管理会计M23HORN555323SEC23Word下载.docx

管理会计M23HORN555323SEC23Word下载.docx

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Marketshare,customersatisfaction.

Internal-business-processesperspective:

Manufacturingleadtime,yield,on-timeperformance,numberofnewproductlaunches,andnumberofnewpatentsfiled.

Learning-and-growthperspective:

employeesatisfaction,information-systemavailability.

23-2Thesixstepsindesigninganaccounting-basedperformancemeasureare:

1.Chooseperformancemeasuresthatalignwithtopmanagement’sfinancialgoals

2.ChoosethetimehorizonofeachperformancemeasureinStep1

3.ChooseadefinitionofthecomponentsineachperformancemeasureinStep1

4.ChooseameasurementalternativeforeachperformancemeasureinStep1

5.Chooseatargetlevelofperformance

6.Choosethetimingoffeedback

23-3TheDuPontmethodhighlightsthatROIisincreasedbyanyactionthatincreasesreturnonsalesorinvestmentturnover.ROIincreaseswith:

1.increasesinrevenues,

2.decreasesincosts,or

3.decreasesininvestments,

whileholdingtheothertwofactorsconstant.

23-4Yes.Residualincome（RI）isnotidenticaltoreturnoninvestment（ROI）.ROIisapercentagewithinvestmentasthedenominatorofthecomputation.RIisanabsolutemonetaryamountwhichincludesanimputedinterestchargebasedoninvestment.

23-5Disagree.Itusestheweightedaveragecostofcapitalofthefirmwhichwillincludethecostofequityaswellasthecostofdebt.Economicvalueadded（EVA）isaspecifictypeofresidualincomemeasurethatiscalculatedasfollows:

=

–

23-6DefinitionsofinvestmentusedinpracticewhencomputingROIare:

1.Totalassetsavailable

2.Totalassetsemployed

3.Totalassetsemployedminuscurrentliabilities

4.Stockholders’equity

23-7Disagree.Currentcostisthecostofpurchasinganassettodayidenticaltotheonecurrentlyheldifanidenticalassetcancurrentlybepurchased;

itisthecostofpurchasinganassetthatprovidesservicesliketheonecurrentlyheldifanidenticalassetcannotbepurchased.Historical-cost-basedmeasuresofROIcomputetheassetbaseastheoriginalpurchasecostofanassetminusanyaccumulateddepreciation.

Somecommentatorsarguethatcurrentcostisorientedtocurrentprices,whilehistoricalcostispast-oriented.

23-8Specialproblemsarisewhenevaluatingtheperformanceofdivisionsinmultinationalcompaniesbecause

a.Theeconomic,legal,political,social,andculturalenvironmentsdiffersignificantlyacrosscountries.

b.Governmentsinsomecountriesmayimposecontrolsandlimitsellingpricesofproducts.

c.Availabilityofmaterialsandskilledlabor,aswellascostsofmaterials,labor,andinfrastructuremaydiffersignificantlyacrosscountries.

d.Divisionsoperatingindifferentcountrieskeepscoreoftheirperformanceindifferentcurrencies.

23-9Insomecases,thesubunit’sperformancemaynotbeagoodindicatorofamanager’sperformance.Forexample,companiesoftenputthemostskillfuldivisionmanagerinchargeoftheweakestdivisioninanattempttoimprovetheperformanceoftheweakdivision.Suchaneffortmayyieldresultsinyears,notmonths.Thedivisionmaycontinuetoperformpoorlywithrespecttootherdivisionsofthecompany.Butitwouldbeamistaketoconcludefromthepoorperformanceofthedivisionthatthemanagerisperformingpoorly.

Asecondexampleofthedistinctionbetweentheperformanceofthemanagerandtheperformanceofthesubunitistheuseofhistoricalcost-basedROIstoevaluatethemanagereventhoughhistoricalcost-basedROIsmaybeunsatisfactoryforevaluatingtheeconomicreturnsearnedbytheorganizationsubunit.Historicalcost-basedROIcanbeusedtoevaluateamanagerbycomparingactualresultstobudgetedhistoricalcost-basedROIs.

23-10Moralhazarddescribessituationsinwhichanemployeepreferstoexertlesseffort（ortoreportdistortedinformation）comparedwiththeeffort（oraccurateinformation）desiredbytheownerbecausetheemployee’seffort（orvalidityofthereportedinformation）cannotbeaccuratelymonitoredandenforced.

23-11No,rewardingmanagersonthebasisoftheirperformancemeasuresonly,suchasROI,subjectsthemtouncontrollableriskbecausemanagers’performancemeasuresarealsoaffectedbyrandomfactorsoverwhichtheyhavenocontrol.Amanagermayputinagreatdealofeffortbutherperformancemeasuremaynotreflectthiseffortifitisnegativelyaffectedbyvariousrandomfactors.Thus,whenmanagersarecompensatedonthebasisofperformancemeasures,theywillneedtobecompensatedfortakingonextrarisk.Therefore,whenperformance-basedincentivesareused,theyaregenerallymorecostlytotheowner.Themotivationforhavingsomesalaryandsomeperformance-basedbonusincompensationarrangementsistobalancethebenefitsofincentivesagainsttheextracostsofimposinguncontrollableriskonthemanager.

23-12Benchmarkingorrelativeperformanceevaluationistheprocessofevaluatingamanager’sperformanceagainsttheperformanceofothersimilaroperations.Theidealbenchmarkisanotheroperationthatisaffectedbythesamenoncontrollablefactorsthataffectthemanager’sperformance.Benchmarkingcancelstheeffectsofthecommonnoncontrollablefactorsandprovidesbetterinformationaboutthemanager'

sperformance.

23-13Whenemployeeshavetoperformmultipletasksaspartoftheirjobs,incentiveproblemscanarisewhenonetaskiseasytomonitorandmeasurewhiletheothertaskismoredifficulttoevaluate.Employerswantemployeestointelligentlyallocatetimeandeffortamongvarioustasks.If,however,employeesarerewardedonthebasisofthetaskthatismoreeasilymeasured,theywilltendtofocustheireffortsonthattaskandignoretheothers.

23-14DisclosuresrequiredbytheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionare:

a.Asummarycompensationtableshowingthesalary,bonus,stockoptions,otherstockawards,andothercompensationearnedbythefivetopofficersinthepreviousthreeyears

b.Theprinciplesunderlyingtheexecutivecompensationplans,andtheperformancecriteria,suchasprofitability,salesgrowth,andmarketshareusedindeterminingcompensation

c.Howwellacompany’sstockperformedrelativetothestocksofothercompaniesinthesameindustry

23-15Thefourleversofcontrolinanorganizationarediagnosticcontrolsystems,boundarysystems,beliefsystems,andinteractivecontrolsystems.

∙Diagnosticcontrolsystemsarethesetofcriticalperformancevariablesthathelpmanagerstrackprogresstowardthestrategicgoal.Thesemeasuresareperiodicallymonitoredandactionisusuallyonlytakenifameasureisoutsideitsacceptablelimits.

∙Boundarysystemsdescribestandardsofbehaviorandcodesofconductexpectedofallemployees,particularlybydefiningactionsthatareoff-limits.Boundarysystemspreventemployeesfromperformingharmfulactions.

∙Beliefsystemsarticulatethemission,purpose,andcorevaluesofacompany.Theydescribetheacceptednormsandpatternsofbehaviorexpectedofallmanagersandotheremployeeswithrespecttoeachother,shareholders,customers,andcommunities.

∙Interactivecontrolsystemsareformalinformationsystemsthatmanagersusetofocusanorganization’sattentionandlearningonkeystrategicissues.Theyformthebasisofongoingdiscussionanddebateaboutstrategicuncertaintiesthatthebusinessfacesandhelppositiontheorganizationfortheopportunitiesandthreatsoftomorrow.

23-16（30min.）ROI,comparisonsofthreecompanies.

1.Theseparatecomponentshighlightseveralfeaturesofreturnoninvestmentnotrevealedbyasinglecalculation:

a.Theimportanceofinvestmentturnoverasakeytoincomeisstressed.

b.Theimportanceofrevenuesisexplicitlyrecognized.

c.Theimportantcomponentsareexpressedasratiosorpercentagesinsteadofdollarfigures.Thisformofexpressionoftenenhancescomparabilityofdifferentdivisions,businesses,andtimeperiods.

d.ThebreakdownstressesthepossibilityoftradingoffinvestmentturnoverforincomeasapercentageofrevenuessoastoincreasetheaverageROIatagivenlevelofoutput.

2.（Filled-inblanksareinboldface.）

CompaniesinSameIndustry

A

B

C

Revenue

Income

Investment

Incomeasa%ofrevenue

Investmentturnover

Returnoninvestment

$1,000,000

$100,000

$500,000

10%

2.0

20%

$500,000

$50,000

$5,000,000

0.1

1%

$10,000,000

$5,000,000

0.5%

2.0

IncomeandinvestmentaloneshedlittlelightoncomparativeperformancesbecauseofdisparitiesinsizebetweenCompanyAandtheothertwocompanies.Thus,itisimpossibletosaywhetherB'

slowreturnoninvestmentincomparisonwithA’sisattributabletoitslargerinvestmentortoitslowerincome.Furthermore,thefactthatCompaniesBandChaveidenticalincomeandinvestmentmaysuggestthatthesameconditionsunderliethelowROI,butthisconclusioniserroneous.Bhashighermarginsbutalowerinvestmentturnover.Chasverysmallmargins（1/20thofB）butturnsoverinvestment20timesfaster.

I.M.A.ReportNo.35（page35）states:

“Introducingrevenuestomeasurelevelofoperationshelpstodisclosespecificareasformoreintensiveinvestigation.CompanyBdoesaswellasCompanyAintermsofincomemargin,forbothcompaniesearn10%onrevenues.ButCompanyBhasamuchlowerturnoverofinvestmentthandoesCompanyA.WhereasadollarofinvestmentinCompanyAsupportstwodollarsinrevenues