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OnJuly21,2002,WorldComGroup,atelecommunicationscompanywithmorethan$30billionin
revenues,$104billioninassets,and60,000employees,filedforbankruptcyprotectionunder
Chapter11oftheU.S.BankruptcyCode.Between1999and2002,WorldComhadoverstateditspre-
taxincomebyatleast$7billion,adeliberatemiscalculationthatwas,atthetime,thelargestin
history.Thecompanysubsequentlywrotedownabout$82billion(morethan75%)ofitsreported
assets.2WorldCom’sstock,oncevaluedat$180billion,becamenearlyworthless.Seventeenthousand
employeeslosttheirjobs;
manyleftthecompanywithworthlessretirementaccounts.Thecompany’s
bankruptcyalsojeopardizedservicetoWorldCom’s20millionretailcustomersandongovernment
contractsaffecting80millionSocialSecuritybeneficiaries,airtrafficcontrolfortheFederalAviation
Association,networkmanagementfortheDepartmentofDefense,andlong-distanceservicesfor
bothhousesofCongressandtheGeneralAccountingOffice.
Background
WorldCom’soriginscanbetracedtothe1983breakupofAT&
T.Small,regionalcompaniescould
nowgainaccesstoAT&
T’slong-distancephonelinesatdeeplydiscountedrates.3LDDS(anacronym
forLongDistanceDiscountServices)beganoperationsin1984,offeringservicestolocalretailand
commercialcustomersinsouthernstateswherewell-establishedlong-distancecompanies,suchas
MCIandSprint,hadlittlepresence.LDDS,likeotherofthesesmallregionalcompanies,paidtouse
orleasefacilitiesbelongingtothirdparties.Forexample,acallfromanLDDScustomerin
NewOrleanstoDallasmightinitiateonalocalphonecompany’sline,flowtoLDDS’sleased
network,andthentransfertoaDallaslocalphonecompanytobecompleted.LDDSpaidboththe
1MatthewBakarak,“ReportsDetailWorldComExecs’Domination,”APOnline,June9,2003.
2WorldCom’swritedownwas,atthetime,thesecondlargestinU.S.history,surpassedonlybythe$101billionwritedown
takenbyAOLTimeWarnerin2002.
3LynneW.Jeter,Disconnected:
deceitandbetrayalatWorldCom(Hoboken,NJ:
JohnWiley&
Sons,2003),pp.17–18.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
ProfessorRobertS.KaplanandSeniorResearcherDavidKiron,GlobalResearchGroup,preparedthiscase.Thecasewasdevelopedfrom
publishedsourcesanddrawsheavilyfromDennisR.Beresford,NicholasdeB.Katzenbach,andC.B.Rogers,Jr.,“ReportofInvestigation,”
SpecialInvestigativeCommitteeoftheBoardofDirectorsofWorldCom,Inc.,March31,2003.Referencestothisreportareidentifiedby
alphabeticletterswhichrefertoinformationintheendnotes.HBScasesaredevelopedsolelyasthebasisforclassdiscussion.Casesarenot
intendedtoserveasendorsements,sourcesofprimarydata,orillustrationsofeffectiveorineffectivemanagement.
Copyright©
2004,2005,2007PresidentandFellowsofHarvardCollege.Toordercopiesorrequestpermissiontoreproducematerials,call1-
800-545-7685,writeHarvardBusinessSchoolPublishing,Boston,MA02163,orgotohttp:
//www.hbsp.harvard.edu.Nopartofthispublication
maybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,usedinaspreadsheet,ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans—electronic,mechanical,
photocopying,recording,orotherwise—withoutthepermissionofHarvardBusinessSchool.
ThisdocumentisauthorizedforuseonlyinORG500-FoundationsofEffectiveManagementbyVariousfrom
December2009toMay2010.
104-071
NewOrleansandDallasphonecompanyprovidersforusingtheirlocalnetworks,andthe
telecommunicationscompanywhoselong-distancenetworkitleasedtoconnectNewOrleansto
Dallas.Theseline-costexpenseswereasignificantcostforalllong-distancecarriers.
LDDSstartedwithabout$650,000incapitalbutsoonaccumulated$1.5millionindebtsinceit
lackedthetechnicalexpertisetohandletheaccountsoflargecompaniesthathadcomplexswitching
systems.ThecompanyturnedtoBernardJ.(Bernie)Ebbers,oneofitsoriginalnineinvestors,torun
things.Ebbershadpreviouslybeenemployedasamilkman,bartender,barbouncer,carsalesman,
truckdriver,garmentfactoryforeman,highschoolbasketballcoach,andhotelier.Whilehelacked
technologyexperience,Ebberslaterjokedthathismostusefulqualificationwasbeing“themeanest
SOBtheycouldfind.”4Ebberstooklessthanayeartomakethecompanyprofitable.
Ebbersfocusedtheyoungfirmoninternalgrowth,acquiringsmalllong-distancecompanieswith
limitedgeographicserviceareasandconsolidatingthird-tierlong-distancecarrierswithlarger
marketshares.Thisstrategydeliveredeconomiesofscalethatwerecriticalinthecrowdedlong-
distanceresellingmarket.“Becausethevolumeofbandwidthdeterminedthecosts,moremoney
couldbemadebyacquiringlargerpipes,whichloweredperunitcosts,”oneobserverremarked.5
LDDSgrewrapidlythroughacquisitionsacrosstheAmericanSouthandWestandexpanded
internationallythroughacquisitionsinEuropeandLatinAmerica.(SeeExhibit1foraselectionof
mergersbetween1991and2002.)In1989,LDDSbecameapubliccompanythroughamergerwith
AdvantageCompanies,acompanythatwasalreadytradingonNasdaq.Bytheendof1993,LDDS
wasthefourth-largestlong-distancecarrierintheUnitedStates.AfterashareholdervoteinMay
1995,thecompanyofficiallybecameknownasWorldCom.
Thetelecommunicationsindustryevolvedrapidlyinthe1990s.Theindustry’sbasicmarket
expandedbeyondfixed-linetransmissionofvoiceanddatatoincludethetransportofdatapackets
overfiber-opticcablesthatcouldcarryvoice,data,andvideo.TheTelecommunicationsActof1996
permittedlong-distancecarrierstocompeteforlocalservice,transformingtheindustry’scompetitive
landscape.Companiesscrambledtoobtainthecapabilitytoprovidetheircustomersasinglesource
foralltelecommunicationsservices.
In1996,WorldComenteredthelocalservicemarketbypurchasingMFSCommunications
Company,Inc.,for$12.4billion.MFS’ssubsidiary,UUNET,gaveWorldComasubstantial
internationalpresenceandalargeownershipstakeintheworld’sInternetbackbone.In1997,
WorldComuseditshighlyvaluedstocktooutbidBritishTelephoneandGTE(thenthenation’s
second-largestlocalphonecompany)toacquireMCI,thenation’ssecond-largestlong-distance
company.The$42billionpricerepresented,atthetime,thelargesttakeoverinU.S.history.By1998,
WorldComhadbecomeafull-servicetelecommunicationscompany,abletosupplyvirtuallyanysize
businesswithafullcomplementoftelecomservices.WorldCom’sintegratedservicepackagesandits
Internetstrengthsgaveitanadvantageoveritsmajorcompetitors,AT&
TandSprint.Analystshailed
EbbersandScottSullivan,theCFOwhoengineeredtheMCImerger,asindustryleaders.6
In1999,WorldComattemptedtoacquireSprint,buttheU.S.JusticeDepartment,inJuly2000,
refusedtoallowthemergerontermsthatwereacceptabletothetwocompanies.Theterminationof
thismergerwasasignificanteventinWorldCom’shistory.WorldComexecutivesrealizedthatlarge-
scalemergerswerenolongeraviablemeansofexpandingthebusiness.aWorldComemployees
4Jeter,p.27.
5Jeter,p.30.
6CFOMagazineawardedSullivanitsCFOExcellenceawardin1998;
FortunelistedEbbersasoneofits“PeopletoWatch2001.”
2
notedthataftertheturndownoftheSprintmerger,“Ebbersappearedtolackastrategicsenseof
direction,andtheCompanybegandrifting.”b
CorporateCulture
WorldCom’sgrowththroughacquisitionsledtoahodgepodgeofpeopleandcultures.One
accountantrecalled,“Wehadofficesinplacesweneverknewabout.We’dgetcallsfrompeoplewe
didn’tevenknowexisted.”WorldCom’sfinancedepartmentattheMississippicorporate
headquartersmaintainedthecorporategeneralledger,whichconsolidatedinformationfromthe
incompatiblelegacyaccountingsystemsofmorethan60acquiredcompanies.WorldCom’s
headquartersforitsnetworkoperations,whichmanagedoneofthelargestInternetcarrierbusinesses
intheworld,wasbasedinTexas.ThehumanresourcesdepartmentwasinFlorida,andthelegal
departmentinWashington,D.C.
Noneofthecompany’sseniorlawyerswaslocatedinJackson.[Ebbers]didnotincludethe
Company’slawyersinhisinnercircleandappearstohavedealtwiththemonlywhenhefeltit
necessary.Heletthemknowhisdispleasurewiththempersonallywhentheygaveadvice—
howeverjustified—thathedidnotlike.Insum,Ebberscreatedacultureinwhichthelegal
functionwaslessinfluentialandlesswelcomethaninahealthycorporateenvironment.c
Aformermanageradded,“Eachdepartmenthaditsownrulesandmanagementstyle.Nobody
wasonthesamepage.Infact,whenIstartedin1995,therewerenowrittenpolicies