FMEA失效模式及其影响分析(3).ppt

FMEA失效模式及其影响分析(3).ppt

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1,FailureModeandEffectAnalysis失效模式及其影响分析,2,ModuleObjectives课程目的,DescribeFMEAprinciplesandtechniques.描述FMEA的法则及技巧。

Summarizetheconcepts,definitions,applicationoptionsandrelationshipswithothertools.摘要概念、定义、应用的选择和其他工具的关联。

PerformaFMEA执行一个FMEA。

3,FMEA:

FailureModesandEffectsAnalysisFMEAisasystematicapproachusedtoexaminepotentialfailuresandpreventtheiroccurrence.Itenhancesourabilitytopredictproblemsandprovidesasystemofranking,orprioritization,sothemostlikelyfailuremodescanbeaddressed.FMEA是用来检查潜在失效和预防它再次发生的系统性方法.它增强了我们预测问题的能力,并提供了一个排序或区分优先次序的系统,因而使得最可能的失效模式得以确定.FMEAisgenerallyappliedduringtheinitialstagesofaprocessorproductdesign.Brainstormingisusedtodeterminepotentialfailuremodes,theircauses,theirseverity,andtheirlikelihoodofoccurring.InSixSigma,weapplyFMEAtoknowfailuremodes.Ourmaininterestsarethecauseandlikelihoodofoccurrence,forwhichwehaveactualdataanddonotneedtorelyonbrainstorming.FMEA通常应用在工艺及产品设计的初期，自由讨论决定潜在失效的模式、原因、严重度及发生的可能性。

在6S中，我们应用FMEA去了解失效的模式。

我们主要感兴趣的是原因及发生的可能性。

FMEAisalsoavaluabletoolformanagingtasksduringdefect/failurereductionprojects.FMEA也是一个在失效缩小的管理任务的有价值的工具。

FMEA,4,DefinitionofFMEA定义,recognizeandevaluatethepotentialfailuremodesandcausesassociatedwiththedesigningandmanufacturingofanewproductorachangetoanexistingproduct.认识和评估新产品的设计和制造时或对现有产品做出改变时相关的潜在失效模式和原因identifyactionswhichcouldeliminateorreducethechanceofthepotentialfailureoccurring,确定消除或减少潜在失效发生机会的行动documenttheprocess.使过程形成文件,FMEAisasystematicdesignevaluationprocedurewhosepurposeisto:

是系统的设计评估程序,5,Failuretoperformadefinedfunction执行既定功能的失效Somethingoccurringthatyoudontexpect,orwant发生了你不希望或不想要的事情Wrongapplication应用错误,AFailureModeis.失效模式是,6,FMEAUsebyBlack/Brown/GreenBelts,ToidentifypotentialfailuremodesandratetheseverityoftheireffectsToidentifycriticalcharacteristicsandsignificantcharacteristicsTorankpotentialdesignandprocessdeficienciesTohelpallofusfocusoneliminatingproductandprocessconcernsandpreventproblemsfromrecurringReducetheproductdevelopmenttimingandcost,7,Background,Developedinearly60sbyNASAto“fail-proof”Apollomissions.Adoptedinearly70sbyUSNavy.Bylate80s,automotiveindustryhadimplementedFMEAandbeganrequiringsuppliersdothesame.Liabilitycostswerethemaindrivingforce.Usedsporadicallythroughoutindustryduring1980s.AdoptedbyMSIin?

SixSigmaisthecatalyst.,8,NASAusedFMEAtoidentifySinglePointFailuresonApolloproject（SPF=noredundancy&lossofmission）.Howmanydidtheyfind?

420andwethoughtwehadproblems!

9,TypesofFMEAs,SYSTEM,DESIGN,PROCESS,SystemFMEAisusedtoanalyzesystemsandsubsystemsintheearlyconceptanddesignstages.,DesignFMEAisusedtoanalyzeproductsbeforetheyarereleasedtoproduction,ProcessFMEAisusedtoanalyzemanufacturing,assemblyandadministrativeprocesses,10,WhenistheFMEAStarted?

“Dothebestyoucanwithwhatyouhave”,ASEARLYASPOSSIBLE!

Guideline:

11,WhentoStart?

Whennewsystems,productsandprocessesarebeingdesignedWhenexistingdesignsandprocessesarebeingchangedWhencarry-overdesignsorprocesseswillbeusedinnewapplicationsorenvironmentsAftercompletingaProblemSolvingStudy,topreventrecurrenceofaproblem,12,BeginningandEnd,13,EffectofFMEAonProcessandDesignchanges,DesignStart,Development,ProductionRelease,Production,Time,NoofEngineeringChanges,Traditionalapproach,FMEAapproach,14,ProcessFMEAForm,15,JLExample,16,ElementsofFMEA,FailureModeAnywayinwhichaprocesscouldfailtomeetsomemeasurableexpectation.EffectAssumingafailuredoesoccur,describetheeffects.Listseparatelyeachmaineffectonbothadownstreamoperationandtheenduser.SeverityUsingascaleprovided,ratetheseriousnessoftheeffect.10representsworstcase,1representsleastsevere.CausesThisisthelistofcausesand/orpotentialcausesofthefailuremode.OccurrenceThisisaranking,onascaleprovided,ofthelikelihoodofthefailureoccurring.10representsnearcertainty;1represents6sigma.InthecaseofaSixSigmaproject,occurrenceisgenerallyderivedfromdefectdata.CurrentControlsAllmeansofdetectingthefailurebeforeproductreachestheenduser,arelistedundercurrentcontrols.DetectionTheeffectivenessofeachcurrentcontrolmethodisratedonaprovidedscalefrom1to10.A10impliesthecontrolwillnotdetectthepresenceofafailure;a1suggestsdetectionisnearlycertain.,17,ProcessFailureMode,Thepotentialfailuremodeisthemannerinwhichtheprocesscouldfailtoperformitsintendedfunction.Thefailuremodeforaparticularoperationcouldbeacauseinasubsequent（downstream）operationoraneffectassociatedwithapotentialfailureinaprevious（upstream）operation.,FAILUREMODE,EFFECT,PREVIOUSOPERATION,CAUSE,NEXTOPERATION,18,ProcessCau