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1.Constitutions,ConstitutionalCourtsandConstitutionalInterpretationattheInterfaceofLawandPolitics

in:

B.Iancu（ed.）,TheLaw/PoliticsDistinctioninContemporaryAdjudication

Utrecht2009,S.21–34

（constitutionalcourtsattheinterfaceoflawandpolitics08-2008.doc）

2.ConstitutionalAdjudicationandDemocracy

M.Andenas（Hrsg.）,JudicalReviewinInternationalPerspective

LiberAmicoruminHonourofLordSlynnofHadleyBandII

DenHaag2000,S.103

（constitutionaladjudicationlib.pdf）

3.PoliticalParties

（politicalpartiesenglfueryale07-2006）

4.LevelsoftheRuleofLaw

（Levelsoftheruleoflawfinal15-12-09.doc）

5.TheDevelopmenttowardsaRights-OrientedLegalCultureinEurope

（rights-orientedlegalculturechina03-2007.doc）

6.HumanRightsandJudicialReviewinGermany

D.Beatty（Hrsg.）,HumanRightsandJudicialReview,Dordrecht1994,S.267

（grimmhumanrights.pdf）

7.ValuesinGermanConstitutionalLaw,DennisDavisu.a.（Hrsg.）-nochnichterschienen,

（valuesingermanconstlawAenderungen20-04-09.doc）

8.ProportionalityinCanadianandGermanConstitutionalJurisprudence

UniversityofTorontoLawJournal57（2007）,S.383–397

（proportionalityprintversion30-01-07.doc）

9.TheProtectiveFunctionoftheState

G.Nolte（Hrsg.）,EuropeanandUSConstitutionalism,Cambridge（England）2005,

S.137–155

（protectivefunctionofthestate12-2004.doc）

10.CivilLibertiesinanAgeofTerror

（http:

//www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-0A000F0A-935A2172/bst/Transatlantic%20Thinkers_Part_5_final.pdf）

Constitutions,ConstitutionalCourtsandConstitutionalInterpretationattheInterfaceofLawandPolitics

I.

1.BeforetheendofWorldWarIIconstitutionalcourtsorcourtswithconstitutionaljurisdictionwereararity.Althoughconstitutionshadbeeninplacelongbefore,aworldwidedemandforconstitutionaladjudicationaroseonlyaftertheexperienceswiththemanytotalitariansystemsofthe20thcentury.Thepost-totalitarianconstitutionalassembliesregardedjudicialreviewasthelogicalconsequenceofconstitutionalism.InaremarkablejudgmenttheIsraeliSupremeCourtsaidin1995:

"

Judicialreviewisthesouloftheconstitutionitself.Striptheconstitutionofjudicialreviewandyouhaveremoveditsverylife…Itisthereforenowonderthatjudicialreviewisnowdeveloping.Themajorityofenlighteneddemocraticstateshavejudicialreview…TheTwentiethCenturyisthecenturyofjudicialreview."

（UnitedMizrahiBankLtd.v.MigdalVillage,CivilAppealNo.6821/93,decided1995）.BasedonthisuniversaltrendtheIsraeliCourtclaimedthepowerofjudicialreviewalthoughithadnotbeenexplicitlyendowedwithitintheconstitution.

Yet,justasthetransitionfromabsoluteruletoconstitutionalismhadmodifiedtherelationshipbetweenlawandpolitics,thisrelationshipwasnowmodifiedbytheestablishmentofconstitutionalcourts.Aslongaslawwasregardedasbeingofdivineoriginpoliticsweresubmittedtolaw.Politicalpowerderiveditsauthorityfromthetasktomaintainandenforcedivinelaw,butdidnotincludetherighttomakelaw.WhentheReformationunderminedthedivinebasisofthelegalorderandledtothereligiouscivilwarsofthe16thand17thcenturytheinversionofthetraditionalrelationshipbetweenlawandpoliticswasregardedasapreconditionfortherestorationofsocialpeace.Thepoliticalruleracquiredthepowertomakelawregardlessofthecontestedreligioustruth.Lawbecameaproductofpolitics.ItderiveditsbindingforcenolongerfromGod’swillbutfromtheruler’swill.Itwashenceforthpositivelaw.Eternalornaturallaw,inspiteofitsname,wasnotlaw,butphilosophy.

Constitutionalismasitemergedinthelastquarterofthe18thcenturywasanattempttore-establishthesupremacyofthelaw,albeitundertheconditionthattherewasnoreturntodivineoreternallaw.Thesolutionoftheproblemconsistedinthereflexivityofpositivelaw.Makingandenforcingthelawwasitselfsubjectedtolegalregulation.Tomakethispossibleahierarchyhadtobeestablishedwithinthelegalsystem.Thelawthatregulatedlegislationandlaw-enforcementhadtobesuperiortothelawthatemanatesfromthepoliticalprocess.Yet,sincetherewasnoreturntodivinelawthehigherlawwasitselftheproductofapoliticaldecision.Butinordertofulfilitsfunctionofsubmittingpoliticstolawitneededasourcedifferentfromordinarypolitics.Inaccordancewiththetheorythat,intheabsenceofadivinebasisofrulershiptheonlypossiblelegitimizationofpoliticalpoweristheconsentofthegoverned,thissourcewasfoundinthepeople.Thepeoplereplacedtherulerassovereign,justasbeforetherulerhadreplacedGod.Buttheroleofthepopularsovereignwaslimitedtoenactingtheconstitutionwhiletheexerciseofpoliticalpowerwasentrustedtorepresentativesofthepeoplewhocouldactonlyonthebasisandwithintheframeworkoftheconstitution.

Hence,onecansaythattheveryessenceofconstitutionalismisthesubmissionofpoliticstolaw.Thisfunctiondistinguishesconstitutionallawfromordinarylawinvariousrespects.Thereis,first,adifferenceinobject.Theobjectofconstitutionallawispolitics.Constitutionallawregulatestheformationandexerciseofpoliticalpower.Thepowerholdersaretheaddresseesofconstitutionallaw.Secondly,constitutionalandordinarylawhavedifferentsources.Sinceconstitutionallawbringsforthlegitimatepoliticalpoweritcannotemanatefromthatsamepower.Itismadebyorattributedtothepeople.Consequently,themakingofconstitutionallawdiffers,thirdly,fromthemakingofordinarylaw.Itisusuallyaspecialbodythatformulatesconstitutionallawanditsadoptionissubjecttoaspecialprocedureinwhicheitherthepeopletakesthedecisionor,ifarepresentativebodyiscalledupontodecide,asupermajorityisrequired.

Fourthly,constitutionallawdiffersfromordinarylawinrank.Itishigherlaw.Incaseofconflictbetweenconstitutionallawandordinarylaworactsofordinarylawapplicationconstitutionallawtrumps.Whathasbeenregulatedintheconstitutionisnolongeropentopoliticaldecision.Insofar,themajorityruledoesnotapply.Thisdoesnotmeanatotaljuridificationofpolitics.Suchatotaljuridificationwouldbetheendofpoliticsandturnitintomereadministration.Constitutionallawdetermineswhoisentitledtotakepoliticaldecisionsandwhichproceduralandsubstantiveruleshehastoobserveinordertogivethesedecisionsbindingforce.Buttheconstitutionneitherpredeterminestheinputintotheconstitutionallyregulatedproceduresnortheiroutcome.Itregulatesthedecision-makingprocessbutleavesthedecisionsthemselvestothepoliticalprocess.Itisaframework,notasubstituteforpolitics.

Finally,constitutionallawischaracterizedbyacertainweaknesscomparedtoordinarylaw.Ordinarylawismadebygovernmentandappliestothepeople.Iftheydonotobeygovernmentisentitledtouseforce.Constitutionallaw,onthecontrary,ismadebyoratleastattributedtothepeopleasitsultimatesourceandappliestogovernment.Ifthegovernmentdoesnotcomplywiththerequirementsofconstitutionallawthereisnosuperiorpowertoenforceit.Thisweaknessmaydifferindegree,dependingonthefunctionoftheconstitution.Regardingtheconstitutivefunctionthestructureofpublicpowerwillusuallyconformtotheconstitutionalarrangement.Regardingitsfunctiontoregulatetheexerciseofpoliticalpowerthiscannotbetakenforgranted.Thehistoricalandactualevidenceisabundant.

2.Itwasthisweaknessthatgaverisetoconstitutionaladjudication,intheUnitedStatessoonaftertheinventionofconstitutionalism,inEuropeandotherpartsoftheworldonlyafterthecollapseofthefascistandracist,socialistandmilitarydictatorshipsbeginninginthe1950sandculminatinginthe1990s.Althoughmanyofthesesystemshadconstitutionstheirimpactwasminimal,andinvokingconstitutionalrightscouldbedangeroustocitizens.Inthelightofthisexperienceconstitutionalcourtsweregenerallyregardedasanecessarycompletionofconstitutionalism.Iftheveryessenceofconstitutionalismisthesubmissionofpoliticstolaw,theveryessenceofconstitutionaladjudicationistoenforceconstitutionallawvis-à

-visgovernment.Thisimpliesjudicialreviewofpoliticalactsincludinglegislation.However,constitutionalcourtsorcourtswithconstitutionaljurisdictioncannotfullycompensatefortheweaknessofconstitutionallaw.Sincethepowertousephysicalforceremainsinthehandsofthepoliticalbranchesofgovernment,courtsarehelplesswhenpoliticiansrefusetocomplywiththeconstitutionordisregardcourtorders.

Butapartfromthissituation,whichisexceptionalinawell-functioningliberaldemocracywithadeeply-rootedsensefortheruleoflaw,itmakesadifferencewhetherapoliticalsystemadoptsconstitutionaladjudicationornot.Evenagovernmentthatisgenerallywillingtocomplywiththeconstitutionwillbebiasedregardingthequestionwhatexactlytheconstitutionforbidsorrequiresinacertainsituation.Politicianstendtointerprettheconstitutioninthelightoftheirpoliticalinterestsandintentions.Inasystemwithoutconstitutionaladjudicationusuallytheinterpretationofthemajorityprevails.Inthelongrunthiswillunderminetheachievementofconstitutionalism.Bycontrast,inasystemwithconstitutionaladjudicationaninstitutionexiststhatdoesnotpursuepoliticalintentions,isnotsubjecttoelectionandspecializesonconstitutionalin