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英文原文及中文译文)
文献出处:
PublicPersonnelManagement,12
(2):
159-166.
英文原文
NewPublicManagementandtheQualityofGovernment:
CopingwiththeNewPoliticalGovernanceinCanada
PeterAucoin
AtensionbetweenNewPublicManagement(NPM)andgoodgovernance,includinggoodpublicadministration,haslongbeenassumedbythosewhoregardthestructuresandpracticesadvocatedandbroughtaboutbyNPMasdepartingfromtheprinciplesandnormsofgoodgovernancethatunderpinnedtraditionalpublicadministration(Savoie1994).Theconcernhasnotabated(Savoie2008).
Asthisdynamichasplayedoutoverthepastthreedecades,however,thereemergedanevenmoresignificantchallengenotonlytothetraditionalstructures,practicesandvaluesoftheprofessional,non-partisanpublicservicebutalsotothosereformsintroducedbyNPMthathavegainedwide,ifnotuniversal,acceptanceaspositivedevelopmentinpublicadministration.ThischallengeiswhatIcallNewPoliticalGovernance(NPG).ItisNPG,andnotNPM,Iargue,thatconstitutestheprincipalthreattogoodgovernance,includinggoodpublicadministration,andthustheQualityofGovernment(QoG)asdefinedbyRothsteinandTeorell(2008).Itisathreattotheextentthatpartisansingovernment,sometimesovertly,mostlycovertly,seektouseandoverridethepublicservice–animpartialinstitutionofgovernment–tobettersecuretheirpartisanadvantage(Campbell2007;
MacDermott2008a,2008b).Insodoing,thesegovernorsengageinapoliticizationofthepublicserviceanditsadministrationofpublicbusinessthatconstitutesaformofpoliticalcorruptionthatcannotbutunderminegoodgovernance.NPMisnotacauseofthispoliticization,Iargue,butitisaninterveningfactorinsofarasNPMreforms,amongotherreformsofthelastthreedecades,havehadtheeffectofpubliclyexposingthepublicserviceinwaysthathavemadeitmorevulnerabletopoliticalpressuresonthepartofthepoliticalexecutive.
IexaminethisphenomenonbylookingprimarilyatthecaseofCanada,butwithanumberofcomparativeWestminsterreferences.Iconsiderthephenomenontobeaninternationalone,affectingmost,ifnotall,Westerndemocracies.Thepressuresoutlinedbelowarevirtuallythesameeverywhere.Theresponsesvarysomewhatbecauseofpoliticalleadershipandtheinstitutionaldifferencesbetweensystems,evenintheWestminstersystems.Thephenomenonmustalsobeviewedinthecontextoftime,givenboththeemergenceofthepressuresthatledtoNPMinthefirstinstance,asanewmanagement-focusedapproachtopublicadministration,andtheemergenceofthedifferentpressuresthatnowcontributetoNPG,asapoliticizedapproachtogovernancewithimportantimplicationsforpublicadministration,andespeciallyforimpartiality,performanceandaccountability.
NewPublicManagementintheCanadianContext
Sincetheearly1980s,NPMhastakenseveraldifferentformsinvariousjurisdictions.Adoptingprivate-sectormanagementpracticeswasseenbysomeasapart,evenifaminorpart,ofthebroaderneo-conservative/neo-liberalpoliticaleconomymovementthatdemandedwholesaleprivatizationofgovernmententerprisesandpublicservices,extensivederegulationofprivateenterprises,andsignificantreductionsinpublicspending–‘rollingbackthestate’,asitwasputaattheoutset(Hood1991).Bysomeaccounts,almosteverythingthatchangedoverthepastquarterofacenturyisattributedtoNPM.Invirtuallyeveryjurisdiction,nonetheless,NPM,aspublicmanagementreform,wasatleastoriginallyaboutachievinggreatereconomyandefficiencyinthemanagementofpublicresourcesingovernmentoperationsandinthedeliveryofpublicservices(Pollitt1990).Thefocus,inshort,wason‘management’.Achievinggreatereconomyintheuseofpublicresourceswasattheforefrontofconcerns,giventhefiscalandbudgetarysituationsfacingallgovernmentsinthe1970s,andmanagerialefficiencywasnotfarbehind,givenassumptionsabouttheimpoverishedqualityofmanagementinpublicserviceseverywhere.
Bytheturnofthecentury,moreover,NPM,asimprovedpublicmanagementinthislimitedsense,waswellembeddedinalmostallgovernments,atleastasthenorm(althoughitwasnotalwaysoreverywherereferredtoasNPM).Thismeantincreasedmanagerialauthority,discretionandflexibility:
•formanagingpublicresources(financialandhuman);
•formanagingpublic-servicedeliverysystems;
and,
•forcollaboratingwithotherpublic-sectoragenciesaswellaswithprivatesectoragenciesintacklinghorizontal–multi-organizationaland/ormultisectoral–issues.
Thisincreasedmanagerialauthority,flexibilityanddiscretionwas,insomejurisdictions,notablytheBritainandNewZealand,coupledwithincreasedorganizationaldifferentiation,asevidencedbyaproliferationofdepartmentsandagencieswithnarrowedmandates,manywithasinglepurpose.“Agencification’,however,wasnotamajorfocusreforminalljurisdictions,includingCanadaandAustraliawheresuchchange,ifnotonthemargins,wasclearlysecondarytoenhancedmanagerialauthorityandresponsibility(PollittandTalbot2004).
ThemajorNPMinnovationsquicklyledtoconcerns,especiallyinthosejurisdictionswherethesedevelopmentsweremostadvanced,aboutalossofpublicservicecoherenceandcorporatecapacity,ontheonehand,andadiminishedsenseofandcommitmenttopublic-serviceethos,ethicsandvalues,ontheother.Reactionstotheseconcernsproducedsomeretreat,reversals,andre-balancingofthesystemsinquestions(Halligan2006).Nowhere,however,wasthereawholesalerejectionofNPM,intheoryorpractice,andareturntotraditionalpublicadministration,eveniftherenecessarilyemergedsometensionbetweenrhetoricandaction(Gregory2006).TheimprovementsinpublicmanagementbroughtaboutbyatleastsomeaspectsofNPMweresimplytooobvious,eveniftheseimprovementsweremodestincomparisontotheoriginalclaimsofNPMproponents.
AtthesametimethatNPMbecameamajorforceforchangeinpublicadministration,however,itwasaccompaniedbyacompanionforcethatsawpoliticalexecutivesseekingtoassertgreaterpoliticalcontrolovertheadministrationandapparatusofthestate,notonlyintheformulationofpublicpoliciesbutalsointheadministrationofpublicservices.Accordingly,fromthestart,atleastintheAnglo-Americansystems,therewasafundamentalparadoxaspoliticalexecutives,onboththeleftandtherightsidesofthepartisan-politicaldivide,soughtto(re)assertdominanceovertheirpublic-servicebureaucracieswhilesimultaneouslydevolvinggreatermanagementauthoritytothem(Aucoin1990).
Theimpetusforthisdynamiclayinthedissatisfactionofmanypoliticalexecutiveswiththe‘responsiveness’ofpublicservantstothepoliticalauthorityandpolicyagendasoftheseelectedofficials.Publicchoiceandprincipal-agencytheoriesprovidedtheideologicaljustificationsfortakingactionagainstwhatwereperceivedasself-servingbureaucrats(Boston1996).Beyondtheoryandideology,however,thepracticeofpublicadministrationbyprofessionalpublicservantsinsomejurisdictions,notablyAustralia,BritainandNewZealand,offeredmorethansufficientevidencetopoliticalleadersofapublic-serviceculturethatgaveonlygrudgingacceptance,atbest,tothecapacityofelectedpoliticianstodeterminewhatconstitutedthe‘publicinterest’inpublicpolicyandadministration.
TheCanadiancaseisofinterest,Isuggest,forseveralreasons.Incomparativeperspective,Canadadidnotapproachpublicmanagementreformwithmuchofanideologicalperspective.WhentheConservativesdefeatedthecentristLiberalsin1984,neitherthenewprimeminister,BrianMulroney,norhisleadingministerswerehardcoreneo-conservativesintheRonaldReaganorMargaretThatchermold.Atthattime,anduntiltheendoftheConservativegovernmentin1993,thepartywasessentiallyacentristpartyintheCanadian‘brokerage’partytradition.Whileimportantaspectsofneoliberalismunfolded,especiallyundertheumbrellaofeconomicderegulationthatcamewithafree-tradeagreementwiththeUnitedStates,therewerenomajoradministrativereformsthatwerepoliticallydriven.Pragmatismprevailed(Gow2004).Asaresult,thereformsinitiatedduringthisperiodwereessentiallyundertakingsoftheprofessionalpublic-serviceleadershipthatsoughttostayabreastwithdevelopmentselsewhere.Thescopeanddepthofthesereformswereaffected,however,bytheextenttowhichministerswantedtomaintainanactiveinvolvementinadministration(Aucoin1995).
Bycomparisontodevelopmentselsewhere,Canadianministerswerelessinclinedtoworryabouttheprofessionalpublicservicebeingunresponsivetotheirpoliticaldirection.Nonetheless,theMulroneyregimesawanexpansioninthenumber,rolesandinfluenceof‘politicalstaff’appointedtoministers’offices,mostnotablyinthePrimeMinister’sOffice(PMO).Thesestaff,whohavegrowncontinuouslyinnumberoverthepastfourdecades,arenotpublicservants,althoughtheyareemployedonthepublicpayroll.Unlikepublicservants,whoareappointedindependentlyofministers,politicalstaffareappointedanddismissedatthediscretionofministersand,ofcourse,theyhavenotenurebeyondtheirministers.And,inofficialconstitutionaldoctrine,theyhavenoseparateauthoritytodirectthepublicservice.IntheCanadiantradition,moreover,theyareappointedalmostexclusivelyfrompartisan-politicalcirclesandappointeesrarelypossessanypublicserviceexperience.
Forallthesereasons,theCanadiangovernmentdidnotgoasfardowntheNPMroadasitsthr