外文翻译确定有利的养老金计划需要多少钱才够0110.docx

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外文翻译确定有利的养老金计划需要多少钱才够0110

原文:

Defined-benefitpensionplans—Howmuchcashisenough?

ByJohnDeinumandWinstonWoo

Recentattentiontopensionissuesprovidesawindowofopportunityforpolicymakerstotakedecisiveactionstoimplementstable,orderlyandsustainablefundingmeasuresfordefined-benefitpensionplans.

AccordingtoCFOInsights(publishedbyDeloitte),availabilityofcashisoneofthetopconcernsforeveryCFO.Whilethefinancialcrisismaybeabating,reducingcostsandincreasingcashflowremaintopprioritiesin2010.Thechallengetobalancestrategicoroperationalinvestmentsagainstshort-termmanagementofcashiscritical.Forcompaniesthatofferdefined-benefit(DB)plans,thechallengeismagnifiedsincepotentiallysignificantpensioncontributionsmaylimitacompany’sabilitytomakebusinessinvestmentsthatfostergrowth.Asaresult,pensionbenefitscouldbeatriskbecauseaviableDBplanrequiresaviablesponsor.

Canada’sretirementincomesystemranksfourthintheworld,accordingtotheMelbourneMercerGlobalPensionIndex.ThestudypointsoutthatCanada’ssystemcouldbeimprovedbyincreasingthelevelofcoverageofemployeesinoccupationalpensionschemes.Itstates:

“TheprevalenceofprivatepensionplansinCanadacontinuestodecreaseforemployeesworkingintheprivatesector.”Toincreasepensioncoverage,plansmustbeaffordableandfundingmethodologiesmustbeimprovedfirstinordertoensurestable,orderlyfunding.

Byadoptingflexibleandinnovativefundingrules,thelikelihoodofDBplan’ssurvivalandexpansionofcoverageinthefuturewouldbeimproved.Otherwise,pressurestofreezeDBplansorconverttoadefinedcontribution(DC)planwillremain.

TheFederalgovernmenthaslongrecognizedthattheregulatoryframeworkforDBplansneedstobestrengthened.Finance’sconsultationpaperacknowledgedthat:

1.Thecombinationofasignificantdeclineinlong-terminterestrates,whichcorrespondtohigherpensionliabilities,andpoorinvestmentreturnshaveledtohigherpensiondeficits

2.Excessivelevelsofcashflowarebeingdirectedtopensionfundingratherthantoinvestmentexpendituresthatcouldbenefitthegrowthofcompaniesandtheeconomymoregenerally;

3.Forfinanciallyvulnerablecompanies,theseincreasedcashdemandscouldhavesignificantimplicationsregardingtheirviability;

4.Byfundingthedeficitsoverashortperiodoftime,wheninterestratesandinvestmentreturnsimprove,theplanmaybeoverfundedanditcouldleadtosurplusesthattheplansponsorscannotutilize.

In2006,temporarymeasureswereannouncedforsponsorsoffederally-regulatedpensionplans,including:

1.Consolidationofallexistingsolvencydeficienciesandreamortizationoverthesubsequentfiveyearperiod;and

2.Extendingthecontributionschedulefromfiveyearsto10years,withconsentfrommembersoftheplanorwiththeusealetterofcredit.

TheFederalgovernmenthaslongrecognizedthattheregulatoryframeworkforDBplansneedstobestrengthened.

ThereliefwasonlyavailabletosponsorswhofiledvaluationreportswithTheOfficeoftheSuperintendentofFinancialInstitutionsCanada(OSFI)before2008.

In2008,companiesfacedunprecedentedfinancialturmoilthatsawanearcollapseofthefinancialsystem,steepdeclinesinequitymarkets,recessionandlowinterestrates.Thecrisis

severelyhurtrevenuesandledtosignificantdownsizingsandbusinessfailures.Inresponse,governmentstookactionstoprovidefundingrelief.InOntario,temporarymeasureswereannouncedinDecember2009thatallowedcompaniestoconsolidateexistingsolvencypaymentschedulesintoanewfiveyearscheduleandtoextendthesolvencypaymentscheduleto10yearswithplanmemberconsent.

Whilethereisnoshameinintroducingtemporaryfixeseverytimeacrisisarises,well-thought-outandlonger-termsolutionsarecriticaltotherevitalizationofDBplans.Thesolutionsmustaddressbothrisksandaffordability.Withthisinmind,belowarerecommendationsforconsiderationbythestakeholders—financialexecutivesandgovernmentpolicymakers.Therecommendationsaimtoreducethelevelofsolvencyfundingcontributionsrequiredwiththegoalthatcashsavingsmaybeinvestedelsewhereinthebusinessforgrowthandtosecurefuturebenefitaccruals.WhiletheconceptsdescribedarespecifictoOntarioplans,theyhavebroadergeneralapplicationtofederally-regulatedandotherprovincially-regulatedplansaswell.

A.Grow-inbenefits

UnderOntariopensionlegislation,apensionplanmemberwhoseageplusserviceisatleast55isentitledtoreceive“grow-in”benefitsonplantermination.Forapensionplanthatoffersearlyretirementsubsidies,“grow-in”providesthesebenefitstoamemberonplanterminationthatmightnototherwisebeavailabletothememberonregulartermination.Essentiallywithgrow-inrights,thememberwillbecomeentitledtoanunreducedpensionasifthemember’smembershipintheplanhadcontinuedpastthedateoftermination.NovaScotiaandOntarioaretheonlytwoprovincesthatprovidegrow-inrights.

Grow-inbenefitsshouldbeeliminatedfromanylegislativerequirements.

B.Pre-fundingofgrow-inbenefits

Ontarioistheonlyprovincetorequirepre-fundingofgrow-inbenefitsaspartofthesolvencyvaluation.Thecostofprefundingcreatesasignificantcashflowburden,acostnotsharedbyDBplansponsorsinotherprovinces,puttingOntarioplansponsorsatacompetitivedisadvantage.

NovaScotiaremovedtherequirementtopre-fundgrow-inbenefitsaspartofamandatedsolvencyvaluation.Asaresult,grow-inbenefitsarepaidfromtheDBplan’sexistingassetsontermination.Iftheplanisnotfullyfundedattermination,thenthegrow-inbenefitsarenotpaid.

Thesefundsmaybetterbedirectedtocorporateinvestmentsandensuringtheemployerisviableoverthelong-term,therebyincreasingthesecurityofpensionsaccruedtodateandfuturepensions.

Ifgrow-inbenefitsmustbemaintainedunderrevisedlegislationinOntario,theNovaScotiaapproachshouldbeadoptedwherebythe“grow-in”benefitsarenotpre-funded.

C.Solvencyvaluation

SolvencyvaluationprovidesafinancialpositionforaDBplanbasedonthepremisethattheplanisterminatedonthevaluationdate.WhensolvencyvaluationswereintroducedinOntario,virtuallyallpensionplanshadsolvencyliabilitiessubstantiallylowerthangoingconcernliabilities,reflectingtheinterestratesavailabletosettlebenefits,expectedinvestmentreturns,andinflationatthattime.Today,manyprivatesectorplanshavesolvencyliabilitiessubstantiallyhigherthanfundingliabilities,reflectingthecurrentfinancialclimate.Pensionsarebynaturealong-termliability,and,assuch,thefundingobligationsshouldreflectthatreality.Along-termoutlookenablesstableplanmanagementandreasonablecontributions.Theoriginalintentofafive-yearamortizationperiodforsolvencydeficitsisnolongerrealisticgivencurrentfinancialrealities.ThegovernmentneedstoappreciatethatDBplansrepresentaverylongundertakingandpensionbenefitsarelongtermobligations;thereforemoretimemustbegiventofundsolvencydeficitswhicharereallya“bestestimate”atonepointintimeassumingplanterminationwhichisworstcasescenario.

Fundingofpensiondeficitsdeterminedatasinglepointintimewillbesubjecttosignificantswingscausedbyuncontrollablemarketevents(suchasassetreturnsandchangesininterestrates).Allowanceforsuchvolatilityshouldbeprovidedbytheuseoflonger-termaverageratesandamortizationperiods,ratherthanshort-termmarketratesandthecurrentfive-yearamortizationperiod.

Linktheminimumfundingrequirementsandamortizationperiodtothelevelofinterestrates:

maintainthefive-yearamortizationperiodforanysolvencydeficiencydeterminedusinga“normalizedinterestrate”ortheactualsolvencyinterestrate,ifhigher,andincreasetheamortizationperiodto15yearsforanyadditionalsolvencydeficiencies;andestablishthe“normalizedinterestrate”at6.0percentperannum.

D.Solvencydiscountrate

TheBankofCanadasignificantlyloweredinterestratestostimulateeconomicrecoveryandincreasecreditinthefinancialmarkets,resultinginasubstantialdeclineingovernmentbondrateswhichserveastheproxyfordeterminingDBplansolvencyliabilities.Lowerinterestratescreatesignificantlyhigherpensionsolvencyliabilities,andhighercontributionsforplansponsors,offsettingbenefitsoftheproposedrelief.

Useoflonger-termaveragediscountrateswillstabilizeplancontributionsforsolvencypurposesandbetterreflectthelongtermnatureofDBplanliabilities.

Table1showsthelowest,average,andhighestyieldoflong-termgovernmentbondspublishedbytheBankofCanada.ThetablewascreatedbasedontheDecember2009yieldonbondseriesV122487(orequivalentasdeterminedbytheBankofCanada)from1919to2008.Averageyieldsfor15,20,25,30and35yearperiodsendingfrom1947to2008werecalculated.

Theobservationsrangefrom5.96percentto6.60percentandsuggestthatuseofaninterestrateofsixto6.5percentwouldbeappropriate.

Useofastableinterestrate,basedonlong-termobservations,todeterminesolvencyliabilitiesandcontributionsoverafive-yearamortizationperiod,combinedwithadditionalfundingovera15-yearperioddeterminedasaresultofmarketinterestrateswouldprovidesignificantsolvencycontributionreliefandpotentiallyenhancebenefitsecurityinthelongterm.

A“normalizedinterestrate”of6.0percentperannumshouldbeusedtoestablishsolvencyliabilitiesandadditionalliabilities,ifany,determinedasares

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