大学英语四级考试模拟试题Word格式.docx

大学英语四级考试模拟试题Word格式.docx

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（SkimmingandScanning）（15minutes）

Inthispart,youwillhave15minutestogooverthepassagequicklyandanswerthequestions.Forquestions1-7,markY（forYES）ifthestatementagreeswiththeinformationgiveninthepassage.N（forNO）ifthestatementcontradictstheinformationgiveninthepassage.NG（forNOTGIVEN）iftheinformationisnotgiveninthepassage.Forquestions8-10,completethesentenceswiththeinformationgiveninthepassage.

"

Theclimateproblemcanbyandlargebesolvediftheeighttotenlargestcountriesintheworldcanagreeoneffectiveclimatemeasures,"

saysProfessorJonHovi.

OneofthethemesatarecentclimateconferencearrangedbytheNorwegianresearchprogramRENERGIwashowwecanachieveaneffectiveinternationalclimateagreement.ProfessorofpoliticalscienceJonHoviattheUniversityofOsloandCICEROhasstudiedthistopicforyears.Hearguesthatalthoughtheinternationalcommunityfacesmanyobstaclesindealingwiththeclimateproblem,solutionsarepossible.

ContinuetheKyotoProcess?

HovidoubtswhetheranagreementthatwouldbasicallyextendtheKyotoProtocolforanothercommitmentperiodisthewaytogotoachievemoreeffectiveclimatecooperation.

TheKyotoProtocolhasbeendescribedasacautiousfirststep,onethatwillmakeitpossibleforotherstojoininlater.ButkeycountriesliketheUnitedStateshavelittleinterestinjoininganinternationalclimateagreementbasedontheKyotoProtocol,"

saysHovi.

Onesuggestionforincreasingtheinterestforothercountriestojointheclimatecooperationistolinktheclimateissuetootherareasofinternationalcooperation,suchastechnology,trade,ordevelopmentassistance.ButHovidoesnotbelievethatsuchissuelinkagewillbereliable.Forexample,itisnotinthebestinterestsoftheKyotocountriestounderminetheWorldTradeOrganization（WTO）byintroducingtraderestrictionsagainstcountriesthatdonotparticipateinKyoto—suchastheUnitedStates.Moreover,theWTO’snondiscriminationprinciplesmakeitdifficulttointroducetraderestrictionsagainsttheUnitedStatesandAustraliabutnotagainstdevelopingcountries,whichalsodonothavebindingemissionstargets.

Besides,historyshowsthatthiskindofpressurerarelyworksonasuperpowersuchastheUnitedStates,"

Anotherobstacleisthatdevelopingcountriesprotecttheirowneconomicdevelopment.TheywillnotacceptbindingemissionstargetsuntiltheUnitedStatesalsoreducesitsowngreenhousegasemissions.Atthesametime,theUnitedStatesisunwillingtoendangerthecompetitivenessofitsownbusinessandindustry,andthusdoesnotwishtoparticipateinaninternationalagreementthatdoesnotalsoincludethedevelopingcountries.

Toovercomethisparticularobstacle,weshouldfocusonclimatemeasuresthatdonotthreateneconomicdevelopment,"

advisesHovi.

TheUnitedStatesisalsodoubtfulabouttheUNsystem,andHovibelievesthatanalternativeinternationalclimateagreementshouldnotnecessarilybeputtogetherwithintheUNframework,astheKyotoProtocolis.

PointofDepartureinAmericanClimatePolicy?

Hovibelievesthatinthelongrun,awaytoreengagetheUnitedStatesmightbetobaseafutureclimateagreementonfederalU.S.climatepolicy.

TheUnitedStatesisoftenmorewillingtocooperatewhenitalreadyhasanationalpolicyinplace.Forexample,'

MontrealProtocolonSubstancesthatDepletetheOzoneLayer’inmanywaysrepresentedaninternationalextensionofaregulatoryframeworkthatalreadyexistedintheUnitedStates.ThusU.S.businessandindustryactedasapusherintheefforttobuildaninternationalagreement."

ButtheproblemwiththispolicyisthattherecurrentlyisnosimilarU.S.climatepolicyatthefederallevel.Whateverpolicyexistsisfragmentedandformativeatbest.

TheKyototargetsarecostlytomeet.Kyotothusdependsoneffectiveenforcement.TheenforcementmechanismthatwasintroducedthroughtheMarrakeshAccordsisprimarilybasedonasystemwherebycountriesthatdonotmeettheirtargetsduringthefirstcommitmentperiodaresanctionedbyhavingtoreduceevenmoreduringthesecondperiod.Theproblemisthatthereisnothingtostopanonobedientcountryfromputtingoffthisadditionalemissionsreduction—perhapsindefinitely.

Inaddition,innocentthirdpartiessufferwhenthesanctionsarecarriedout.Asapotentialbuyerofemissionspermitsandamajorexporteroffossilfuels,Norwaywillbeparticularlyhardhit,becausecarryingoutthepunishmentwillcausethepriceoffossilfueltogodownandthepriceofemissionspermitstogoup.Finally,whereasthecompliancesystemwillpunishacountrythatisamemberandreducesemissions,butfailstoreachitsemissionstarget,itprovidesnobasisforpunishingacountrythatdeclinestobeamemberanddoesnothingtoreduceitsemissions.Thus,thecompliancesystemisarguablyunfair.

Hovithinksthatinternationallyitispoliticallydifficulttoachieveaneffectiveenforcementmechanism.Forthisreason,itmaybeagoodideatofocusonanagreementthatdoesnotneedenforcement.

AnAgreementthatEveryoneWantstoBePartof?

ManyoftheproposedalternativestotheKyotoProtocolresembleKyotointhattheyrequireenforcement.Forexample,thisistrueforregionalclimateagreements,anagreementbasedonemissionsintensitytargets,andanagreementbasedonharmonizedcarbontaxes.Onetypeofagreementthatdoesnotdependonenforcementisanagreementwherethepartiescommittousingemissions-reducingtechnology.

Supplementedwithagreementsontechnologydevelopmentandtransfer,anagreementontheuseofemissions-reducingtechnologycansetconsistenttechnologystandardsinawaythatmakesitinthebestinterestofallcountriestoparticipate.Assumingthatnetworkexternalitiesexist—thatis,thecostsorbenefitsdependonwhetherornotothercountriesalsochoosethesametechnology—theneachcountrywillwanttousethesametechnologyastheothercountries.

Inshort,themorecountriesthatuseacertaintechnology,themoreattractiveitwillbeforotherstoswitchtothistechnology.Anagreementcanenablemany,orevenall,countriestoswitchtomoreclimate-friendlytechnologysimultaneously.

1.TheUSGovernmentrecentlyheldaclimateconferencewithathemeofhowaneffectiveinternationalclimateagreementcouldbeachieved.

2.TheUnitedStateshasgreatinterestinjoininganinternationalclimateagreementbasedontheKyotoProtocol.

3.Developingcountrieswon’tacceptbindingemissionstargetsuntiltheUnitedStatesreducesitsgreenhousegasemissions.

4.TheUnitedStatesisdoubtfulabouttheUNsystem.

5.ItisbelievedthatdevelopingcountrieswillbenefitmostfromtheKyotoProtocol.

6.TheKyotoProtocoldependsoneffectiveenforcementbecauseofthehighcoststomeetitstargets.

7.Internationally,itispoliticallydifficulttoachieveaneffectiveenforcementmechanism.

8.TheUnitedStates_______________whenitalreadyhasanationalpolicyinplace.

9.ManyoftheproposedalternativestotheKyotoProtocolresembleKyoto_____________.

10.Themorecountriesthat_________________,themoreattractiveitwillbeforotherstoswitchtothistechnology.

PartIIIListeningComprehension

（ReadinginDepth）（35minutes）

SectionA

Inthissection,youwillhear8shortconversationsand2longconversations.Attheendofeachconversation,oneormorequestionswillbeaskedaboutwhatwassaid.Boththeconversationandthequestionswillbespokenonlyonce.Aftereachquestiontherewillbeapause.Duringthepause,youmustreadthefourchoicesmarkedA）,B）,C）andD）,anddecidewhichisthebestanswer.

11.A）At9:

15.

B）At8:

45.

C）At9:

00.

D）At8:

15.

12.A）Anewdress.

B）Anewdepartmentstore.

C）Anewcar.

D）Anewhouse.

13.A）Inadoctor’soffice.

B）Inashoeshop.

C）Inanoffice.

D）Inahotel.

14.A）It’snotasgoodasitusedtobe.

B）It’sbetterthanitusedtobe.

C）It’sverybadnow.

D）It’sevenworsethanwhatpeoplesay.

15.A）Hewillfindapart-timejob.

B）Hewon’tfindapart-timejob.

C）Hehasalotofpocketmoney.

D）Hedoesn’twanttomakemoney.

16.A）Inthehospital.

B）Inthetheatre.

C）Onthebus.

D）Onthetaxi.

17.A）Hedidn’tknowtherewouldbeheavysnow.

B）Hedidn’tknowtherewouldbesomanycatsanddogsinthestreet.

C）Hedidn’tthinkitwouldrainsoheavily.

D）Heknewtherewouldbealotofcatsanddogsinthestreet.

18.A）Shedidn’twanttomove.

B）Shedidn’tmindmoving.

C）Shedidn’treplydirectly.

D）Shedidn’tunderstandwhatthemansaid.

Questions19to22arebasedontheconversationyouhavejustheard.

19.A）Avilla.

B）Anapartment.

C）Ahotel.

D）Alocalfamily.

20.A）About14days.

B）About5days.

C）About4days.

D）About3days.

21.A）InJuly.

B）InJune.

C）InMay.

D）InApril.

22.A）Thinkovertheprice.

B）Thinkabouttheplace.

C）Discusswithherfriends.

D）Askforanothertravelagency.

Questions23to25arebasedontheconversationyouhavejustheard.

23.A）Sendhimtheinformationonafter-salesservice.

B）Sendhimthebookletaboutthenewestcomputers.

C）Sendhimalistofsoftwareproduct