RusselWord文档格式.docx
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Indailylife,weassumeascertainmanythingswhich,onacloserscrutiny,arefoundtobesofullofapparentcontradictionsthatonlyagreatamountofthoughtenablesustoknowwhatitisthatwereallymaybelieve.Inthesearchforcertainty,itisnaturaltobeginwithourpresentexperiences,andinsomesense,nodoubt,knowledgeistobederivedfromthem.Butanystatementastowhatitisthatourimmediateexperiencesmakeusknowisverylikelytobewrong.ItseemstomethatIamnowsittinginachair,atatableofacertainshape,onwhichIseesheetsofpaperwithwritingorprint.ByturningmyheadIseeoutofthewindowbuildingsandcloudsandthesun.Ibelievethatthesunisaboutninety-threemillionmilesfromtheearth;
thatitisahotglobemanytimesbiggerthantheearth;
that,owingtotheearth'
srotation,itriseseverymorning,andwillcontinuetodosoforanindefinitetimeinthefuture.Ibelievethat,ifanyothernormalpersoncomesintomyroom,hewillseethesamechairsandtablesandbooksandpapersasIsee,andthatthetablewhichIseeisthesameasthetablewhichIfeelpressingagainstmyarm.Allthisseemstobesoevidentastobehardlyworthstating,exceptinanswertoamanwhodoubtswhetherIknowanything.Yetallthismaybereasonablydoubted,andallofitrequiresmuchcarefuldiscussionbeforewecanbesurethatwehavestateditinaformthatiswhollytrue.
Tomakeourdifficultiesplain,letusconcentrateattentiononthetable.Totheeyeitisoblong,brownandshiny,tothetouchitissmoothandcoolandhard;
whenItapit,itgivesoutawoodensound.Anyoneelsewhoseesandfeelsandhearsthetablewillagreewiththisdescription,sothatitmightseemasifnodifficultywouldarise;
butassoonaswetrytobemorepreciseourtroublesbegin.AlthoughIbelievethatthetableis'
really'
ofthesamecolourallover,thepartsthatreflectthelightlookmuchbrighterthantheotherparts,andsomepartslookwhitebecauseofreflectedlight.Iknowthat,ifImove,thepartsthatreflectthelightwillbedifferent,sothattheapparentdistributionofcoloursonthetablewillchange.Itfollowsthatifseveralpeoplearelookingatthetableatthesamemoment,notwoofthemwillseeexactlythesamedistributionofcolours,becausenotwocanseeitfromexactlythesamepointofview,andanychangeinthepointofviewmakessomechangeinthewaythelightisreflected.
Formostpracticalpurposesthesedifferencesareunimportant,buttothepaintertheyareall-important:
thepainterhastounlearnthehabitofthinkingthatthingsseemtohavethecolourwhichcommonsensesaysthey'
have,andtolearnthehabitofseeingthingsastheyappear.Herewehavealreadythebeginningofoneofthedistinctionsthatcausemosttroubleinphilosophy--thedistinctionbetween'
appearance'
and'
reality'
betweenwhatthingsseemtobeandwhattheyare.Thepainterwantstoknowwhatthingsseemtobe,thepracticalmanandthephilosopherwanttoknowwhattheyare;
butthephilosopher'
swishtoknowthisisstrongerthanthepracticalman'
s,andismoretroubledbyknowledgeastothedifficultiesofansweringthequestion.
Toreturntothetable.Itisevidentfromwhatwehavefound,thatthereisnocolourwhichpreeminentlyappearstobethecolourofthetable,orevenofanyoneparticularpartofthetable--itappearstobeofdifferentcoloursfromdifferentpointsofview,andthereisnoreasonforregardingsomeoftheseasmorereallyitscolourthanothers.Andweknowthatevenfromagivenpointofviewthecolourwillseemdifferentbyartificiallight,ortoacolour-blindman,ortoamanwearingbluespectacles,whileinthedarktherewillbenocolouratall,thoughtotouchandhearingthetablewillbeunchanged.Thiscolourisnotsomethingwhichisinherentinthetable,butsomethingdependinguponthetableandthespectatorandthewaythelightfallsonthetable.When,inordinarylife,wespeakofthecolourofthetable,weonlymeanthesortofcolourwhichitwillseemtohavetoanormalspectatorfromanordinarypointofviewunderusualconditionsoflight.Buttheothercolourswhichappearunderotherconditionshavejustasgoodarighttobeconsideredreal;
andtherefore,toavoidfavouritism,wearecompelledtodenythat,initself,thetablehasanyoneparticularcolour.
Thesamethingappliestothetexture.Withthenakedeyeonecanseethegram,butotherwisethetablelookssmoothandeven.Ifwelookedatitthroughamicroscope,weshouldseeroughnessesandhillsandvalleys,andallsortsofdifferencesthatareimperceptibletothenakedeye.Whichoftheseisthe'
real'
table?
Wearenaturallytemptedtosaythatwhatweseethroughthemicroscopeismorereal,butthatinturnwouldbechangedbyastillmorepowerfulmicroscope.If,then,wecannottrustwhatweseewiththenakedeye,whyshouldwetrustwhatweseethroughamicroscope?
Thus,again,theconfidenceinoursenseswithwhichwebegandesertsus.
Theshapeofthetableisnobetter.Weareallinthehabitofjudgingastothe'
shapesofthings,andwedothissounreflectinglythatwecometothinkweactuallyseetherealshapes.But,infact,asweallhavetolearnifwetrytodraw,agiventhinglooksdifferentinshapefromeverydifferentpointofview.Ifourtableis'
rectangular,itwilllook,fromalmostallpointsofview,asifithadtwoacuteanglesandtwoobtuseangles.Ifoppositesidesareparallel,theywilllookasiftheyconvergedtoapointawayfromthespectator;
iftheyareofequallength,theywilllookasifthenearersidewerelonger.Allthesethingsarenotcommonlynoticedinlookingatatable,becauseexperiencehastaughtustoconstructthe'
shapefromtheapparentshape,andthe'
shapeiswhatinterestsusaspracticalmen.Butthe'
shapeisnotwhatwesee;
itissomethinginferredfromwhatwesee.Andwhatweseeisconstantlychanginginshapeaswe,moveabouttheroom;
sothathereagainthesensesseemnottogiveusthetruthaboutthetableitself,butonlyabouttheappearanceofthetable.
Similardifficultiesarisewhenweconsiderthesenseoftouch.Itistruethatthetablealwaysgivesusasensationofhardness,andwefeelthatitresistspressure.Butthesensationweobtaindependsuponhowhardwepressthetableandalsouponwhatpartofthebodywepresswith;
thusthevarioussensationsduetovariouspressuresorvariouspartsofthebodycannotbesupposedtorevealdirectlyanydefinitepropertyofthetable,butatmosttobesignsofsomepropertywhichperhapscausesallthesensations,butisnotactuallyapparentinanyofthem.Andthesameappliesstillmoreobviouslytothesoundswhichcanbeelicitedbyrappingthetable.
Thusitbecomesevidentthattherealtable,ifthereisone,isnotthesameaswhatweimmediatelyexperiencebysightortouchorhearing.Therealtable,ifthereisone,isnotimmediatelyknowntousatall,butmustbeaninferencefromwhatisimmediatelyknown.Hence,twoverydifficultquestionsatoncearise;
namely,
(1)Istherearealtableatall?
(2)Ifso,whatsortofobjectcanitbe?
Itwillhelpusinconsideringthesequestionstohaveafewsimpletermsofwhichthemeaningisdefiniteandclear.Letusgivethenameof'
sense-data'
tothethingsthatareimmediatelyknowninsensation:
suchthingsascolours,sounds,smells,hardnesses,roughnesses,andsoon.Weshallgivethename'
sensation'
totheexperienceofbeingimmediatelyawareofthesethings.Thus,wheneverweseeacolour,wehaveasensationofthecolour,butthecolouritselfisasense-datum,notasensation.Thecolouristhatofwhichweareimmediatelyaware,andtheawarenessitselfisthesensation.Itisplainthatifwearetoknowanythingaboutthetable,itmustbebymeansofthesense-data--browncolour,oblongshape,smoothness,etc.--whichweassociatewiththetable;
but,forthereasonswhichhavebeengiven,wecannotsaythatthetableisthesense-data,oreventhatthesense-dataaredirectlypropertiesofthetable.Thusaproblemarisesastotherelationofthesense-datatotherealtable,supposingthereissuchathing.
Therealtable,ifitexists,wewillcalla'
physicalobject'
.Thuswehavetoconsidertherelationofsense-datatophysicalobjects.Thecollectionofallphysicalobjectsiscalled'
matter'
.Thusourtwoquestionsmaybere-statedasfollows:
(1)Isthereanysuchthingasmatter?
(2)Ifso,whatisitsnature?
ThephilosopherwhofirstbroughtprominentlyforwardthereasonsforregardingtheimmediateobjectsofoursensesasnotexistingindependentlyofuswasBishopBerkeley(1685-1753).HisThreeDialoguesbetweenHylasandPhilonous,inOppositiontoScepticsandAtheists,undertaketoprovethatthereisnosuchthingasmatteratall,andthattheworldconsistsofnothingbutmindsandtheirideas.Hylashashithertobelievedinmatter,b