Two Sides of the Metaethical Mountaindrsrevcor.docx

Two Sides of the Metaethical Mountaindrsrevcor.docx

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TwoSidesoftheMetaethicalMountaindrsrevcor

TwoSidesoftheMeta-EthicalMountain?

PeterRailton

Introduction

DerekParfit’sOnWhatMattersisabookthatmatters.Itisacontributiontosystematicethicsofsuchsweepandcumulativeargumentativeforcethatitwillhaveacentralroleindebatesinmoralphilosophyforyearstocome.ThereisagreatdealinOnWhatMattersthatIfindcompelling.Inanagemarkedbyratherstarkoppositionsbetween“Kantian”and“Humean”approachestoethics,or“Deontologist”and“Consequentialist”normativetheories,OnWhatMattersachievesaremarkablesynthesis.Foritsuggeststhattheseapproaches,properlyunderstood—andthereforeliberatedtosomeextentfromanumberoftheircontemporaryadvocates—mightbeseenasclimbingdifferentsidesofthesamemountain,tofindthemselvesunitedatthesummit.

Inmeta-ethics,however,Parfitseesthingsdifferently.Naturalistsnevergetbeyondthefoothillsofnormativity.Whentheytrytoscaletheheights,thebottomlesscreviceofNihilismawaitsthem,notre-unionwiththeParfitianNon-Naturalist:

“Normativityiseitheranillusion,orinvolvesirreduciblynormativefacts”（267）.WereNaturalismtobeouronlyoption,Parfitwrites,muchofhisphilosophicallife,aswellasmuchofthelivesofsuchgreatmodernmoralphilosophersasSidgwickandRoss,wouldhavebeen“wasted”（303-304）.Worse,“wewouldhavelearntthatnothingmatters”（367）.

ThissadthoughtismadeallthemorepoignantbythefactthatParfitseesthesituationasasymmetric.Eveniftheyprovewrongonmattersmeta-ethical—asitseemswemusthopetheyare—thegreatNaturalistsofthepastsuchasHobbes,Hume,Bentham,andMillwillnothavewastedtheirphilosophicallives:

theywillhavetaughtussomethingaboutthenaturalreason-givingfeaturesoftheworld.Thatis,theNaturalistsmighthavedescribedeverythingthatisofgenuinenormativeimportance—pleasuresandpains,well-being,Mill’s“permanentinterestsofmanasaprogressivebeing”,andsoon—eventhoughthenatureofnormativityitselfaltogethereludedthem.Thenon-naturalnormativepropertiesandfactsParfitinsistsupon,heexplains,themselveshavenosuchimportance.Theyservetoformulatereasons-relations,butdonotgive“anyfurtherreason”foractingintheirownright（279-280）.

The“decisivebattlefield”

Thus,wemightbeawareofpleasureandpain,wealandwoe,hopeanddespair,helpingandharming,truthandfalsehood—everythingofthatisofnormativeimportance—yetabsentrecognitionofindependentreasonsrelations,“thatimportancewouldbeunknowntous—asitisunknown,forexample,tosomeactive,intelligentcat”（288）.WereItosay,‘Youwouldenjoythisbook’or‘Yourwineispoisoned’,thiswould“tellyoufactsthatwouldgiveyoureasonsforacting”,whichyoumighttaketoheartandbegladyoudid,butthiscouldnotconstitutegenuineadvice—forthatweneedtheirreduciblynormativeconceptofreasonsforacting（281）.

Ofcourse,manyNaturalistswouldaccepttheexistence—andusefulness—ofirreduciblynormativeconcepts,preciselyforsuchpurposesasreflectingindividuallyortogetheronwhatmatters,anddeliberating,deciding,andadvisingaboutwhattothinkorfeelordo.Theyalsoaccepttheexistenceofsubstantivetruthsinvolvingtheseconcepts.Parfitcallssuchviews“Soft”Non-AnalyticNaturalism,andParfithimselfhassometimesseentheinitialplausibilityinsuchaposition,despitehislongyearsofadamantresistancetoNaturalism（349）.MoreoverheallowsthatNaturalistsofvariouskindsmightbeabletogiveaplausibleaccountofsuchformsofnormativityasthenormativityofcorrectness（includingtruthorfalsityforbelieforcorrectnessforassertion,266）,rules,customs,laws,meaning,well-being,andevenbeauty,rationality（intheproceduralsense）,andmoralrightness（intheattitude-orpractice-basedsense）—indeed,asthesenotionsareoftenunderstood（267-269）.

Butexplainingtheseisnotthe“decisivebattlefield”inmeta-ethics（269）.Noristhebattleoverwhatweordinarilyhaveinmindwhenmakingnormativejudgments.Rather,itconcernswhatweshouldhaveinmind,atleast,whenthinkingatthemostfundamentallevelofnormativereflection（272）.Andthatistheideaofunqualifiedreasons—reasonsfullstop.Itis‘reasons’inthissensethatenableusintelligiblytoask,ofanyoftheseothernormativecategories,Dowe,intheend,havesufficientreasontotakethemseriously—toguideourlivesbytheserules,procedures,attitudes,orpractices,ortoholdourselvestothesestandardsofcorrectness?

Thisisthe“reason-involving”or“reason-implying”senseofnormativity,thesenseinwhichitimpliestheexistenceof“somereasonorapparentreason”（268）.Andthisiswherethebuckstopswhenweareaskingwhatreallymatters—orseekingdecisiveguidanceastowhatweoughttothinkanddo.

Thus,aNaturalistmightbeabletogiveanaccountofmoralityinsomethinglikethesenseinwhichHumeunderstoodit（310）—thesenseinwhichitisembodiedinaconstellationofhumanattitudes,traitsofcharacter,norms,practices,andconcernsasgroundedinrelationshipsofmutualcooperationandshareddiscussionandrestraint,whichpromotethe“generalinterest”andearnourreflectiveapprovalandmotivatedcommitmentbymakingourlivesgobetter.ButacceptingthatsomethingismoralinthissensedoesnotlogicallyimplythatIhavesufficientreasontotakeitsvaluesorinjunctionsasaction-guiding.ImightdecidethatIshoulddoso,eventhatitwouldbeaterriblemistakenotto,buttheningivingthisanswerIamtobeunderstoodasansweringanormativequestionneitherposednorprecludedbytheoriginalstandardsthemselves.Fortunately,Parfitbelievesthatthereareobjective,externalreasons,independentofwhatwehappentocareaboutorfindmotivating,andthatthesereasonscanspeakonbehalfofmorality.Andbecausetheyarereasonsfullstop,IcannotinasimilarwayaskameaningfulnormativequestionaboutwhetherIoughttoheedthem.FortoasksuchaquestionissimplytoaskwhetherIhavesufficientreasonforsodoing.

Nowitmightseemthatwecouldasksuchaquestion,preciselybecausethesereasonsareexternal.Wemightseethatanactissupportedbyexternalreasons,yetfindthatthesereasonssimplydonotspeaktousandourdeepestconcerns.Butregardingwhatactuallyorreflectivelymovesus,orisendorsedbyus,Parfitwrites:

Thereis,Ibelieve,nonormativityhere.Anirresistibleimpulseisnotanormativereason.Norisanimpulsemaderationalbyitsabilitytosurvivereflectiononthefacts.Evenaftercarefullyconsideringthefacts,wemightfindourselvesirresistiblyimpelledtoactincrazyways.[291]

Afterall,someonemightfindthatbloodyrevengeiswhatspeakstohim—evenafterfullreflection,andevenattheacknowledgedcostofanyhopeoffuturehappinessforallconcerned.Ifso,andifheexactsvengeanceasaresult,heisactingwithnoreasonandmakinga“terriblemistake”（437,292）.“Thereissomethingelse,andsomethingbetter,fornormativitytobe”（285）.Indeed,eventhehard-core“Internalist”whodisagreesisinfactmakingacontrary“external”orobjectiveclaim—aclaimaboutwhatreasonsthereare,fullstop.Parfitconcludes,“Toavoidconfusion,weshouldusethephrase‘areason’onlyinitsexternal,irreduciblynormativesense”（290）.

Conceptsandproperties:

theSoftNaturalist’sDilemma

Parfitarguesatlengththat,atthecoreofthedisputebetweentheNon-NaturalismaboutreasonshefavorsandNon-Analytic,SoftNaturalism—hereinafterwhatIwillmeanby‘Naturalism’whenusedwithoutqualification—liesinaseeminglyrathersubtlequestion.Namely,whetherstatementslike:

（A）Whatwehavemostreasontodoistomaximizehappiness

admitareadinginwhichtheycancoherentlybeunderstoodassyntheticpropertyidentities,inwhichtwoconcepts,onenormative（）andonenatural（）,pickoutoneandthesamenaturalproperty,maximizinghappiness,withoutanyintermediationbyanon-naturalproperty.SuchareadingwouldpermittheNaturalisttoacceptthatnormativeconceptscannotbereducedtonaturalconcepts,whileatthesametimehavingnoneedtoenlargehermetaphysicsbeyondnaturalproperties.Thepropertymaximizinghappinesswoulddodoubleduty,descriptive/explanatoryandnormative.Inconsequence,theNaturalist’sontologywouldnotneedtoadmitirreduciblynon-naturalproperties.Onsuchareading,aNaturalistwhoadheredto（A）couldbesayingthatanact’srightness“consistsin”itsmaximizationofhappiness,orthat,tomaximizehappiness“iswhatitisfor”anacttoberight.（A）,iftrue,wouldbeasynthetic,substantivetruth,discoveredaposteriori.

Ananalogywouldbewitha“Soft”Materialismaccordingwhich,forexample,thepropertyofhavingC-fibersfiringcandodoubleduty,figuringinphysiologicalexplanationsofneurologicalandbehavioralphenomena,ontheonehand,andasthereferentforthementalconceptandtruth-makerforpainascriptions,ontheother.ThiswouldallowtheMaterialisttorecognizethedistinctiveinferentialandconceptualrolesofmentalascriptions—situatingtalkof‘pain’withinthecommonsensicalmentalisticconceptualframework.ItwouldalsoaccountfortheaposteriorinatureofthediscoverythatpainconsistsinC-fiberfiring,whileatthesametimepositingnoirreduciblymentalpropertiesorsubstances.

Anotheranalogywouldbewitha“Soft”Physicalismaccordingtowhichthemicrophysicalpropertyofasystemhavingacertainmeanmolecularkineticenergycandodoubleduty,figuringinthermodynamicalexplanatio