对信息披露和财务报表关注的有限性文献翻译Word格式.docx

对信息披露和财务报表关注的有限性文献翻译Word格式.docx

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外文翻译

题目我国上市公司资产质量信息的披露研究

专业会计学

外文题目Limitedattention,Information

DisclosureandFinancialReporting

外文出处FisherCollegeofBusiness

外文作者DavidHirshleiferandSiewHongTeoh

原文：

Limitedattention,InformationDisclosureandFinancialReporting

Abstract

Thispapermodelsfirms’choicesbetweenalternativemeansofpresentinginformation,andtheeffectsofdifferentpresentationsonmarketpriceswheninvestorshavelimitedattentionandprocessingpower.Inamarketequilibriumwithpartiallyattentiveinvestors,weexaminetheeffectsofalternative:

levelsofdiscretioninproformaearningsdisclosure,methodsofaccountingforemployeeoptioncompensation,anddegreesofaggregationinreporting.Wederiveempiricalimplicationsrelatingproformaadjustments,optioncompensation,thegrowth,persistence,andinformativenessofearnings,short-runmanagerialincentives,andotherfirmcharacteristicstostockpricereactions,misevaluation,long-runabnormalreturns,andcorporatedecisions.

KeyWords:

limitedattention,behavioralaccounting,investorpsychology,capitalmarkets,accountingregulation,disclosure,marketefficiency

1Introduction

Firmsandregulatorscarenotjustabouttheinformationmadepubliclyavailabletoinvestors,buttheforminwhichitisrevealed.Oneissueofgreatconcerntopractitionersiswhetherinformationitemsshouldberecognizedaspartofearnings,ormerelydisclosedasafootnote.Anotheristheprominencewithwhichdifferentkindsofinformationaredisplayedinfinancialstatements.Thereisalsointenseconcernastotheformofdisclosure,evenwhentheinformationcontentofthealternativeformatsisidentical.Evidentlyregulatorsandcommentatorsthinkthatinvestorsareimperfectprocessorsofpubliclyavailableinformation.Suchconcernsarereflectedinthestructureofaccountingregulation,andinpoliticallychargeddebatesoversuchissuesasmergeraccounting,whetheremployeeoptioncompensationshouldbeexpensed,andtowhatextentfirmsshouldbefreetomakeproformadisclosuresthatdifferfromGAAPdefinitionsofearnings.

Incontrast,inexistinganalyticresearchonfinancialreporting,thechoicebetweenrecognitionversusdisclosure,andbetweenequivalentformsofdisclosureorreporting,hasnoeffectoninvestorperceptions.Inexistingmodelsofreporting,investorsarefullyrational,andmarketpricesaresetefficientlytoreflectallpubliclyavailableinformation.Thisapproachhasprovidedimportantinsightsintotheinterplayoffinancialreporting,optimalcontracts,andcapitalmarkets.However,fromtheperspectiveofthistraditionalapproach,thepassionateinterestofpractitionersintheregulationofinformationallyequivalentdisclosuresandreportsisamajorpuzzle.

Thispaperoffersanapproachtotheanalyticalmodelingoffinancialreportinganddisclosurethatencompassestheseissues.Ourapproachdepartsfromexistingtheoryinassumingthatinvestorshavelimitedattentionandprocessingpower.Animmediatebutfar-reachingconsequenceoflimitedattentionisthatinformationallyequivalentdisclosurescanhavedifferenteffectsoninvestorperceptions,dependingontheformofpresentation.Limitedattentionhasimplicationsfornon-equivalentdisclosuresaswell.

Inourmodel,owingtolimitstoinvestorattention,informationthatispresentedinsalient,easilyprocessedformisassumedtobeabsorbedmoreeasilythaninformationthatislesssalient,orthatisonlyimplicitinthepublicinformationset.Thus,investorsneglectrelevantaspectsoftheeconomicenvironmentstheyface.Forexample,investorsmayneglectthedistinctivefeaturesofdifferentdivisionsofadiversifiedfirm,ormaynotadequatelyadjusttheirinterpretationsofdisclosurestotakeintoaccountthestrategicincentivesoffirmstomanipulateobservers’perceptions.Wemodelthesepossibilitiesbyassumingthateachinvestorhasonlyaprobabilityofattendingtotherelevantconsideration.Furthermore,weassumethatinvestorsareriskaverse,sothathighlyattentiveinvestorsarelimitedintheextenttowhichtheyarewillingtobearriskinordertoexploitmispricing.

Inattentionseemsfoolishinoursetting,asinattentiveinvestorslosemoneybyignoringaspectsoftheeconomicenvironment.However,iftimeandattentionarecostly,suchbehaviormaybereasonable.

Todisplaysomeoftherangeofrelevanceoflimitedattentionforreportingandforreporting-relateddisclosure,weapplythisapproachtothreespecificcontexts.Theseapplicationsshowhowtheapproachcanhelpexplainpuzzlingstylizedfacts,generateuntestedempiricalimplications,andsuggestpossibleconsiderationsforpolicy.Themodelingisstark,andwehopewillstimulatemoregeneralanalysesoftheconsequencesoflimitedattentionandreportingchoices.

Thefirstapplicationistoproformaearningsdisclosure.Weconsidertheeffectofdiscretioninfirms’disclosureofnon-GAAPearningsmeasuresinproformaearningsannouncements.Wefindthatproformadisclosuresbiasinvestors’perceptionsupwards,yetcanmakestockpricesmoreaccuratelyreflectfundamentalvalue.

Thesecondapplicationistoanissueoftimingallocation,thepossiblereportingofemployeestockoptioncompensationasanexpenseatthetimethattheoptionsaregranted.Wetakeasapremisethatthecompensationmustbedisclosedupfront,andexaminehowthefailuretoexpensethiscompensationpriortooptionexercisecancauseovervaluation,andinducearelationbetweenthesizeofthiscompensationandsubsequentabnormalstockreturns.However,theanalysisalsopredictsthatfullexpensingoftheseoptionswouldcausemarketundervaluation,consistentwiththevigorousprotestsofhigh-techfirmsagainsttheexpensingoftheseoptions.Surprisingly,theanalysisfurtherimpliesthattheexpensingrulethatsupportsaccuratemarketvaluationsdependsonthepersistenceofearnings.Asimilarimplicationwouldalsoapplymoregenerallytotheexpensingofaccountingitemswhenlumpyexpendituresgeneratebenefitsoverseveralsubsequentreportingperiods.

Thefinalapplicationistoanissueofaggregationinfinancialreporting.Weexaminetheeffectsoninvestorperceptionsofsegmentreportingversusaggregatereportingversusdivestitureinadiversifiedfirm.Wefindthatduringperiodsofhighforeseengeneralearningsgrowth,investorswhofocusontherecentgrowthrateofafirm’saggregateearningswilltendtooverweightlowgrowthsegmentsattheexpenseofhighgrowthsegments,andinconsequencewilltendtoundervaluethefirm.Moreimportantly,themodelsuggestsadirectionforanalyzingreportingaggregationwhenattentionislimited.

Thereisaremarkabledisjunctionintheaccountingliteraturebetweentheexperimentalresearchversusanalyticalmodelsoffinancialinformationprocessing.Experimentalresearchhasprovidedaprovocativearrayofevidencethatbothnaiveandsophisticatedinvestorsandprofessionalanalystsaresystematicallybiasedintheirinterpretationofaccountingdata,andthatthesebiasesaffectmarketprices.AsLibby,Bloomfield,andNelson（2002）describetheevidence,

…theinformationthatdecisionmakersrelyuponintheirjudgmentsislimited,andtheinformationemphasizedclearlychangesdependingonthefinancialjudgmentbeingmade,andotherelementsoftheenvironment.Infact,awarenessofcosmeticdifferences（andabilityto‘dothemath’）doesnotensurefullconsiderationoftheirimplicationsforvaluation.Thesameistrueofknowledgeofmanagement’stendencytoopportunisticallyemployvaguereportingstandardsoranalysts’tendencytobiastheirreports.

Furthermore,inaninsightfulrecentdiscussion,Bloomfield（2002）suggeststhatfailuresininformationprocessingcanhelpexplainempiricalpatternsrelatedtoaccountinginformation.

Incontrast,analyticalmodelsofdisclosureandreporting,oftenpublishedinthesamejournalswithoutreferencetotheexperimentalliterature,havealmostuniformlyassumedfullrationalityofdecisionsandpricing.Onegoalofthispaperistobeginthesearchforcomplementaritiesbetweentheinsightsderivedfromexperimentalstudyandthroughanalyticalmodelinginaccounting.

Therearesomeimportantexceptionstotheassumptionofperfectinformationprocessinginaccountingmodelsofreportingordisclosure.Bushman,Gigler,andIndjejikian（1996）analyzetheeffectsofSECproposalsfortwo-tieredfinancialreportingwheninvestorsprocessfinancialreportsinordertogenerateprivateinformation.Ourfocusisnotonskillingeneratingnewprivatesignals,butoninvestors’failuretotakeintoaccountcertainaspectsoftheirdecisionenvironment.

IntheheuristictradingmodelsofdisclosureofFischerandVerrecchia（1999）andVerrecchia（2001）,‘heuristicinvestors’areassumedtoeitherunder-orover-reacttoaninformationsignal.FischerandVerrecchiathenexploretheconditionsunderwhichheuristicinvestorscansurviveincompetitionwithrationalBayesianinvestors.Theyofferageneralanalysisoftheprofitabilityofdifferentformsofirrationaltrading.Theiranalysisimplicitlyallowsforlimitedattentionbyallowingforthepossibilitythatsomeinvestorsunderreacttothepublicsignal.

Webuildupontheseimportantcontributionsbyallowingforformsofinvestorerrorsnotpresentintheheuristictradermodels.Inourapproach,errorsderivefromafailureofinvestorstoattendtosomenon-salientorhard-to-processaspectoftheeconomicenvironment,whichneednotbeanewly-arrivedsignal（seealsofootnote3）.Ourmodelingfocusisalsodifferent;

weexaminetheeffectsoflimitedattentioninspecificdisclosureandrepo