalbothforincumbentandentrantwithoutco-