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ChapterIV

FunctionofPanels:

Art.11oftheDSU

OUTLINE

IIntroduction

IIApplicationofArt.11asaGeneralStandardofReview

IIIReviewin“neitherdenovonortotaldefence”

IVAllegationagainstPanels’StandardofReview

VExerciseofJudicialEconomy

ThefunctionofpanelsisexpresslydefinedinArt.11oftheDSU,whichreadsasfollows:

“ThefunctionofpanelsistoassisttheDSBindischargingitsresponsibilitiesunderthisUnderstandingandthecoveredagreements.Accordingly,apanelshouldmakeanobjectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeit,includinganobjectiveassessmentofthefactsofthecaseandtheapplicabilityofandconformitywiththerelevantcoveredagreements,andmakesuchotherfindingsaswillassisttheDSBinmakingtheremendationsoringivingtherulingsprovidedforinthecoveredagreements.Panelsshouldconsultregularlywiththepartiestothedisputeandgivethemadequateopportunitytodevelopamutuallysatisfactorysolution.”

ThisprovisionsuggeststhatthefunctionofpanelsistomakeanobjectiveassessmentsuchastoassisttheDSBinmakingtheremendationsoringivingtherulingsprovidedforinthecoveredagreements.However,howdopanelsfulfilltheirfunctionsasprovidedinArt.11oftheDSU?

Itistheissuethatwewilltouchoninthischapter.Inthischapter,theauthorexploresonthestandardofreviewissueundertheWTO,“anobjectiveassessment”;

aswellasontheexercisedjudicialeconomyprincipledevelopedinpanel’sreview.

Withregardtothestandardofreviewissue,theGATT/WTOdisputesettlementprocedureshaveincreasinglyconfrontedquestionsconcerningthedegreetowhichaninternationalbody,undertheGATT/WTO,should“secondguess”adecisionofanationalgovernmentagencyconcerningeconomicregulationsthatareallegedlyinconsistentwithaninternationalrule.Itseemsclearthattheinternationalagreementdoesn’tpermitanationalgovernment’sdeterminationalwaystoprevail,otherwisetheinternationalrulescouldbeeasilyevadedorrenderedineffective.Butshouldtheinternationalbodyapproachtheissuesinvolvedwithoutanydeferencetothenationalgovernment?

IthasbeenarguedintheGATT/WTOproceedingsthatpanelsshouldrespectnationalgovernmentdeterminations,uptosomepoint.That“point”isthecrucialissuethathassometimesbeenlabelledthe“standardofreview”.1

Ofcourse,thisissueisnotuniquetotheGATT/WTO.Naturally,thestandard-of-reviewissueisonethatmanylegalsystemsface.“Thestandard-of-reviewquestionisfacedatleastimplicitlywheneversovereignmembersofatreatyyieldinterpretiveanddisputesettlementpowerstointernationalpanelsandtribunals.Moreover,asnationaleconomiesbeeincreasinglyinterdependent,andastheneedforinternationalcooperationandcoordinationaccordingl

ybeesgreater,thestandard-of-reviewquestionwillbeeincreasinglyimportant.”2And“itcanbeseenthatthestandard-of-reviewquestionisarecurringanddelicateone,andonethattosomeextentgoestothecoreofaninternationalprocedurethatmust（inarule-basedsystem）assessanationalgovernment’sactionsagainsttreatyorotherinternationalnorms”.3

However,fortheimmediatepurpose,wewanttofocusbelowonthemoreparticularquestionoftheproperstandardofreviewforaWTOpanelwhenitundertakestoexamineanationalgovernment’sactionsorrulingsthatengagethequestionofconsistencywiththevariousWTOagreementsandaresubjecttotheDSUprocedures.

UndertheWTOjurisprudence,it’sdemonstratedthatArt.11oftheDSUhasbeenappliedasageneralstandardofreview.Art.11suggeststhatthefunctionofpanelsistomake“anobjectiveassessment”soastoassisttheDSBinmakingtheremendationsoringivingtherulingsprovidedforinthecoveredagreements.

Forexample,inUS-ShirtsandBlouses（DS33）,thePanelrulesthat,“althoughtheDSUdoesnotcontainanyspecificreferencetostandardsofreview,weconsiderthatArticle11oftheDSUwhichdescribestheparametersofthefunctionofpanels,isrelevanthere”.4

AndtheapplicationofArt.11asageneralstandardofreviewundertheDSUisanalyzedsystematicallyinEC-Hormones（DS26/DS48）wheretheAppellateBodyrulesthat:

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“Thefirstpointthatmustbemadeinthisconnection,isthattheSPSAgreementitselfissilentonthematterofanappropriatestandardofreviewforpanelsdecidinguponSPSmeasuresofaMember.NorarethereprovisionsintheDSUoranyofthecoveredagreements（otherthantheAnti-DumpingAgreement）prescribingaparticularstandardofreview.OnlyArticle（i）oftheAnti-DumpingAgreementhaslanguageonthestandardofreviewtobeemployedbypanelsengagedinthe‘assessmentofthefactsofthematter’.WefindnoindicationintheSPSAgreementofanintentonthepartoftheMemberstoadoptorincorporateintothatAgreementthestandardsetoutinArticle（i）oftheAnti-DumpingAgreement.Textually,Article（i）isspecifictotheAnti-DumpingAgreement.

[…]

Wedonotmean,however,tosuggestthatthereisatpresentnostandardofreviewapplicabletothedeterminationandassessmentofthefactsinproceedingsundertheSPSAgreementorunderothercoveredagreements.Inourview,Article11oftheDSUbearsdirectlyonthismatterand,ineffect,articulateswithgreatsuccinctnessbutwithsufficientclaritytheappropriatestandardofreviewforpanelsinrespectofboththeascertainmentoffactsandthelegalcharacterizationofsuchfactsundertherelevantagreements[…]”

Insum,forallbutoneofthecoveredagreements,Art.11oftheDSUsetsforththeappropriatestandardofreviewf

orpanels.Asstatedonmorethanoneoccasion,Art.11oftheDSU,and,inparticular,itsrequirementthat“apanelshouldmakeanobjectiveassessmentofthematterbeforeit,includinganobjectiveassessmentofthefactsofthecaseandtheapplicabilityofandconformitywiththerelevantcoveredagreements”,setsforththeappropriatestandardofreviewforpanelsexaminingtheconsistencyorinconsistencyofallegedmeasuresundertheWTOjurisprudence.AndtheonlyexceptionistheAgreementonImplementationofArticleVIoftheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade1994,inwhichaspecificprovision,Art.,setsoutaspecialstandardofreviewfordisputesarisingunderthatAgreement（tobediscussedinsubsequentchapter）.6

InEC-Hormones（DS26/DS48）,intheviewoftheEuropeanCommunities,“theprincipalalternativeapproachestotheproblemofformulatingthe‘properstandardofreview’sofaraspanelsareconcernedaretwo-fold.Thefirstisdesignatedas‘denovoreview’.ThisstandardofreviewwouldallowapanelpletefreedomtoetoadifferentviewthanthepetentauthorityoftheMemberwhoseactordeterminationisbeingreviewed.Apanelwouldhaveto‘verifywhetherthedeterminationbythenationalauthoritywas…correct（bothfactuallyandprocedurally）’.Thesecondisdescribedas‘deference’.Undera‘deference’standard,apanel,inthesubmissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,shouldnotseektoredotheinvestigationconductedbythenationalauthoritybutinsteadexaminewhetherthe‘procedure’requiredbytherelevantWTOruleshadbeenfollowed”.7Inthisrespect,theAppellateBodyrulesthat:

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“Sofarasfact-findingbypanelsisconcerned,theiractivitiesarealwaysconstrainedbythemandateofArticle11oftheDSU:

theapplicablestandardisneitherdenovoreviewassuch,nor‘totaldeference’,butratherthe‘objectiveassessmentofthefacts’.Manypanelshaveinthepastrefusedtoundertakedenovoreview,wisely,sinceundercurrentpracticeandsystems,theyareinanycasepoorlysuitedtoengageinsuchareview.Ontheotherhand,‘totaldeferencetothefindingsofthenationalauthorities’,ithasbeenwellsaid,‘couldnotensurean‘objectiveassessment’asforeseenbyArticle11oftheDSU’.”

Therulingisconfirmedonmanyotheroccasions.Forexample,thePanelonUS-Underwear（DS24）findsthat:

9

“Inouropinion,apolicyoftotaldeferencetothefindingsofthenationalauthoritiescouldnotensurean‘objectiveassessment’asforeseenbyArticle11oftheDSU.Thisconclusionissupported,inourview,bypreviouspanelreportsthathavedealtwiththisissue,andmostnotablyinthepanelreportonthe‘Transformers’case.

Thepanelinthe‘Transformers’casewasconfrontedwiththeargumentofNewZealandthatthedeterminationof‘materialinjury’bythepetentNewZealandinvestigatingauthor

itycouldnotbescrutinizedbythepanel.The‘Transformers’panelrespondedtothisargumentasfollows:

‘ThePanelagreedthattheresponsibilitytomakeadeterminationofmaterialinjurycausedbydumpedimportsrestedinthefirstplacewiththeauthoritiesoftheimportingcontractingpartyconcerned.However,thePanelcouldnotsharetheviewthatsuchadeterminationcouldnotbescrutinizedifitwerechallengedbyanothercontractingparty.Onthecontrary,thePanelbelievedthatifacontractingpartyaffectedbythedeterminationcouldmakeacasethattheimportationcouldnotinitselfhavetheeffectofcausingmaterialinjurytotheindustryinquestion,thatcontractingpartywasentitled,undertherelevantGATTprovisionsandinparticularArticleXXIII,thatitsrepresentationsbegivensympatheticconsiderationandthateventually,ifnosatisfactoryadjustmentwaseffected,itmightreferthemattertotheCONTRACTINGPARTIES,ashadbeendonebyFinlandinthepresentcase.Toconcludeotherwisewouldgivegovernmen