上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料.docx
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上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料
上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料
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关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献 文献出处:
AborJ;BokpinA.Investmentopportunities,corporatefinance,anddividendpayoutpolicy.StudiesinEconomicsandFinance.2015;27(3):
180-194. Investmentopportunities,corporatefinance,anddividendpayoutpolicy AborJ;BokpinA Abstract Purpose-Thepurposeofthispaperistoinvestigatetheeffectsofinvestmentopportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Design/methodology/approach-Thisissueistestedwithasampleof34emergingmarketcountriescoveringa17-yearperiod,1990-2006.Fixedeffectspanelmodelisemployedinourestimation.Findings-Asignificantlynegativerelationshipbetweeninvestmentopportunitysetanddividendpayoutpolicyisfound.Thereare,however,insignificanteffectsofthevariousmeasuresofcorporatefinancenamely,financialleverage,externalfinancing,anddebtmaturityondividendpayoutpolicy.Profitabilityandstockmarketcapitalizationarealsoidentifiedasimportantininfluencingdividendpayoutpolicy.Profitablefirmsaremorelikelytosupporthighdividendpaymentstoshareholders.However,firmsinrelativelywell-developedmarketstendtoexhibitlowdividendpayoutpolicy.Originality/value-Themainvalueofthepaperisinrespectofthefactthatitusesalargedatasetfromemergingmarketcountries.Theresultsgenerallysupportexistingliteratureoninvestmentopportunitysetanddividendpayoutpolicy. Keywords:
International;Dividends;Corporatefinance;1.Introduction Theimpactofinvestmentandfinancingdecisionsonfirmvaluehasbeenthefocusofextensiveresearchsince[50]ModiglianiandMiller(1958)proposedthe\principle\independentofthemannerinwhichitsproductiveassetsarefinanced.Infactsome authorslike[12]Barnesetal.(1981)supporttheirview.However,othershavecontrastedthefindingsoftheearlierstudiessuggestingthatinvestment,financing,anddividendpolicyarerelated([30]GrabowskiandMueller,1972;[46]McCabe,1979;[5]Anderson,1983).ThisispredicatedontheassumptionthatModiglianiandMiller’sidealworlddoesnotexist.Financialmarketsarenotperfectgiventaxes,transactioncosts,bankruptcycosts,agencycosts,anduncertaininflationinthemarketplace.Accordingto[13]BiermanandHass(1983),managementusuallyaddressesthedividendtargetpayoutlevelinthecontextofforecastingthefirm’ssourcesanduseoffunds.Consideringprospectiveinvestmentopportunitiesandtheinternalcashgenerationpotentialofthefirm,bothcapitalstructureanddividendpolicyarechosentoensurethatsufficientfundsareavailabletoundertakealldesirableinvestmentswithoutusingnewequity([14]Black,1976).Butwhatconstitutesa\investment?
Ifitisonethathasanexpectedreturngreaterthanthecostoffundsthatfinanceit,andifthecostofretainedearningsisdifferentfromthecostofnewequitycapital,thendividendpolicy,capitalstructure,andinvestmentstrategyarenecessarilyjointlydetermined([15]BlackandSchools,1974). Dividendpayoutpolicyisanimportantcorporateissueandmaybecloselyrelatedto,andinteractswith,mostofthefinancialandinvestmentdecisionsfirmsmake.Aproperunderstandingofdividendpolicyiscriticalformanyotherareassuchasassetpricing,capitalstructure,mergersandacquisitions,andcapitalbudgeting([2]AllenandMichael,1995).Firms’dividenddecisionscouldalsobeinfluencedbytheirprofitlevel,risk,andsize.Thoughdividendpolicyhasbeenidentifiedasamajorcorporatedecisionfacedbymanagement,itremainsoneofthepuzzlesincorporatefinance([52]Obi,2001).Therehasbeenemergingconsensusthatthereisnosingleexplanationofdividends.[19]Brooketal.(1998)agreethat,thereisnoreasontobelievethatcorporatedividendpolicyisdrivenbyasinglegoal. Attentionofempiricalresearchhasbeenatascertainingtherelationshipbetweeninvestmentopportunities,corporatefinancinganddividendpayout([54]PruittandGilman,1991;[6]AviationandBooth,2003).However,thesefindingshavefailedto establishanyclearlinkconcerningthisissue.Mostofthesestudiestendtofocusondevelopedmarkets.Littleis,however,knownabouthowinvestmentopportunitiesandcorporatefinanceinfluencedividendpayoutpolicyofemergingmarkets.Thispresentstudycontributestotheextantliteraturebyfocusingonemergingmarkets.FirmsinemergingmarketstendtoexhibitdifferentdividendbehaviorfromthoseofdevelopedmarketsliketheUS.Thismaybearesultofthedifferencesinlevelsofefficiencyandinstitutionalarrangementsbetweendevelopedmarketsandemergingmarkets.Itis,therefore,usefultoimproveourunderstandingoftheissuefromanemergingmarketperspective. Thepurposeofthispaperistoexaminetheeffectsofinvestmentopportunitysetandcorporatefinanceondividendpayout.Thecontributionofthispaperliesinthefactthatitconsidersalarge-scaledatasetcovering34emergingmarketcountriesovera17-yearperiod,1990-2006.Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.Section2coverstheliteratureondividendpolicy.Italsoreviewstheexistingliteratureontheeffectsofinvestmentopportunitiesandcorporatefinanceondividendpayoutpolicy.Section3discussesthedatausedinthestudyandalsodetailsthemodelspecificationusedfortheempiricalanalysis.Section4includesthediscussionoftheempiricalresults.Finally,Section5summarizesandconcludesthepaper.2.Overviewofliterature Sincethepublicationofthedividendirrelevancetheoryby[47]MillerandModigliani(1961),alotofstudieshavebeenconductedintheareaofdeterminantsofdividendpayouttheworldover.Thedividendirrelevancetheoryispossibleinaperfectandefficientmarketwherestockholdersareperfectlyrationalandtherearenotaxesandtransactioncosts.Thetheory,however,pointedouttheimportanceofinvestmentasbeingthemainissue.MillerandModiglianiframeworkhasthusformedthefoundationofsubsequentworkondividendsandpayoutpolicyingeneral.Theirframeworkisrichenoughtoencompassbothdividendsandrepurchase,astheonlydeterminantofafirm’svalueisitsinvestmentpolicy([3]AllenandMichael,2002).Itisarguablysaidacompany’soverridinggoalistomaximizeshareholderwealth([18] BerkleyandMyers,1996;[16]BlockandHart,2000),butto[16]BlockandHart(2000)thisconceptisnotasimpletaskasmanagementcannotdirectlyinfluencethepriceofasharebutcanonlyactinamannerconsistentwiththedesiresofinvestors.Intheviewof[61]WoodsandRandall(1989),shareholderwealthisgenerallyacceptedastheaggregatemarketvalueofthecommonshares,whichinturnisassumedtobethepresentvalueofthecashflowswhichwillaccruetoshareholders,discountedattheirrequiredrateofreturnonequity.Thesecashflowsincludedividendandperhapsmoreimportantlycapitalappreciationexceptforitshighvolatility.Firmsmust,therefore,makeimportantdecisionsoverandoveragainabouthowmuchcashthefirmshouldgivebacktoitsshareholdersandprobablywhatformitshouldtake. Black(1976)observedthattheharderwelookatthedividendspicture,themoreitseemslikeapuzzle,withpiecesthatjustdonotfittogether.Thisatteststothemuchcontroversythatsurroundsdividendpolicy.Thedividendpuzzlerevolvesaroundfiguringoutwhycompaniespaydividendsandinvestorspayattentiontodividend.To[18]BerkleyandMyers(1996),dividendpolicyisseenasatrade-offbetweenretainingearningsononehandandpayingoutcashandissuingnewsharesontheother.Thetheoreticalprinciplesunderlyingthedividendpolicyoffirmsrangefrominformationasymmetries,tax-adjustedtheorytobehavioralfactors.Theinformationasymmetriesencompassseveralaspects,includingtheagencycost,freecashflowhypothesis,andsignalingmodels. Tax-adjustedmodelspresumethatinvestorsrequireandsecurehigherexpectedreturnsonsharesofdividend-payingstocks.Theconsequenceoftaxadjustedtheoryisthedivisionofinvestorsintodividendtaxclienteleandtheclienteleeffectisresponsibleforthealterationsinportfoliocomposition([49]Modigliani,1982).To[45]MarsalisandTruman(1988),investorswithdifferingtaxliabilitieswillnotbeuniformintheiridealfirmdividendpolicy.Theyconcludethatastaxliabilityincreases,thedividendpaymentdecreaseswhileearningsreinvestmentincreasesandviceversa. Shareholderstypicallyfacetheproblemofadverseselectionandmoralhazardinthefaceofseparationofownershipandcontrol.Theproblemofinformationasymmetryisevidentinconflictsofinterestbetweenvariouscorporateclaimholders.Itholdsthatinsiderssuchasmanagershavemoreinformationaboutthefirm’scashflowthantheprovidersofthefunds.Agencycostsarelowerinfirmswithhighmanagerialownershipstakesbecauseofbetteralignmentofshareholderandmanagerialcontrol([39]JensenandHeckling,1976)andalsoinfirmswithlargeblockshareholdersthatarebetterabletomonitormanagerialactivities([57]HeiferandVishnu,1986).[27]FameandJensen(1983)arguethatagencyproblemscanberesolvedbythepaymentoflargedividendtoshareholders. Accordingtothefreecashflowmodel,[37]Jensen(1986)explainsthatfinanceavailableafterfinancingallpositivenetpresentvalueprojectscanresultinconflictsofinterestbetweenmanagersandshareholders.Clearly,dividendsanddebtinterestpaymentdecreasethefreecashflowavailabletomanagerstoinvestinmarginalnetpresentvalueprojectsandmanagerperquisiteconsumption.Firmswithhigherlevelsofca